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The subject of this dissertation is the U. S. atomic intelligence effort against both Nazi 
Germany and the Soviet Union in the period 1942-1949. Both of these intelligence efforts 
operated within the framework of an entirely new field of intelligence: scientific intelligence. 
Because of the atomic bomb, for the first time in history a nation’s scientific resources – the 
abilities of its scientists, the state of its research institutions and laboratories, its scientific 
educational system – became a key consideration in assessing a potential national security threat. 
 Considering how successfully the United States conducted the atomic intelligence effort 
against the Germans in the Second World War, why was the United States Government unable to 
create an effective atomic intelligence apparatus to monitor Soviet scientific and nuclear 
capabilities? Put another way, why did the effort against the Soviet Union fail so badly, so 
completely, in all potential metrics – collection, analysis, and dissemination? In addition, did the 
general assessment of German and Soviet science lead to particular assumptions about their 
abilities to produce nuclear weapons? How did this assessment affect American presuppositions 
regarding the German and Soviet strategic threats? Despite extensive historical work on atomic 
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A “Curious Incident” 
 
  
In September 1949, the U.S. intelligence establishment was shocked to discover 
that the Soviet Union had detonated its first atomic bomb. Coming just four years after 
the United States had become the world’s first nuclear power, the Soviet atomic bomb 
was produced in half the time American intelligence had predicted. The consensus among 
the intelligence community, American scientists, the military, and the civilian political 
leadership had been that the earliest probable date for a Soviet atomic bomb was 1953. 
Somehow the Soviet Union had exceeded the expectations of American national security 
experts by almost four years.  
Compounding the confusion of U.S. leadership was the fact that, during the 
Second World War, American intelligence had engaged in an effort against Nazi 
Germany that had correctly assessed the status of the German atomic bomb program. The 
German program had been given considerable attention by American intelligence, yet 
despite the belief that the German atomic bomb project was significantly ahead of the 
progress of the American Manhattan Project, in 1944 U.S. intelligence discovered that 
the Germans would not develop an atomic bomb in time to affect the outcome of the war.  
Both of these intelligence efforts operated within the framework of an entirely 
new field of intelligence: scientific intelligence. For the first time in history a nation’s 
scientific resources – the abilities of its scientists, the state of its research institutions and 
laboratories, its scientific educational system – became a key consideration in assessing a 
potential national security threat. Information concerning a nation’s technological 
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capabilities had been a priority for U.S. intelligence organizations since the American 
Revolution. Yet scientific intelligence was a product of the Second World War and the 
development – and strategic implications – of the atomic bomb. The atomic bomb itself 
was a direct application of scientific theory to a weapon of war, the culmination of four 
decades of scientific research into the physics of the atom. Nuclear weapons, therefore, 
made intelligence about an enemy nation’s scientific abilities an integral part of strategic 
planning. It was no longer sufficient to know just the ramifications of an enemy’s 
deployed weapons systems or technological achievements. With the advent of a weapon 
of unprecedented destructive force, it became paramount to acquire information about an 
enemy’s scientists, research laboratories, universities, and overall scientific infrastructure 
in order to correctly assess the immenseness of dire strategic threat.  Such information 
was indeed crucial to national survival. 
Scientific intelligence also forced a change in thinking about intelligence 
collection and analysis. Other types of intelligence can base their collection and analysis 
efforts on tangible things: technological intelligence can look at an aircraft and calculate 
the air speed, payload, survivability; military intelligence can count tanks, troops, 
divisions; economic intelligence can determine industrial capability, monitor debt, 
calculate GDP. Yet scientific intelligence is primarily focused on future potential, on how 
the scientific abilities of a particular state might, at some point, threaten national security. 
In doing so, scientific intelligence takes general assessments of a nation’s scientific 
ability and presupposes that these findings are indicators of a potential strategic threat. In 
other words, assessments made about particular scientific research with strategic 
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applications – such as the ability to develop nuclear weapons – are extrapolated from 
general assumptions made about the totality of a nation’s scientific abilities. 
The subject of this dissertation is the U. S. atomic intelligence effort against both 
Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in the period 1942-1949.
1
 In 1942 American 
scientists began to fear the possibility that Germany would develop and deploy an atomic 
bomb before the Manhattan Project could build its own weapon. As a result, American 
scientists created an ad hoc organization for atomic intelligence, drawing upon their 
scientific contacts in Europe and their scientific experience to learn and discern what they 
could about the German atomic bomb program. In the summer of 1943 the U.S. 
Government authorized Manhattan Project director Brigadier General Leslie Groves to 
take complete control of all atomic intelligence-related operations. This action was a 
response to the acute fear of German scientific ability, the ineffectiveness of American 
scientists in collecting any actionable intelligence on their own, as well as the recognition 
that there were no existing intelligence organizations that could carry out such a difficult 
task. In doing so, the government gave Groves unprecedented power to centralize and 
consolidate intelligence functions.  
 A little over a year later, the decision to give Groves that responsibility paid off. 
The Manhattan Engineer District (MED - the formal name of the Manhattan Project) 
                                                          
1
 During the Second World War, American atomic intelligence made no considerable effort to collect 
information on atomic developments in Japan. There were several reasons Japan was dismissed as a 
potential atomic threat. First, it was believed that Japan did not have the necessary raw materials to 
produce an atomic weapon. Second, U.S. intelligence assumed that Japan did not have the necessary 
industrial capability for an atomic program on the scale needed to produce deployable atomic weapons. 
Third, while the American scientific community greatly respected their Japanese counterparts, the 
American scientists told the intelligence community that the qualified and capable Japanese atomic 
scientists were too few in number to allow Japan to produce an atomic bomb. Finally, unlike the situation 
in Germany, the Japanese had given U.S. intelligence no indications that they were interested in building 




intelligence team discovered evidence that strongly indicated that the German atomic 
bomb program was significantly behind that of the United States, and thus it was highly 
unlikely that Germany would have an atomic bomb before the end of the war. The MED 
intelligence effort against the Germans was successful because it excelled at all three 
aspects of what is known as the “intelligence cycle”: collection, analysis, and 
dissemination. Collection is the acquisition of information from a variety of sources such 
as human intelligence, signals intelligence, and imagery intelligence. Analysis is taking 
the raw data acquired by the collection effort and discerning its military significance. 
This is done through the creation of intelligence estimates, which assess the capabilities 
and intentions of a prospective opponent. Finally, dissemination is presenting this 
analysis to policymakers – and convincing them of its validity so that they can make use 
of it in the formation of national policies and strategies. A failure in any one aspect of the 
intelligence cycle means failure of the whole. 
 Leslie Groves’ intelligence organization collected a wealth of information from a 
variety of sources. His analysis contingent was highly capable and quickly transformed 
the collected information into a conclusive argument. As a result, although the American 
scientific, military, and political leadership had a deep-seated belief in the abilities of the 
German scientists, Groves’ intelligence system was effective enough to convince the 
American leadership that the German atomic program lagged behind that of the U.S. and 
that there would, as a consequence, be no German bomb.  
When the Second World War ended, the United States had a capable atomic 
intelligence organization that had achieved great success against the Germans. Yet in the 
early post-war period, its institutional foundations were dismantled along with much of 
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the rest of the American intelligence apparatus. Despite the knowledge gained through 
the German experience, the available trained intelligence personnel, and the existing 
atomic intelligence organization, atomic intelligence against the Soviet nuclear program 
was not an immediate priority. Although the U.S. atomic intelligence apparatus would 
later be rebuilt, the rebuilding process was not done with a sense of urgency. Instead, 
American scientific and intelligence leaders assumed they had ample time – years, 
perhaps even decades – to create an effective system before the Soviets could build a 
bomb. 
The result was an atomic intelligence system that failed in all three aspects of the 
intelligence cycle. Collection was done piecemeal, through a variety of intelligence 
organizations, and could not provide analysts with anything close to a complete picture of 
the status of the Soviet atomic program. Analysts, also strewn throughout the 
government’s intelligence community, made estimates that were based mainly on wild 
speculation of what they assumed the Soviet Union would and could do. In many cases 
these estimates were based solely on the American and German experiences, and not in 
any way based on actual information from the Soviet Union. As a result, both military 
and civilian policymakers were given the impression that the Soviet atomic program did 
not pose an immediate threat. Thus, a vicious cycle was created: the poor performance of 
American atomic intelligence meant the faulty estimates of the Soviet nuclear program 
would continue, thereby slowing any measures to improve the American atomic 
intelligence system. 
 This dynamic stands in deep contrast to the German experience, and it is what 
prompted this dissertation to pose the following historical questions: Considering how 
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successfully the United States conducted the atomic intelligence effort against the 
Germans in the Second World War, why was the United States Government unable to 
create an effective atomic intelligence apparatus to monitor Soviet scientific and nuclear 
capabilities? Put another way, why did the effort against the Soviet Union fail so badly, 
so completely, in all potential metrics – collection, analysis, and dissemination? In 
addition, did the general assessment of German and Soviet science lead to particular 
assumptions about their abilities to produce nuclear weapons? How did this assessment 
affect American presuppositions regarding the German and Soviet strategic threats? 
Despite extensive historical work on atomic intelligence, the current historiography has 
not adequately addressed these questions. 
First, historians have failed to acknowledge any continuity between the American 
intelligence effort against the Germans and the American intelligence effort against the 
Soviets.
2
 Prominent authors who have written about atomic intelligence in this period, 
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 For the American atomic intelligence effort against the Germans in the Second World War, the most 
notable works are Thomas Powers’ Heisenberg’s War, Richard Rhodes’ The Making of the Atomic Bomb, 
Jeffery Richelson’s Spying on the Bomb, David Irving’s The German Atomic Bomb, Boris Pash’s The ALSOS 
Mission, Robert Jungk’s Brighter Than a Thousand Suns, Samuel Goudsmit’s The History of Modern 
Physics, and Leslie Groves’ Now it Can be Told. Thomas Powers. Heisenberg's War: The Secret History of 
the German Bomb (New York, NY: Knopf, 1993), Richard Rhodes. The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New 
York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1986), Jeffery Richelson. Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence 
from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), David Irving. 
The German Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1967), Boris Pash. The Alsos Mission (New York: 
Award House, 1969), Robert Jungk. Brighter Than a Thousand Suns: A Personal History of the Atomic 
Scientists (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1958), Samuel Goudsmit. The History of Modern Physics, 
1800-1950, Volume I (Alsos) (New York, NY: Henry Schuman Inc., 1947), Leslie Groves. Now it Can be Told: 
The Story of the Manhattan Project (New York, NY: Da Capo Press, 1975). For further reading, see Jeremy 
Bernstein. Hitler’s Uranium Club: The Secret Recordings at Farm Hall (Woodbury, NY: American Institute of 
Physics, 1996),     L. R. David and I. A. Warheit. German Reports on Atomic Energy: Bibliography of ALSOS 
Technical Reports (YID-3030) (Oak Ridge, TN: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1952), Joseph Ermenc, ed. 
Atomic Bomb Scientists: Memoirs, 1939-1945 (Westport, CT: Meckler Corporation, 1989), James Phinney 
Baxter. Scientists Against Time (Boston: Atlantic-Little Brown, 1946), Vannevar Bush. Pieces of the Action 
(New York: William Morrow and Company, 1970), Arthur Compton. Atomic Quest: A Personal Narrative 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), Allen Dulles. The Craft of Intelligence (New York: Signet Books, 
1965), R. V. Jones. The Wizard War: British Scientific Intelligence, 1939-1945 (New York: Coward, McCann 
& Geohegan, 1978), Leo James Mahoney. A History of the War Department Scientific Intelligence Mission 
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such as Jeffery Richelson, Richard Rhodes, and David Holloway, have written about the 
intelligence efforts independently of one another, as though they existed decades apart 
and did not include many of the same personnel and basic institutional foundations. 
Historians have constructed an artificial line of demarcation between the intelligence 
efforts, suggesting that the end of the Second World War ended one program, and 
immediately after another began. Clearly, this is not the case. The intelligence efforts 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(ALSOS), 1943-1945 [Dissertation] (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1981), Robert Norris. Racing for the 
Bomb: General Leslie R. Groves, the Manhattan Project’s Indispensable Man (South Royalton, VT: 
Steerforth Press, 2002), David Cassidy. Beyond Uncertainty: Heisenberg, Quantum Physics, and the Bomb 
(New York: Bellevue Literary Press, 2009), Victor Weisskopf. The Joy of Insight: Passions of a Physicist 
(New York, NY: Basic Books, 1991), Richard Hewlett and Oscar Anderson, Jr. The New World: A History of 
the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Volume 1, 1936-1946 (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1990), and Bar-Zohar. The Hunt for German Scientists (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1967) 
 
For the U. S. Government’s intelligence operation against the Soviet atomic program, there are equally 
important works, including Richard Rhodes’ Dark Sun, Jeffery Richelson’s Spying on the Bomb, American 
Espionage and the Soviet Target, and he Wizards of Langley, Herbert York’s Race to Oblivion, Lawrence 
Freedman’s U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, and David Holloway’s Stalin and the Bomb 
and The Soviet Union and the Arms Race. Richard Rhodes. Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), Jeffery Richelson. Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence 
from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), American 
Espionage and the Soviet Target (New York: Wm. Morrow, 1987), and The Wizards of Langley: Inside the 
CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), Herbert York. Race to 
Oblivion: A Participant’s View of the Arms Race (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), Lawrence 
Freedman. U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977), David 
Holloway. Stalin and the Bomb: the Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1994), and The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1983). For further reading, see P.M.S. Blackett. Atomic Weapons and East-West Relations (Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press, 1956), Allen Dulles. The Craft of Intelligence (New York: Signet 
Books, 1965), Thomas Cochran, Robert Norris, and Oleg Bukharin. Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin 
to Yeltsin (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), Steven Zaloga. Target America: The Soviet Union and the 
Strategic Arms Race, 1945-1964 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993), John Prados. The Soviet Estimate: U.S. 
Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength (New York: Dial Press, 1982), Michael Goodman. Spying 
on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb (Palo Alto: Stanford University 
Press, 2007), Woodrow Kuhns. Assessing the Soviet Threat: The Early Cold War Years (Washington, DC: 
Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1997), Clarence Lasby. Project Paperclip: 
German Scientists and the Cold War (New York: Atheneum, 1971), Michael Gordin. Red Cloud at Dawn: 
Truman, Stalin, and the End of the Atomic Monopoly (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), Gerald 
Haines and Robert Leggett, eds. Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet Union 
(Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2001), Tsuyoshi 
Hasegawa. Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2005), and Richard Hewett and Francis Duncan. Atomic Shield: A History of the United 





against the Germans and the Soviets, while varying in its effectiveness, was one single, 
continuous program, not programs. This was a process that developed from the inception 
of the first scientific intelligence effort of American scientists to the formalized 
intelligence organizations of the early Cold War. This dissertation will correct this 
misrepresentation in the historiography, and should force historians to reevaluate their 
treatment of atomic intelligence in the 1940s. 
  Historians have also taken it for granted that the closed system of the Soviet 
Union was invulnerable to even the most aggressive American atomic intelligence 
efforts. Because of this assertion, historians have not accounted for the enormity or 
breadth of the intelligence failure. To correct this faulty assumption, this dissertation 
draws upon the available relevant source material concerning the American atomic 
intelligence effort against the Germans and Soviets, and utilizes a wide variety of source 
materials, including archival sources, printed primary sources, personal papers, published 
memoirs, unpublished memoirs, institutional histories, transcripts of oral interviews, 
contemporary (1940s) journal and newspaper articles, and secondary works. In some 
instances, the dissertation offers a reinterpretation of documents that appear within the 
current historiography, but were misunderstood or misevaluated by historians who did 
not identify the continuity within the atomic intelligence program of the 1940s, or who 
did not appreciate that there was more to the failure of the U.S. intelligence effort against 
the Soviet Union than the effectiveness of Soviet counterintelligence. This dissertation 
will provide a comprehensive assessment of why U.S. atomic intelligence failed so 
completely against the Soviet Union. 
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 In addition, this dissertation will address another fundamental question that is 
missing from current historiography: How much of a role did centralization play in the 
effectiveness of the Manhattan Engineer District intelligence program? Another way of 
asking this same question is: What role did decentralization play in the inability of 
American atomic intelligence to predict accurately Soviet atomic capabilities? This 
question is closely related to the primary question, but in this specific form has modern-
day applications. The issue of centralization in intelligence was, and still is, at the 
forefront of the debate over the failure of the United States intelligence community to 
prevent the attacks of September 11, 2001. One of the main culprits of the intelligence 
failure was the uncoordinated character of the American intelligence effort. The security 
of the United States suffered because agencies could not work together. In response to the 
problems caused by decentralization, the United States Government created the position 
of the Director of National Intelligence, consolidating all American intelligence functions 
under one unified command. This dissertation investigates these same themes within 
atomic intelligence during the 1940s. 
  One of the most difficult aspects of any study of intelligence, particularly one that 
also deals with atomic weapons, is the issue of classification and secrecy. While it has 
been 70 years since the events in this work occurred, there are still documents that are 
unavailable to researchers due to their perceived importance to national security. 
Compounding this problem is the fact that many of the decisions of the American atomic 
intelligence organization were not recorded. Groves was especially careful when it came 
to security and very often would transmit orders via word of mouth alone. This was the 
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case for many of the highly secret missions of the MED intelligence team.
3
 In fact, there 
is no official document authorizing Groves to create his own intelligence organization. 
Chief of Staff George Marshall gave him verbal orders, in secret, and this oral agreement 
set in motion the creation of a formalized intelligence apparatus.
4
 What this means, in 
practice, is that this dissertation depends heavily on the memoirs and oral interviews of 
key personnel. While this is not a perfect solution by any means, memoirs and oral 
interviews can mitigate classification issues and can provide context to events that cannot 
be fully understood through the documentary record alone. The dissertation attempts to 
compensate for some of the problematical aspects of memoirs by using other sources to 




The first chapter, “A Reasonable Fear,” details the causes of the United States 
Government’s considerable apprehension about the German atomic bomb program. By 
1942 American progress in atomic development had made it apparent that atomic bombs 
were more than theoretical possibilities, they were practical certainties. That is to say, it 
was only a matter of time before someone built an atomic bomb. The problem for 
American scientists was that the Germans were believed to be significantly ahead of the 
Americans in atomic development. The estimates varied from a lead of six months to as 
much as two years, but all American scientists were united in their belief that the United 
States would have to make a serious effort to catch up to the Germans. Making matters 
                                                          
3
 Groves, p. 202 
4
 Ibid, p. 185-186 
11 
 
worse was the fact that most American scientists considered their German counterparts to 
be at least as good as, or perhaps even better, than the American scientists. Germany had 
been the center of the scientific world in the decades leading up to the Second World 
War, and German scientists had discovered many of the key scientific principles that 
surrounded atomic energy. In addition, it was understood that Germany had the necessary 
research institutions and industrial infrastructure to create and maintain an aggressive 
atomic bomb program. Finally, no one in the United States doubted that Adolph Hitler 
and the German High Command would readily support a research program that could 
give them access to the most powerful weapons system ever conceived. The Germans had 
the best scientists, a well-developed industrial system, widespread political support, and 
they had a significant head start. American scientists had reason to worry.      
The second chapter, “Making Something Out of Nothing,” discusses the creation 
of America’s atomic intelligence organization under the direction of Brigadier General 
Leslie Groves. At first, American scientists believed they could keep track of German 
atomic research developments on their own, and without the assistance of intelligence 
professionals. When this proved to be incorrect, and it became clear that the existing 
intelligence agencies (the Office of Strategic Services, the Office of Navy Intelligence, 
and Army Intelligence) also did not have the scientific capabilities for an effective atomic 
intelligence program, Leslie Groves was asked to intervene. Groves had all of the 
necessary qualifications: he and his subordinates not only possessed the necessary 
expertise about atomic energy, but they also had extensive experience with intelligence 
operations. This was a combination only Groves could provide, making him the natural 
choice to direct America’s first atomic intelligence organization. Immediately upon 
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taking command, Groves moved to consolidate and centralize his control over all aspects 
of atomic intelligence. He acquired the assurances of the heads of the other U.S. 
intelligence agencies that they would do all within their power to assist his mission. He 
moved his most trusted subordinates into the top management positions in his new 
organization, and exploited foreign sources of atomic intelligence to their fullest extent. 
By the time this centralization period ended, Groves’ organization had compiled target 
lists of the all the prominent Italian, French, and German nuclear scientists, their probable 
locations and activities, the locations of the key scientific laboratories and research 
centers, the locations of raw materials manufacturing plants, and the locations of the 
industrial centers that could process these materials into atomic bombs.      
The third chapter, “Alsos,” discusses the scientific intelligence mission sent to 
Europe to collect firsthand information about the German atomic project and to prevent 
its successful completion. Following in the footsteps of the Allied Armies, the 
intelligence mission to Europe, code-named “Alsos”, first arrived in Italy in December, 
1943. Comprised of a mixture of intelligence operatives and trained scientific personnel, 
the mission scoured Italy for clues about the German atomic bomb program. Although in 
the end they found very little of significance, the Alsos Mission had proven itself worthy 
of being given a second chance during the Allied invasion of France. Once there, Alsos 
made a number of important discoveries, none more so than the location of a town on the 
French-German border which would, after close inspection, hold the key to unlocking all 
of the secrets of the German atomic bomb program.    
The fourth chapter, “Transitions,” discusses the American atomic intelligence 
organization’s shift in focus from the German atomic bomb program to the atomic 
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research effort of the Soviet Union. After discovering a cache of documents left by 
German scientists who were fleeing the Allied advance, Alsos scientists were convinced 
that the German atomic bomb program was far behind that of the United States, and 
would not be a factor in the Second World War. Once it had successfully conveyed these 
facts to the American military and policymaking leadership, Alsos had completed its 
original mission. However, Alsos was kept in Europe and was directed to enter Germany 
to ensure that the Soviet Union did not gain access to German atomic resources. This 
meant capturing German scientists, occupying German research facilities and 
laboratories, and capturing German raw materials and industrial centers. In some cases, 
when it became apparent that Allied forces would not be able to reach certain areas of 
significance before Soviet forces arrived, Groves utilized the conventional forces of the 
U.S. Army and the covert forces of the OSS to destroy the resource to ensure it could not 
be of benefit to the Soviets.    
The fifth chapter, “Regression,” details the dismantling of the American atomic 
intelligence program following the conclusion of the Second World War. Although it was 
clear to most that the Soviet Union was intent on building its own atomic weapon, the 
American atomic intelligence program did not survive the general demobilization of the 
post-war United States. Groves’ MED intelligence team was disbanded, and while he 
kept a small intelligence analysis unit, the means for adequate intelligence collection and 
analysis were decentralized and scattered across the U.S. Government. Many of the 
personnel remained, and most of the organizations continued to exist in some form, but 
the effectiveness of American atomic intelligence was disrupted. During the late 1940s, 
American intelligence made a series of estimates for when the Soviet Union would build 
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their first atomic bomb. Based on supposition, speculation, and the American and 
German experiences, the estimates did not effectively evaluate the realities in the Soviet 
Union. Although this problem was widely acknowledged by the American scientific and 
intelligence leadership, most of the prominent people in power assumed that the United 
States had years to improve American atomic intelligence before the Soviets developed 
their own atomic weapon. From 1946 to 1949, the United States Government made an 
attempt to increase the capabilities of atomic intelligence through a succession of 
incremental actions that culminated in the formation of the CIA’s Office of Scientific 
Intelligence (OSI) in January 1949. In the end, however, OSI did not have the time to 
build an effective organization, and it was unable to replicate the success of the MED 
intelligence operation before the Soviets detonated their first atomic bomb in August, 
1949. 
The sixth chapter, “Whistling in the Dark,” discusses the reasons the United 
States Government did not consider the Soviet atomic bomb program an immediate 
national security threat. In contrast to their beliefs about German science, many American 
scientists and some within the civilian and military leadership regarded Soviet science as 
institutionally backward, and many of its scientists as intellectual inferiors. This was 
particularly true among those in the political leadership and among many of the younger 
American atomic bomb scientists. Other key players in American leadership, including 
Leslie Groves, argued that the Soviet Union did not have the industrial capabilities to 
manufacture an atomic bomb in less than 20 years. Conscious of the industrial effort 
needed by the United States to build their bombs, and aware of the industrial strength of 
Nazi Germany, who still could not build an atomic bomb, Groves assumed the Soviets 
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were decades away from a deployable weapons system. Finally, there were some within 
American scientific leadership who believed that the Soviet system was incompatible 
with the kind of science necessary to make this revolutionary weapon. Again using the 
Nazi failure to build a bomb, but in this case ascribing that failure to the German 
totalitarian system of government, which they believed to be analogous to the Soviet 
system, the proponents of this theory argued that the rigidity of the Soviet system would 
prevent a Soviet bomb from being developed in a short time period. Regardless of the 
reasoning (whether it was an indictment of Soviet science, Soviet industry, or the Soviet 
system), the people in the positions of power in the United States almost universally 
assumed they had time to build an effective atomic intelligence system, and do so before 




 The author of this dissertation, like all authors must do, has made deliberate 
decisions regarding what subjects and specific information to include and exclude. When 
the leadership of the United States calculates the potential nuclear threat of a foreign 
power it takes into consideration a myriad of intelligence factors. These include political 
intelligence – the willingness of political leadership to use their nuclear arsenal; 
technological and industrial intelligence – the capability of an enemy nation to produce 
weapons in significant numbers enough to make a decisive impact; economic intelligence 
– the capability of a foreign power to divert the resources necessary to the maintenance of 
a nuclear program; intelligence about delivery systems – the ability of an enemy to 
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transport the atomic bombs to American territory; and, of course, scientific intelligence. 
This dissertation will not include, or will discuss only tangentially, intelligence factors 
other than scientific intelligence.  
The reasons for this are twofold. First, historiographically scientific intelligence is 
by far the least studied of these factors. There is a wide gap in the literature that needs to 
be addressed. Second, while these other factors are important to determine nuclear threats 
in the long run, scientific intelligence, at least in the specific case study of the 1940s, was 
the prerequisite for all other types of intelligence. That is to say, in the scientific 
intelligence efforts against both the Germans and the Soviet Union, the scientific abilities 
of those nations was first determined before anything else was seriously considered. This 
was understandable: it made very little sense for the United States to expend resources 
pondering the Soviet political leadership’s opinion on nuclear weapons or the Soviet 
Union’s ability to deliver such weapons if first it had not been established that the Soviets 
had the basic capabilities to make atomic bombs. This fact makes scientific intelligence 
the foundation of all other intelligence relating to the nuclear threat on the United States. 
Finally, historians of intelligence may balk at this dissertation’s conflation of the 
concept of “intelligence,” and may argue that this dissertation oversimplifies the 
complexity of intelligence operations. Admittedly, this dissertation uses the term 
“intelligence” without differentiating between open and closed sources of intelligence 
information. Nor does it distinguish (at least significantly so) between human intelligence 
(HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and imagery intelligence (IMINT – in this 
time period usually provided by aerial reconnaissance). This is deliberate, although not 
because the author of this dissertation intends to minimize the importance of these 
17 
 
distinctions. Instead, this study intends to focus primarily on the process of the 
establishment of an American intelligence apparatus. This does not mean ignoring the 
individual elements that comprise this apparatus, but it does mean maintaining the 
emphasis of the dissertation on process and organization. Entire dissertations could be 
written on the development of cryptographic technologies for breaking Soviet codes, or 





A Reasonable Fear 
 
For the whole world was flaring then into a monstrous phase of destruction. Power after 
Power about the armed globe sought to anticipate attack by aggression. They went to war 
in a delirium of panic, in order to use their bombs first. China and Japan had assailed 
Russia and destroyed Moscow, the United States had attacked Japan, India was in 
anarchistic revolt with Delhi a pit of fire spouting death and flame; the redoubtable King 
of the Balkans was mobilising. It must have seemed plain at last to every one in those days 
that the world was slipping headlong to anarchy. By the spring of 1959 from nearly two 
hundred centres, and every week added to their number, roared the unquenchable crimson 
conflagrations of the atomic bombs, the flimsy fabric of the world’s credit had vanished, 
industry was completely disorganised and every city, every thickly populated area was 
starving or trembled on the verge of starvation. Most of the capital cities of the world were 
burning; millions of people had already perished, and over great areas government was at 
an end. 






The idea for the militarization of atomic energy was realized gradually, beginning 
in the early twentieth century. New Zealand-born British experimental chemist and 
physicist Ernest Rutherford and his partner, British radiochemist Frederick Soddy, sought 
to build upon the discovery of radioactivity by French scientists in the 1890s. In a series 
of experiments conducted in 1902 and 1903 at McGill University in Montreal, Rutherford 
and Soddy
2
 demonstrated that the energy contained in an atomic reaction was hundreds 
of thousands, or even a million, times the energy contained in a chemical reaction of the 
same mass.
3
 “These considerations,” Soddy wrote of their discovery, “force us to the 
conclusion that there is associated with the internal structure of the atom an enormous 
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store of energy which, in the majority of cases, remains latent and unknowable.”
4
 Of 
course, at the time no one had the slightest idea of how to affect the release of this 
energy. In fact, most scientists thought the possibility of such a release would be 
prohibitively difficult to achieve, if not scientifically impossible. Until a more complete 
understanding of the structure and properties of the atom could be known, atomic energy 
would remain only a hypothetical construct. 
Between 1904 and 1911, Rutherford systematically investigated these structures 
and properties, culminating in a groundbreaking 1911 discovery that would dramatically 
shift the scientific paradigm of atomic physics. In a paper he presented to the Manchester 
Literary and Philosophical Society, Rutherford announced that the universally-held belief 
that the entire mass of the atom, including all of its positive and negative charge, was 
contained in a single structure (the so-called “plum pudding” model of the atom)
5
, was 
now obsolete. Instead, Rutherford explained that the atom had a small, massive nucleus 
surrounded by a cloud of orbiting electrons, and this nucleus contained nearly all the 
mass of the atom (over 99.9%), and thus nearly all its energy. 
Rutherford’s discovery clearly demonstrated that the future of atomic physics 
rested in the dissection of the nucleus, and a complete understanding of its parts. During 
the 1920s and early 1930s, scientists in Europe and the United States studied the nuclei of 
atoms of various elements. This enterprise was significantly aided by the discovery, in 
1932, of the neutron by a student of Rutherford’s, British physicist James Chadwick. 
Chadwick, who received the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1935 for this discovery, first began 
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to look for the neutron due to an apparent discrepancy between an elements atomic 
number and its atomic weight. The atomic number is the count of the protons in an 
element’s nucleus (hydrogen has one proton so its atomic number is one, silver has 47 
protons and its atomic number is 47, and so on up and down the periodic table), and 
atomic weight is a measurement of the mass of an atom (which includes the mass of 
protons, electrons, and anything else that may be present inside of an atom). The problem 
Chadwick looked to solve was the fact that the atomic number was different, sometimes 
radically different, from the atomic weight. For example, helium’s atomic number is 2, 
but its atomic weight is 4; oxygen’s atomic number is 8, but its atomic weight is 16; 
uranium’s atomic number is 92, but its atomic weight is 238. Electrons contribute very 
little to the atomic mass. Nearly all the mass of an atom is contained in the nucleus, and if 
the nucleus only consisted of protons, what then accounts for the significant 
discrepancies in atomic weights? Chadwick’s answer was the neutron, a subatomic 
particle with the relative mass of a proton, but with no electric charge. 
The advantages of this newly discovered subatomic particle were immediately 
evident to scientists studying atomic physics. Before the neutron, scientists who wished 
to investigate the nucleus could bombard it with protons or alpha particles (essentially 
helium atoms) in the hope that this assault would force some kind of physical reaction 
within the nucleus. The problem with this method is that both the tools used for 
bombardment (protons and alpha particles) and the nucleus itself are positively charged. 
This means that in order to penetrate the electrical barrier of the nucleus, the protons or 
alpha particles would need to be accelerated to very high speeds and would have to 
contain an enormous amount of energy to successfully enter the nucleus. This process 
21 
 
was extremely expensive, and until the later spread of high-energy physics in the late 
1930s and 1940s, was prohibitively difficult for most experimental scientists.
6
 
The neutron was as massive as a proton, but had no electrical charge. It could 
enter a nucleus at much lower speeds and with much less expenditure of energy, making 
it an effective and universally available tool for nuclear exploration.
7
 American physicist 
I. I. Rabi, the 1944 Nobel laureate who worked on radar and the atomic bomb for the 
United States in the Second World War, describes the advantages of the neutron: “When 
a neutron enters a nucleus, the effects are about as catastrophic as if the moon struck the 
earth. The nucleus is violently shaken up by the blow, especially if the collision results in 
the capture of the neutron. A large increase in energy occurs and must be dissipated, and 
this may happen in a variety of ways, all of them interesting.”
8
 
One prominent scientist who immediately understood the revolutionary 
consequences of the discovery of the neutron was Hungarian-born physicist Leo Szilard. 
After the First World War, Szilard left Hungary in order to study atomic physics under 
Albert Einstein, Max Planck, and Max von Laue in Berlin. After receiving his doctorate 
in 1923, Szilard worked as an assistant to von Laue and worked on a series of inventions 
he patented individually or with his collaborative partner, Albert Einstein.
9
 In 1933 he 
moved to London, where he heard of the discovery of the neutron, and had his first true 
revelation about the atomic nucleus. It occurred to him that if scientists could find an 
element which is split by one neutron and which would then emit at least two neutrons, 
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then this element could sustain a nuclear chain reaction.
10
 On March 12, 1934, Szilard 
applied for his first patent on the chain reaction, entitled “Improvements in or Relating to 
the Transmutation of Chemical Elements.”
11
 He followed this with two amendments to 
the patent, dated June 28 and July 4, 1934. It is here that he took the next step: the 
liberation of energy from a chain reaction. Szilard argued that if he could find an element 
in which he could create a self-sustaining chain reaction, and if he could assemble this 
element in a critical mass, then in his words, “I can produce an explosion.”
12
 
Despite this huge step, Szilard still did not have answers to the vast majority of 
questions scientists would face between this point and the successful creation of the 
atomic bomb a decade later. In fact, he still did not know what element would be best for 
producing a self-sustaining chain reaction. It would be physicist Enrico Fermi’s Italian 
team in Rome that would determine that uranium, more than any other element, was the 
key to harnessing the untapped energy of the nucleus. Beginning in early 1934, the Fermi 
team systematically experimented through the elements on the periodic table. As a result 
of their experiments, Fermi concluded that heavier elements, like uranium, captured 
neutrons and became heavier isotopes of themselves, and even in some cases, transmuted 
into heavier, entirely different elements. Thus, Fermi argued that uranium, when 
bombarded with neutrons, became a man-made element, atomic number 93, called a 
transuranic element. For this discovery, Fermi was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1938.
13
 
Fermi’s experiments would end up being some of the most groundbreaking 
discoveries of atomic physics, but interestingly not for the reasons anyone would have 
                                                          
10
 The two neutrons could then hit other nuclei, releasing two more neutrons in the process, and so on. 
11
 Rhodes, p. 203 
12
 Leo Szilard. The Collected Works: Scientific Papers (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1972), p. 642; Rhodes, p. 
214 
13
 Rhodes, 212 
23 
 
believed in early 1938 when Fermi’s Nobel was awarded. Enrico Fermi’s conclusion that 
neutron bombardment led to transuranic elements was proven incorrect in late 1938, 
when the German team of Otto Hahn, Lise Meitner, and Fritz Strassmann, in an attempt 
to build upon Fermi’s discoveries, instead found a far different, and far more momentous, 
experimental result. As a result of their experiments, they argued that uranium did not 
become a heavier element when it captured a neutron, but it instead split into two smaller 
elements. The Germans had discovered nuclear fission, and they immediately understood 
the implications. 
When a uranium atom splits, perhaps (as one of several possibilities) into a 
lanthanum atom and a bromine atom (as elements 57 and 35 respectively), the resulting 
elements’ combined atomic weight is not the same as the atomic weight of the original 
uranium atom (lanthanum’s atomic weight is 138.91, and bromine’s is 79.9, for a total of 
218.81. The atomic weight of a uranium atom is, depending on the isotope, 235 or 238). 
The missing mass doesn’t just vanish into the ether, it is released as energy. While the 
energy released from a single atom’s fission is not significant, it is important to 
understand that in each gram of uranium, there are 2.5 x 10
21
 atoms, and that it would 
most likely require several kilograms of uranium in order to achieve the critical mass 
necessary to create a self-sustaining chain reaction (and a bomb).
14
 Thus the discovery of 
fission proved, at least in theory, that immense energy could be released through a 
nuclear reaction. 
News of the German breakthrough, announced on December 17, 1938, spread 
quickly around the world, and by January, 1939, was the principal topic of conversation 
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in physics faculties at universities throughout the United States. The historian/journalist 
Richard Rhodes described the impact of the announcement of fission on American 
scientists in his book The Making of the Atomic Bomb. Rhodes writes that, within a week 
of hearing of the discovery of fission, Robert Oppenheimer had drawn a basic schematic 
of an atomic bomb in his Berkeley office. Enrico Fermi, who by this time had immigrated 
to the United States, is revealed to have remarked that a baseball-sized atomic bomb 
could destroy an urban area the size and density of Manhattan. “A little bomb like that,” 
Fermi said, “and it would disappear.”
15
 
Leo Szilard, who in 1938 had come to the United States to conduct research at 
Columbia University in New York, felt it was a matter of great urgency to convey to the 
United States Government the implications of this new discovery. Although he was well-
respected within the scientific community, Szilard knew that he did not have the prestige 
or necessary name recognition in order to convince the government to pay attention. He 
did, however, know someone who could get his message to the highest levels of the 
American leadership: his old friend and invention partner Albert Einstein. In the summer 
of 1939, Szilard convinced Einstein to sign a letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
written by Szilard but in Einstein’s name, explaining the dangers and opportunities 
provided by the discovery of fission. In the August 2, 1939 letter, Szilard wrote that “the 
new phenomenon would also lead to the construction of bombs, and it is conceivable – 
though much less certain – that extremely powerful bombs of a new type may thus be 
constructed. A single bomb of this type, carried by a boat and exploded in port, might 
very well destroy the whole port together with some of the surrounding territory.” 
Additionally, Szilard recommended that “in view of this situation you may think it 
                                                          
15
 Rhodes, 274-275 
25 
 
desirable to have some permanent contact maintained between the Administration and the 
group of physicists working on chain reactions in America. One possible way of 
achieving this might be for you to entrust with this task a person who has your confidence 
and who could perhaps serve in an official capacity.” This individual might be tasked 
with coordinating with government agencies and providing funds to university and 
industrial research laboratories. The letter ended with a warning that the Germans had 
already begun research and might soon become dangerously ahead of the United States.
16
 
The letter was delivered to the President later that month. Yet, despite President 
Roosevelt’s agreement with the basic implications of the 1939 Szilard/Einstein letter, the 
American atomic bomb program made little progress in its first three years. Roosevelt’s 
sole action after learning of the German threat was to appoint an advisory committee 
under the chairmanship of the director of the Bureau of Standards, Lyman Briggs. The 
Uranium Committee, or sometimes called the Briggs Committee, was made up of 
representatives from the Bureau of Standards and the armed forces. It met occasionally 
during the subsequent months, consulting with American scientists about the feasibility 
of both atomic power and atomic weapons. According to General Leslie Groves, the 
future head of the Manhattan Project, “on the basis of these discussions, the committee 
recommended that the Army and Navy make available a modest sum for the purchase of 
research materials.”
17
 Most of the work was to be conducted by universities and private 
institutions, funded by the military and then later, after June 1940, by the newly-created 
National Defense Research Committee (the NDRC was placed under the leadership of 
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Vannevar Bush, and after its creation the Uranium Committee became one of its 
subcommittees). Groves estimated that more than two years after the letter to Franklin 
Roosevelt (by November 1941), the United States Government had spent only about 
$300,000 on projects related to atomic fission research.
18
 
In their book detailing the first years of the Atomic Energy Commission, Richard 
Hewlett and Oscar Anderson, Jr. argue the American atomic bomb program faced serious 
difficulties from the beginning: 
Fundamentally, the trouble was that the United States was not yet at 
war. Too many scientists, like Americans in other walks of life, 
found it unpleasant to turn their thoughts to weapons of mass 
destruction. They were aware of the possibilities, surely, but they 
had not placed them in sharp focus. The senior scientists and 
engineers who prepared the reports that served as the basis for 
policy decisions either did not learn the essential facts or did not 
grasp their significance. The American program came to grief on 
two reefs – a failure of the physicists interested in uranium to point 




In November of 1941, with American entry into the war imminent, Bush decided 
he needed to press the issue. He reassigned the Uranium Committee to the Office of 
Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) and established a planning board to study 
the engineering of facilities for the production of atomic weapons. That same month, the 
U.S. National Academy of Sciences created a committee to investigate the difficulties 
associated with an atomic bomb project. They sent a report to Roosevelt on November 
27, 1941, that detailed the research taking place throughout the country. As a result of the 
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report, Roosevelt authorized the creation of the S-1 Committee on December 6, 1941, 
which included Bush, Chair of the Physics Department and the Dean of the Division of 
Physical Sciences at the University of Chicago Arthur Compton, Lyman Briggs, 
University of California, Berkeley physicist Ernest Lawrence, and President of Harvard 
University and chemist James Conant. Over the next six months, progress was made 
toward a viable atomic weapons program in American university laboratories, yet by the 
summer of 1942 no significant mass-scale production had yet occurred (the Manhattan 
Project under the Army Corps of Engineers would not be created until August 1942). 
American atomic research in 1942 was still in the basic science, small-scale laboratory 
research phase. 
The progression of the German atomic bomb program was in many respects 
similar to its American counterpart. The German government created their own 
committee on uranium, called the Uranverein (or Uranium Club) to study the properties 
and potential military applications of fission. The Uranverein included such prominent 
German scientists as Otto Hahn, Werner Heisenberg, and Paul Harteck, as well as some 
of the government’s leading scientific advisors. The Uranverein convinced the Nazi 
regime to provide funds for research and assigned research projects to universities and 
research institutions throughout Germany (like the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, the Reich 
Research Council and the Reich Ministry of Education).
20
 
However, by the summer of 1942, just when the United States was about to 
accelerate its own atomic production with the creation of the Manhattan Project, the 
Germans were ending any serious effort to build atomic weapons. In June, the German 
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Uranium Committee had decided that the separation of uranium isotopes was too difficult 
a project to undertake during wartime, and instead shifted their fission research to the 
development of nuclear reactors for powering ships.
21
 Hitler, knowing nothing about the 
American and British atomic programs, concluded atomic weapons would not be 
available in time to affect the current war. He thus decided to concentrate German 
financial resources on developing the V-1 and V-2 rockets to attack Great Britain, 
weapons systems he believed could have a more immediate effect.
22
 According to the 
director of the German atomic bomb program: 
The total amount which was spent in nuclear research was in the order of 5 million 
marks or so, not more than that. For the rocket business perhaps 200 or 300 million 
marks was spent during the war…I would say it was much less than the factor of one 
tenth; maybe a twentieth or a thirtieth, or less…It has been said that more money was 
spent on the [American scientific intelligence mission to discover the status of the 





Of course, scientists and government officials in the United States had no idea 
these decisions were being made in Germany. They assumed the Germans were 
vigorously pursuing an atomic weapons capability. In hindsight, the fear of the Germans 
in the atomic field appears irrational, even paranoid. Yet, at that moment, in the summer 
of 1942, there were several factors that made the American concern about the German 
atomic bomb program reasonable. Each of these reasons, when taken individually, were 
cause for anxiety within the American scientific community. Taken collectively, 
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however, they produced a sense of near-panic, and impelled American scientists and their 
government to create a remarkably sophisticated and energetic system of scientific 
intelligence. 
First, there was a widely held belief among American scientists that the German 
atomic bomb program had a significant head start over that of the United States. Arthur 
Compton addressed this problem: “But at best I do not see how we can catch up with the 
Germans unless they have overlooked some possibilities that we recognize, or unless our 
military action should delay them.”
24
 Estimates varied, from a minimum of six months to 
a maximum of two or even three years, but a consensus was reached among the U.S. 
scientific community: the Americans were far behind the Germans in fission research. 
Evidence of German activity had begun to arrive in the United States in the 
summer of 1939. American scientists returning to the United States from Europe that 
summer reported a coordinated and intensive research program, centered at the Kaiser 
Wilhelm Institute in Berlin, focusing on the separation of uranium isotopes. According to 
the American scientists, a large group of prominent German physicists and chemists were 
working on mastering the thermal diffusion method of separating the U-235 isotope from 
the significantly more concentrated U-238. Uranium isotope separation was considered 




In June 1939, German physicist Siegfried Flügge published an article in the 
German scientific journal Die Naturwissenschaften titled, “Can the Energy Contained in 
the Atomic Nucleus Be Exploited on a Technical Scale?” Flügge discussed the 
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implications of fission and hypothesized that fission research could lead to atomic 
weapons. This journal was not only available in Germany, but also Britain and the United 
States as well. If anyone had missed the Die Naturwissenschaften article, in mid-August 
1939, Flügge published a more accessible version of his argument in the widely-read 
German newspaper Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. Together, these articles clearly 




Troubling intelligence also came in from émigré Peter Debye. Debye was a Dutch 
physicist, a 1936 Nobel laureate, and former director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for 
Physics in Berlin (succeeding Albert Einstein). He arrived in the United States in January 
1940 and proceeded to tell American scientists that he had left Germany because he had 
been “forced out of his institute and was not allowed to know what was going on in it.” 
However, Debye “did observe that practically every person in Germany who knew 




A final source of information about German science and their interest in atomic 
fission that would influence American scientists in the summer of 1942 came in through 
what became to be known as the “scientific underground.” This term refers to a loose 
consortium of European scientists who had remained in Europe during the war, opposed 
the Nazi regime, and who covertly passed along information about German scientists to 
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their American, British, or émigré colleagues. Leo Szilard provided some information 
from the scientific underground. He explained that in September 1941, his friend Dr. 
John Marshall had given him alarming news from Germany. Szilard wrote that “a son of 
[German physicist Friedrich] Dessauer who arrived from Switzerland told Marshall that 
according to his information the Germans got a chain reaction going.”
28
 If accurate, this 
was alarming since it would still be more than a year before the Americans would 
achieve their own self-sustaining chain reaction. To Szilard, and many of his American 
colleagues, this indicated that the Germans were significantly ahead. 
Second, Germany had (or had acquired through conquest) all the necessary 
facilities, materials, and industrial infrastructure needed to initiate a successful atomic 
bomb project. No one in the United States doubted the might of German industry. If the 
Germans had dedicated a significant proportion of their industrial resources to an atomic 
bomb project, American scientists were convinced they would be successful. Germany 
was also the home of many of the world’s greatest scientific laboratories, including the 
Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes for Physics and Chemistry in Berlin, but also the university 
laboratories at the Universities of Gottingen, Leipzig, Cologne, Hamburg, Giessen, 
Heidelberg, and Vienna (through the Anschluss). Each of these laboratories maintained 
state-of-the-art facilities for fission research, and thus were potential contributors to a 
German atomic bomb project. Additionally, the German military’s advance through 
Europe had given German scientists the use of what were arguably the most advanced 
laboratories on the Continent: Niels Bohr’s institute in Copenhagen, Denmark, and 
Frédéric Joliot-Curie’s laboratory at the Collége de France in Paris. Each of these 
laboratories had provided the Germans with a key piece of experimental technology 
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which they were previously lacking, and that was essential for any serious atomic bomb 
program: the cyclotron. 
The cyclotron was invented in 1932 by the American physicist Ernest Lawrence, 
eventually earning him the Nobel Prize in 1939. The machine accelerated charged 
subatomic particles (protons or alpha particles) to high speeds that enabled them to 
penetrate the nucleus of an atom and alter its atomic structure (hence its alternate names: 
particle accelerator and atom smasher). The cyclotron had many uses, the most important 
of which was that it allowed scientists to study nuclear reactions in an entirely novel way. 
By providing the means to bombard nuclei with positively-charged particles at high 
speeds and with high energy, the learning curve for discovering the secrets of atomic 
weapons would be considerably lower. Under the right circumstances, the cyclotron 
could even create fissionable artificial materials such as plutonium, otherwise 
inaccessible to the Germans without the possession of a working nuclear reactor. 
Of course, you need uranium to produce plutonium, and the Germans had as 
much of this element as it would need for any atomic bomb program. They acquired 
much of their uranium through the German conquest of Czechoslovakia, which brought 
them the most productive uranium mine in Europe at Joachimsthal, in the Ore Mountains 
of what is today the Czech Republic.
29
 While Joachimsthal was a key source of uranium, 
it paled in comparison to what Leslie Groves argued was the “most important source of 
uranium ore during the war years,” the Shinkolobwe Mine in the Belgian Congo.
30
 The 
Belgian firm Union Miniére had been mining Shinkolobwe throughout the 1930s, and 
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had shipped thousands of tons of uranium ore to Belgium. When the Germans invaded 
Belgium in 1940, some of that ore was smuggled out to Britain and the United States, but 




The Germans had also acquired through conquest a hydroelectric plant in Norway 
which produced a large quantity of a substance called “heavy water” (or D2O; D is 
Deuterium, an isotope of hydrogen with an atomic mass of 2 since it has a single neutron, 
thus “heavy”). Heavy water could be used as a moderator in a nuclear reaction. A 
moderator is a substance used to slow down the neutrons emitted in a fission reaction. If 
neutrons are moving too fast, they will not interact with the fissionable material in a way 
sufficient to produce a self-sustaining chain reaction. Slowing down a neutron gave it a 
better chance to interact with the particles inside the nucleus, thereby statistically 
increasing the chance of a successful reaction. The atoms of heavy water, or any other 
moderator like graphite or beryllium, slow neutrons by bumping into them and 
decreasing their velocity, thus increasing the probability for neutron absorption and, in a 
practical sense, reducing the amount of material needed to reach critical mass.
32
 
The American bomb program would eventually choose graphite as their 
moderator, but initially they entertained the use of a heavy water moderator. For many 
scientists in the United States, the advantages of heavy water as a moderator were 
obvious. However, they believed the time it would take to build the industrial 
infrastructure for producing an adequate supply of heavy water for an atomic bomb 
program was prohibitive. 
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This would certainly have been true for the Germans as well. But instead of 
having to build their own heavy water plant, in 1940 the Germans captured the Norsk 
Hydro plant in Rjukan, Norway, the only operational heavy water facility in Europe. At 
full capacity, the Norsk Hydro plant could easily produce enough heavy water for an 
aggressive atomic bomb program. In December 1941, American physical chemist Harold 
Urey brought news back from British sources that the Germans were manufacturing a 
substance called “heavy paraffin” from heavy hydrogen produced in Norway. According 
to Arthur Compton, “this could only be for a moderator for a fission reactor.”
33
 
Third, to the Americans, German science had long been considered the best in the 
world. German scientists were revered by many of their American counterparts as 
paragons of creative scientific accomplishment. The Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes in Berlin 
were the centers of worldwide physics and chemistry in the 1920s and 1930s. At one 
point in the 1920s, the directors of the various Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes included a roster 
of scientific giants: Albert Einstein (Physics), Fritz Haber (Physical Chemistry), and the 
future discoverer of fission Otto Hahn (Chemistry). A graduate student at any of the 
prominent German institutions could expect to receive instruction from such leading 
figures as Max Planck, Albert Einstein, Erwin Schrödinger, Max Born, Paul Ehrenfest, 
Arnold Sommerfeld, and Max von Laue. During the first half of the twentieth century, 
Germany won more Nobel Prizes in science than any other nation, most of them in 
physics and chemistry. Many of the leading Manhattan Project scientists had done their 
graduate or post-doctoral work in Germany, including Robert Oppenheimer, Hans Bethe, 
Edward Teller, Enrico Fermi, Wolfgang Pauli, and Victor Weisskopf, to name only a few 
of those working on the American atomic bomb. 
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Despite the mass emigration of Jewish scientists from Germany to Britain and the 
United States in the 1930s following Hitler’s rise to power, many outstanding scientists 
still remained in Germany, including several of the world’s most exceptional minds. The 
most important German scientist was undoubtedly Werner Heisenberg. After the war, 
Samuel Goudsmit, a Dutch-born American physicist and the future scientific chief of the 
American scientific intelligence mission to Europe in 1944-45 (see Chapters 3 and 4), 
would describe the American scientists’ perception of Heisenberg when the Second 
World War began: “To an outsider, a professor is a professor, but we knew that no one 
but Professor Heisenberg could be the brains of a German uranium project and every 
physicist throughout the world knew that.”
34
 Later in his book, Goudsmit would further 
clarify his feelings toward Heisenberg when he wrote, “he is still the greatest German 
theoretical physicist and among the greatest in the world. His contributions to modern 
physics rank with those of Einstein.”
35
 
Heisenberg was a prodigy. He was only 22 when he earned his PhD in physics 
under Arnold Sommerfeld in Munich. By 26 he was a Professor of Theoretical Physics at 
the University of Leipzig, and by 32 he was a Nobel laureate for his work on quantum 
theory. By the time of his 40
th
 birthday, he had been appointed the Director of the Kaiser 
Wilhelm Institute for Physics in Berlin, the premiere physics facility in Germany and 
perhaps worldwide, and what American scientists assumed would be the center of 
German atomic bomb research. 
Heisenberg’s meteoric rise to prominence began when his genius was recognized 
at an early stage in his scientific career. Sommerfeld was quick to identify Heisenberg’s 
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potential, particularly when the young German physicist was able in his first semester to 
work through a physics problem that had been unsolvable to physicists with two or three 
times the experience and education. In June of 1922, Sommerfeld took his prized student 
to meet Niels Bohr in Göttingen, during an annual series of talks given by the founder of 
atomic theory. These lectures were frequently attended by notable physicists throughout 
the world, and Bohr and the rest of the elite of the European scientific community were 
amazed when a young German graduate student directly questioned aspects of Bohr’s 
theories. Some professors were offended by Heisenberg’s presumption, but Bohr was not 
offended. “He had found a keen mind, a young person who could really understand 
quantum theory in depth, at a level beyond that of anyone else in the audience.” From this 
moment, Bohr and Heisenberg would become close friends and scientific collaborators.
36
 
After Heisenberg received his doctorate, he left Munich in 1924 to join Max Born 
in Göttingen. Born, a close associate of Einstein and one of the founders of quantum 
mechanics, like Sommerfeld saw the promise in Heisenberg, and the two of them, along 
with contributor Pascual Jordon, developed the matrix mechanics formulation of quantum 
mechanics in 1925, along with a number of other papers on quantum mechanics that 
furthered the development of quantum theory.
37
 A year later, Heisenberg moved to 
Copenhagen to be Bohr’s assistant at the Institute of Theoretical Physics and a lecturer at 
the University of Copenhagen. It was in Copenhagen that Heisenberg developed the 
principle that he is most known for today. In 1927 he proposed the idea that a particle’s 
momentum and its position could not be known simultaneously with precision, the so-
called Uncertainty Principle. It stated that the more precise a particle’s position is known, 
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the less precise its momentum can be calculated, and vice versa.
38
 Heisenberg’s theories 
revolutionized physics and would eventually allow for the development of modern 
electronics, including most of the computer-based products used today.
39
 
Heisenberg’s talents in theoretical physics were well appreciated by American 
and émigré scientists, but what truly worried the American scientific community were 
events that took place in the summer of 1939. Just as tensions in Europe were reaching 
their height, and as war seemed imminent, Heisenberg traveled across the United States, 
meeting with many of his old colleagues, some who had immigrated to the United States 
from Europe, others Americans who had studied in Europe during the 1920s and 1930s. 
At each stop, Heisenberg was urged to leave Germany and Hitler behind and take a 
teaching and researching position in the United States. 
At the University of Rochester in New York, Victor Weisskopf and Hans Bethe 
(who had come to Rochester from Cornell to speak with Heisenberg) prevailed upon 
Heisenberg to take a job in the United States. They told him that he could essentially 
choose where he wanted to live and teach, and any American institution would bend over 
backwards to open a faculty position for the brilliant German physicist. Eugene Wigner 
urged Heisenberg to take a job at Princeton, while physicist Isidor (I. I.) Rabi and George 
Pegram at Columbia University again extended an offer (Pegram had first offered 
Heisenberg a job in 1937). He spoke with a group of scientists at the University of 
Chicago and with Robert Oppenheimer at Berkeley, where he was met with similar 
requests and provided similar refusals. At the end of July, Heisenberg stayed for a week 
in the home of his friend Samuel Goudsmit, whom he had known since 1925, at the 
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University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. There he spoke at length with Goudsmit and 
Enrico Fermi, who had also known Heisenberg since the 1920s when they had met in 
Göttingen. In Michigan, both Goudsmit and Fermi expressed their belief that the United 
States offered the best opportunity for Heisenberg to continue his groundbreaking 
research. Once again, Heisenberg politely refused. 
What worried American scientists the most was Heisenberg’s reasons for 
returning to Germany. After speaking to him, most of the American scientists (and 
European émigrés) came to the same conclusion as to Heisenberg’s motives: he was a 
German nationalist at heart. His country needed him. Despite the ominous nature of the 
Hitler regime, Heisenberg would stay in Germany to ensure he could do whatever it took 
to help his country in the coming war. The greatest fear for scientists in the United States 
was that this would include the development of a German atomic bomb.
40
 
If Heisenberg had indeed decided to stay in the United States, the most dangerous 
scientist in Germany would have become the chemist Otto Hahn. According to Glenn 
Seaborg, “Hahn was the undisputed world leader in radiochemistry; his book Applied 
Radiochemistry [published in 1936] was my bible.”
41
 As described above, in 1938 Hahn, 
along with Lise Meitner and Fritz Strassmann, was the first to discover nuclear fission 
after bombarding uranium with neutrons. On December 22, 1938, Hahn sent the results to 
the journal Die Naturwissenschaften who announced to the world the revolutionary 
findings. In February of 1939, Hahn and Strassmann published a second article in Die 
Naturwissenschaften in which they predicted the release of additional neutrons during the 
fission process. Later proven correct by the French scientist Frédéric Joliot-Curie, Hahn’s 
                                                          
40
 Aczel, p. 131-132; Powers, p. 5-8; Weisskopf, p. 130 
41
 Glenn T. Seaborg. Adventures in the Atomic Age: From Watts to Washington (New York, NY: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 2001), p. 57 
39 
 
prediction served as the basis for the concept of a chain reaction, and ultimately for the 
atomic bomb. 
By this time, Hahn had already established himself as a giant in the field of 
chemistry. At the turn of the twentieth century, Hahn had discovered several isotopes of 
thorium (radiothorium, mesothorium I and II, and ionium) and was nominated for the 
Nobel Prize for his discovery of mesothorium I. In 1912 Hahn became head of the 
Radioactivity Department of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin, and was Director of 
the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Chemistry from 1928-1946. In 1924, Hahn was elected a 
full member of the Prussian Academy of Sciences in Berlin. His nominators for this 
prestigious post included Albert Einstein, Max Planck, Fritz Haber, and Max von Laue. 
In between his early discoveries and the recognition of his accomplishments, he served in 
the German Army during World War I as a chemical warfare specialist under the 
command of Fritz Haber
42
. Hahn was eager to go to war and serve his country.
43
 As a 
member of Haber’s Pioneer Regiment, Hahn participated in poison gas experiments and 
attacks on both fronts, and he strove to make the gas as efficient and deadly as possible. 
This history made it probable that Hahn would do what was necessary to assist the 
German government in the Second World War in their quest for atomic weapons. He had 
not hesitated to help develop weapons of mass destruction in the past, and the American 
scientists assumed he would support the Nazis in the present.
44
 
                                                          
42
 In 1909 Haber had developed a method for extracting nitrogen from the air to artificially make 
ammonia, predominantly for use as a fertilizer. Later, this process would become strategically essential 
for the Germans to produce nitrates for explosives. Germany had no nitrates of its own. Instead they had 
counted on the importation of sodium nitrates from the northern desert of Chile. During the First World 
War, the Allies successfully cut off this supply from the Germans. Without Haber’s discovery, the Germans 
would have not been able to last nearly as long as they did. 
43
 Aczel, p. 67 
44
 Ibid, p. 68-69; Arnold Kramish. The Griffin (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1986), p. 185-186 
40 
 
Heisenberg and Hahn were the two most famous of the scientists who remained in 
Germany during the Second World War, but by no means were they the only scientists of 
considerable skill available to the Nazi atomic bomb project. Another scientist of note 
was Paul Harteck, an expert in isotope separation and a specialist in heavy water 
production. Harteck was a physical chemist who had earned his PhD at the University of 
Vienna under Max Planck. In 1928 he became the primary assistant to Fritz Haber at the 
Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physical Chemistry in Berlin and in 1933 won the 
Rockefeller Fellowship to study with Ernest Rutherford at the Cavendish Laboratory in 
Cambridge, England. While in Cambridge, he, Rutherford, and Marcus Oliphant had 
jointly discovered the hydrogen fusion reaction (a key discovery for the later 
development of thermonuclear, or hydrogen, bombs). In 1934, Harteck was named the 
Director of the Institute for Physical Chemistry in Hamburg, a post he held until 1951.
45
 
His expertise in isotope separation, and in particular his experience working with heavy 
water, made him a natural, and in the minds of the Americans, an incredibly dangerous 
choice for the German atomic bomb program. 
Other prospective German atomic bomb scientists included Hans Geiger, 
Wolfgang Gentner, Pascual Jordan, Klaus Clusius, Walther Gerlach, Walther Bothe, 
Erich Bagge, Max von Laue, Fritz Strassmann, and Karl Wirtz. Geiger, who had worked 
with Ernest Rutherford, was the inventor of the device used for detecting ionizing 
radiation that bears his name. Gentner was an able experimental physicist who had 
worked with both Ernest Lawrence in the United States and Frédéric Joliot-Curie in 
France. He was an expert in cyclotron operations and would be a key asset for the 
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Germans if they wanted to construct their own atom-smashing machines. Jordan, as 
explained above, worked with Heisenberg and Born on the conceptualization of quantum 
theory. In 1933 he became a member of the Nazi Party and later that year joined a 
Brownshirts unit (Sturmabteilung Unit or SA).
46
 
Klaus Clusius was the Director of the Physical Chemistry Institute of the 
University of Munich in the 1930s. There he conducted major experiments on heavy 
water and developed, along with a colleague, the thermal diffusion method of isotope 
separation. Walther Gerlach was an internationally-known physicist who had done 
groundbreaking work in the early 1920s (he co-discovered a phenomenon known as the 
Stern-Gerlach effect
47
 through an experimental process which is still used today). He was 
known in the United States and Britain to have connections with the Gestapo.
48
 
Erich Bagge, a member of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, was also a specialist in 
isotope separation, while Max von Laue was a Nobel laureate for his discovery of X-ray 
diffraction in 1914. Bothe, Strassmann, and Wirtz were all world-class experimentalists. 
Bothe worked at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Medical Research, Strassmann was a 
colleague of Otto Hahn who had helped Hahn demonstrate the unknown phenomenon of 
nuclear fission, and Karl Wirtz was a close friend of Heisenberg’s. He was a close 
collaborator and made up for what was, perhaps, Heisenberg’s only significant weakness: 
his lack of experimental experience. Wirtz knew how to run a lab and how to create and 
manage large-scale experiments. He was considered Heisenberg’s right hand man. 
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The Americans also worried about the potential contributions to the German 
atomic bomb program of several non-Germans. Two Italians, Edoardo Amaldi and Gian 
Carlo Wick of the University of Rome, had been colleagues of Enrico Fermi before the 
war. They were both excellent physicists who had worked with Fermi in his experiments 
with radioactivity (for which Fermi won the Nobel Prize in 1938). Now citizens of an 
Axis nation, the Americans worried that they would be pressured to work for the German 
war effort. The most effective use of their skills, Fermi and others feared, would be the 
German atom bomb project. 
Finally, two French physicists, the married couple of Frédéric and Iréne Joliot-
Curie, could provide considerable assistance to the Germans. Both Iréne and Frédéric 
were outstanding physicists in their own right. Iréne was the daughter of Pierre and Marie 
Curie and followed in her parents’ footsteps when she received her PhD in physics in 
1925 from the Sorbonne. Frédéric was an assistant to Marie when he met and fell in love 
with her daughter, whom he married the following year. The two decided to work 
together and in January 1934 announced that they had been able to induce artificial 
radioactivity, a feat that would lead directly to Hahn’s discovery of fission in 1938. In 
1935, they had jointly been awarded the Nobel Prize in Chemistry for this discovery, and 
by the time the war began were continuing their research at the Collège de France in 
Paris, where Frédéric had built a cyclotron and was working on building a chain-reacting 
nuclear pile (Iréne was diagnosed with tuberculosis and was not able to work for several 
years). With Heisenberg and Hahn, Frédéric Joliot-Curie was the most prominent and 
decorated physicist remaining in Europe.  
43 
 
Fourth, it was widely believed that the German atomic bomb program had all the 
necessary support from the Nazi political hierarchy for an ambitious research effort. 
There was specific evidence that the German government was interested in fission 
research. The United States had learned that the Germans had suspended the sale and 
export of uranium from their mines in Czechoslovakia. To the Americans, this indicated 
that the Germans were hoarding the material in an effort to acquire an adequate supply 
for bomb research. This information was supplied to the U.S. Government via the 
Szilard/Einstein letter to President Roosevelt in 1939.
49
 American scientists had also 
heard of a story related to Urey in the summer of 1940 by a Colonel Zoring of the U.S. 
Army’s Ordinance Department. Zoring was attached to the German Army as an official 
observer during its invasion of France, and described an occasion when a German officer 
went in search of French physicists to recruit for German war research. The German 
officer explained that all the German physicists were busy in Germany working for the 
regime on atomic research.
50
 
American scientists also knew of a number of connections between German 
science and high-level officials within the German government. Reichsmarschall 
Hermann Göring, Hitler’s designated successor and chief deputy, was the titular head of 
the Reich Research Council, the main German agency coordinating atomic fission 
research. Heinrich Himmler, the commander of the German Home Army and the man 
most responsible for the policies of the Holocaust (other than Hitler, of course), was an 
old family friend of Werner Heisenberg’s. This fact was widely known to the Americans 
and they feared this relationship would be exploited to promote atomic research to the 
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 The most direct relationship between German science and the 
German government was that of German physicist Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, a 
colleague and close friend of Heisenberg. An experienced and capable physicist in his 
own right, von Weizsäcker was assumed to be an integral member of any German atomic 
bomb program. This is not, however, why he was notable to the Americans, or why he is 
the only scientist specifically mentioned in the Szilard/Einstein letter to Roosevelt. Von 
Weizsäcker’s father was Ernest von Weizsäcker, one of Hitler’s top diplomats and the 
man who would become state secretary in Joachim von Ribbentrop’s Foreign Ministry.
52
 
Close ties to high-ranking members of the German government such as these 
could guarantee that atomic research was taken seriously by those most capable of 
providing the necessary funding and support. A major concern among American 
scientists was the question of whether Hitler and the Nazi regime would authorize an all-
out effort in the nuclear field. If they did, many within the American scientific 
community believed that an authoritarian government like that of Germany would be a 
better sponsor for atomic research than the government of the United States, because, it 
was thought, “totalitarianism [sic] gets things done where democracy fumbles along, and 
that certainly in those branches of science contributing directly to the war effort the Nazis 
were able to cut all corners and proceed with ruthless and matchless efficiency.”
53
 
American scientists were “aware of the pressures that certainly would be brought to bear 
on the German scientists to ensure their utmost support of their country’s military 
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 If this pressure was successful, and German science beat the Americans to 
the bomb, the nightmare scenario, could come true - Hitler with an atomic bomb. No one 
on the Allied side, from the scientists to the military to the British to the American 
civilian government, doubted that Hitler would waste any time using his new 
technological wonder weapon in a devastating attack on the Allies.
55
 
Fifth, even if Germany was unsuccessful in completing a working atomic bomb, 
there was a reasonable fear among American scientists that the German fission program 
could produce enough radioactive material to create an offensive weapon for spreading 
deadly radioactivity on London or on concentrated troop formations. Arthur Compton 
was particularly fearful of this eventuality. He had first thought of the potential of 
radioactive weapons as early as 1941 (when he suggested developing them for American 
use).
56
 In the summer of 1942, he was principally concerned with Allied vulnerability to 
attack with German radioactive bombs. In a memorandum entitled “Protection Against 
Ionizing Bombs,” Compton urged the chairman of the National Defense Research Board, 
James Conant, to take action to protect likely Allied targets. According to Compton, 
American scientists had “become convinced that there is real danger of bombardment by 
the Germans within the next few months using bombs designed to spread radio-active 
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material in lethal quantities.” Compton was most worried about the vulnerability of 
British cities and industry: 
You will probably have learned from Mr. [sic] Bush that apparently 
reliable information has reached us to the effect that the Germans have 
succeeded in making the chain reaction work. Our rough guess is that 
they may have had the reaction operating for two or three months. 
When they reach the hundred thousand kilowatt stage in their power 
plant, they will be producing radio-active material fast enough to 
supply bombs of about 100,000 Curies each, daily. Exploded inside 
important industrial plants, these would make them uninhabitable for 
some months, (half life about two weeks). We anticipate that our 
experimental plant will be producing such radio-active materials in 
amounts of military importance before the end of this year. The 




There was also concern that the Germans could use radioactive weapons to attack 
large groups of troops on the battlefield, or perhaps troops that were gathered at an 
embarkation point. An obvious target would be the Allied soldiers who would later mass 
in British ports for the invasion of Normandy. The Germans could drop radioactive 
material on those troops or could even irradiate the Channel in order to prevent its 
crossing.
58
 Or they could drop radiation bombs on the Allied soldiers once they had 
established the Normandy beachhead, a fear so acute that some American officers during 
D-Day were equipped with Geiger counters and American army doctors were warned to 
be on the lookout for any signs of radiation poisoning.
59
 
A less likely scenario, but still one feared by American scientists, would be a 
German radiological attack on cities within the United States. The difficulties the 
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Germans would have getting the weapons across the Atlantic may not have been 
sufficiently considered by the American scientists, but they worried that potential targets 
for the Germans could be the water and food supplies of major U.S. cities. The Germans 
could use “chemically non-detectable substances and sow death wholesale among us by 
dreadful invisible radiations.” Samuel Goudsmit described the sense of apprehension 
within the American scientific community: 
The fear was so real that scientists were even sure of the place 
and the date of Hitler’s supposed radioactive attack. The Germans 
must know, they thought, that Chicago was at that time the heart 
of our atom bomb research. Hitler, loving dramatic action, would 
choose Christmas day [1942] to drop radioactive materials on that 
city. Some of the men on the project were so worried they sent 
their families to the country. The military authorities were 
informed and the fear spread. I heard rumors that scientific 
instruments were set up around Chicago to detect the radioactivity 




The final reason for American concern had less to do with German atomic 
progress than with atomic research in the United States. All of the above reasons for 
American concerns about the German atomic bomb program were not new realities in the 
summer of 1942. The question then must be asked: Why then? Why in the summer of 
1942 did it become so vital for the United States to learn what the Germans were up to? 
Why not earlier, when so much of the information was first learned? Why not later? 
The answer lies in the considerable progress American scientists made in the first 
months of 1942. When the idea of an atomic bomb was simply that, an idea, a theoretical 
construct relegated to the chalkboards of university laboratories, there was less to fear in 
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a German atomic bomb program. If the bomb could not be built then it also could not be 
built by the Germans, regardless of how scientifically talented they might be. But when 
atomic weapons changed from an intellectual exercise in theoretical physics into a very 
likely reality, the American scientists’ fear of a German atomic bomb increased 
dramatically. In the six months leading up to the correspondences of June 1942 outlined 
in the beginning of this chapter, the American atomic bomb program reached major 
theoretical milestones which made the construction of a nuclear weapon seem much more 
achievable. The American scientists celebrated their discoveries, but the victory was 
bittersweet: If it could be done by the Americans, it could be done by the Germans. 
In the winter of 1941-42, Ernest Lawrence’s Berkeley laboratory made 
considerable progress on the separation of U-235 and concluded that they could replicate 
their success on the scale necessary for mass production. By the spring, it looked as 
though the progress made by American scientists could shorten, by perhaps as much as 
six months, the previously estimated time before enough material would be available for 
strategic use (to make a working bomb). Scientists in the spring of 1942 also saw new 
reasons to be hopeful about the power and efficiency of atomic weapons. The size of the 
necessary critical mass was calculated to be much smaller than what was expected just 
months earlier, due in part to new discoveries regarding the fissionability of U-235: it 
was found to be much more fissionable than earlier believed, particularly in how it 
reacted to “fast” neutrons. Furthermore, the Americans were by that time convinced that 
they had seriously underestimated the destructive force of an atomic bomb. New 
calculations suggested that the yield of an atomic bomb would be at least three times the 
49 
 
predicted yield of six months earlier (an estimated 2,000t yield in spring/summer 1942 
versus 600t in late 1941).
61
 
By late April 1942, all of the pieces were in place for the American atomic bomb 
program to take the next step out of the university laboratory and into full-scale, 
government-sponsored, and government-run production. Arthur Compton presented the 
complete argument to the S-1 Committee. He argued that a chain-reacting pile (a nuclear 
reactor) was feasible and imminent, the processes for U-235 isotope separation were 
working better than expected, that Glenn Seaborg had demonstrated an efficient method 
for separating plutonium chemically from uranium, and that the design for a mass-scale 
plutonium production plant was soon to be realized.
62
 By the summer, engineering 
studies had showed that plutonium, like U-235, could be produced in quantity. As a result 
of these conclusions, the task of producing both of these fissionable elements would be  
assigned in June 1942 to the United States Army Corps of Engineers, who began initial 
construction in August. 
Despite the forward movement of the American program, and as it has been 
demonstrated here because of the progress of the American program, scientists in the 
United States were still terrified by the possibility of a German atomic bomb. Samuel 
Goudsmit expressed what most American scientists were feeling: 
Our scientists realized clearly the dreadful implications of the 
atom bomb, if it could be put together, and being men of good 
will many of them secretly hoped that the thing would be too 
difficult to achieve during the war. When they found out it was 
not only not impossible, but highly probable, that they could 
make an atom bomb that would work, they became a little scared, 
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The scientists in the United States working on nuclear physics and chemistry were 
universally convinced of the danger Germany represented. The only thing left to do at 
that point would be to convince the United States Government to take the problem as 
seriously as they did. Thus on June 1, 1942, Leo Szilard wrote a letter to Arthur Compton 
urging the United States Government to begin a concerted effort to discover the status of 
the German atomic bomb program.
64
  Compton agreed. Unlike Szilard, however, 
Compton had the prestige and authority to take action. He had won the 1927 Nobel Prize 
in physics for the discovery of the “Compton Effect.”
65
 Also, in addition to his duties at 
the University of Chicago, Compton was the head of the OSRD’s S-1 Committee, which 
was tasked with investigating the properties and manufacture of uranium for potential use 
in atomic weapons. According to Glenn Seaborg, the discoverer of plutonium and 
participant in the American bomb program, Compton’s role in S-1 was to supervise the 
early design of the atomic bomb, and “until the War Department took control with the 




Compton wrote his own letter on June 22, and sent it straight to the top of the 
American scientific hierarchy, OSRD chairman Vannevar Bush. Compton told Bush that 
it was essential that the United States do something to gather information about the 
German atomic program, warning that he has, “recently become aware that the threat of 
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German fission bombs is even more imminent than we supposed [a month earlier].” He 
continued by outlining the lack of current options the Americans believed they had: 
“Secret service activity in German is urgently needed, to locate and disrupt their 
activities. Perhaps our physicists can give helpful advice to this end. Our careful 
consideration of possible counter-measures has led to nothing except such destruction at 
the source and blocking of planes, etc., bringing their bombs to us.” Compton’s most 
ominous warning concerned a potential timetable for German atomic capability: “If the 
Germans know what we know [about the production of plutonium] – and we dare not 
discount their knowledge – they should be dropping fission bombs on us in 1943, a year 
before our bombs are planned to be ready.”
67
 
 Compton’s letter had the desired effect. Bush was convinced of the importance of 
the creation of a viable, effective scientific intelligence program targeted at the German 
atomic bomb program. The only question that remained in the summer of 1942: how to 
begin? 
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Making Something Out of Nothing 
 
 
 During the summer of 1942 the American scientific leadership made two key 
national security decisions. In both cases, these choices were prompted by an acute fear 
of the dire threat posed by German atomic bomb research. The first, initiated in mid-June 
by OSRD chairman and presidential science advisor Vannevar Bush, was the decision to 
shift the American atomic bomb project from an experimental to the development and 
production stage. On June 17, Bush asked for and received permission from President 
Roosevelt to begin this transformation, and by the end of the summer a crash program to 
build an atomic bomb was formed under the leadership of Brigadier General Leslie 
Groves of the Army Corps of Engineers. Groves chose University of California, Berkeley 
physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer to be the scientific chief of the Manhattan Engineer 
District (MED), informally known as the Manhattan Project. Over the next three years, 
Groves and Oppenheimer would together shape and guide the American bomb research 
and manufacture to its successful conclusion.
1
  
 The second key decision was concerned with scientific intelligence. Before the 
summer of 1942 the United States had never paid attention to the basic laboratory 
research and scientific discovery of an enemy nation. Instead the emphasis had been 
placed on technological intelligence, or the practical applications of scientific research or 
engineering in the form of the production and deployment of weapons systems or related 
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military equipment. Technological intelligence had been a mainstay of United States 
national security since the time of the Revolution
2
, and the Second World War was no 
exception. Captured Enemy Material Units from the Economic Intelligence Division of 
the Office of Economic Warfare (OEW) were deployed to each theatre of operation. 
Once there, they sent back to Washington reports of enemy weapons and equipment, 
including detailed technical information on radar, aircraft, engines, armament, chemical 
and biological weapons equipment (like protective masks), munitions, armor, petroleum 
products, and gear like rangefinders and medical equipment.
3
 
 Scientific intelligence presented unique challenges not normally faced in other, 
more traditional, types of intelligence. The majority of intelligence officers in the 1940s 
did not possess a scientific or technical education. Instead, most spies were trained to 
evaluate political, military, or economic data and determine what was, or was not, 
actionable intelligence. This meant that, even if they were able to infiltrate the scientific 
establishment of Germany, an average intelligence asset engaging in human intelligence 
collection (or HUMINT) would not have the necessary background to understand the 
kinds of information they should be seeking. To complicate matters further, science is 
comprised of multiple distinct fields, each of which requires specialized knowledge. 
There is biology, physics, chemistry, geology, astrophysics, and, of course, nuclear 
physics. In other words, just because the government employed a highly skilled 
“scientist” does not mean that he or she had the necessary educational background to 
understand scientific intelligence outside of his or her particular field. The United States 
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Government could not treat science as they did economics or politics (and hire a generic 
economist or a political scientist), but instead they would be forced to recruit scientists 
from all security-related fields (which is essentially all scientific fields) in order to assess 
German capabilities. Furthermore, scientific language presented serious problems for 
those tasked to translate correctly scientific intelligence into English. Even the best 
trained linguist may not have the skills necessary to translate highly technical data from 
German to English, and certainly not in the timely manner required by the pace of the 
war. In essence, what was needed was a highly educated scientist with excellent linguistic 
capabilities. Unfortunately, this skill set was very rare. 
 Thus the American scientific leadership was tasked with not only discovering the 
extent to which German atomic science had progressed, but also designing and 
developing the scientific intelligence organization – without any historical precedent – 
that would accomplish this mission. The American scientists’ efforts led to mixed results. 
On one hand, scientists were well qualified to investigate some of the major 
apprehensions outlined in Chapter 1, specifically, the potential threat of radiological 
attack on the United States. Arthur Compton, who was especially concerned about this 
eventuality, assigned J. C. Sterns, one of his physicists at the University of Chicago’s 
Metallurgical Laboratory, to investigate possible defenses against such an attack. Sterns 
was chosen for this task not only because Compton considered him “one of our most 
capable men,” but also because any such project would require close collaboration with 
the military and Sterns was “suitable for cooperation with the army in connection with 
the use as well as the development of the appropriate detection devices.”
4
 In a letter dated 
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July 16, 1942, Compton told Sterns that a German radiological attack on the Allies was 
likely and could be a real possibility before the end of the year.  He argued the United 
States must “take urgent steps to prepare” for this contingency, ordering Sterns to “free 
yourself of your present duties at the earliest moment possible and that you accept the 




 American scientists were also able to tap into their contacts in Europe for 
information about German atomic research, the so-called “scientific underground”. 
Scientists in Europe passed along information about the location and activities of German 
scientists, including Heisenberg, Hahn, and von Weizsäcker, as well as French physicist 
Frédéric Joliot-Curie.
6
 However, in many cases the reports were ambiguous and 
sometimes conflicting (with one another as well as with what the Americans understood 
to be the truth). In some cases the information came from state-controlled German 
newspapers, or even came from third- or fourth-hand reports that had worked their way 
through many different people (and perhaps many different revisions) before arriving in 
the United States. With scientific information this is a particularly vexing problem. 
Nuanced mistakes in scientific reporting, or minor changes to information via 
transmission, can have a major impact on the veracity of the information. For example, in 
the letter from Leo Szilard to Arthur Compton detailed in Chapter 1, Szilard argued that 
the Germans may have had already achieved a self-sustaining chain reaction. He based 
this contention on information he had received from his friend, a Dr. Marshall in 
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Switzerland, who in turn had heard this “fact” from a son of German physicist Friedrich 
Dessauer, who himself had learned it from his father.
7
 The result of this scientific game 
of “telephone,” in many cases, was a warped, inaccurate picture of the scientific situation 
in Europe, and thwarted any precise assessment of the reality of the progress of the 
German atomic bomb program. 
    Another approach to the intelligence problem was to make estimates of German 
progress based on scientific expertise and knowledge of American atomic bomb research. 
American physical chemist Harold Urey, a Nobel Prize winner in 1934 for his discovery 
of heavy water, provided Vannevar Bush with his best guess as to how much success the 
Germans had had in the use of heavy water in their isotope separation effort. He argued 
that while it was impossible to know for certain the progress made by the Germans, “I 
think it is unsafe to assume that they were less efficient in their development than we 
have been.” Urey continued: “It is therefore reasonable to assume that they had a one 
year start on us and that [since] it will require two years for us to get a plant in operation 
[for full-scale isotope separation] we should assume that by a year from now [the summer 
of 1943] the Germans will have such a plant going.”
8
 Hungarian-American theoretical 
physicist and mathematician Eugene Wigner would also contribute to this effort. Wigner, 
who would win his own Nobel Prize in Physics in 1963, used his knowledge of the 
American uranium isotope separation and plutonium production program to create a 
memorandum that presupposed a German schedule for the production of fissile material. 
Like Urey (and many other American scientists) he concluded that the Germans would 
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have enough uranium or plutonium by the summer of 1943 to make at least one, but more 
likely several, atomic bombs.
9
   
 The most coordinated effort to use American scientific expertise to estimate the 
extent of the German atomic bomb program was directed by Vannevar Bush and the 
OSRD. Using his knowledge of the American program, Bush tried to create a detailed 
analysis of the characteristics that could be found in any plant designed to manufacture 
fissile material for use in an atomic bomb. Perhaps distinctive elements such as water 
supply, the temperature of cooling water, and the availability of electrical power sources 
could be utilized to identify atomic research facilities through airborne surveillance.
10
 
Using information about German infrastructure he obtained from the Board of Economic 
Warfare, Bush hoped that he could locate German facilities that could be targeted and 
destroyed by American and Allied bombing. 
 Unfortunately, this expedient proved worthless. When Bush first proposed this 
approach in early July, 1942, he believed it obligatory to pursue this method even though 
he also felt that it was “none too promising.”  He resigned himself to “follow them up” 
wherever they might lead.
11
 But by late September Bush would reluctantly accept the fact 
that attempts to determine the location of German fissile material production plants by 
studying water supply and available power sources “does not seem to get anywhere.”
12
 In 
a memorandum provided to Army Intelligence Chief Major General George V. Strong, 
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Bush details the reasons for failure, which stemmed from the inability to discover places 
within Germany that were using a disproportionate amount of electric power: 
The evidence at hand seems to indicate, in spite of some pessimistic statements 
put out by German government officials, presumably with the hope of creating the 
impression among her enemies that Germany is suffering a shortage of electric 
power, that the fact is that she has an ample power supply. 
It is known that many of the power plants in Germany and in occupied territory 
have been increased in capacity and a considerable block of power is being imported 
from Belgium and possibly from other neighboring countries. All of the power 
stations which have been increased are at strategic locations for fuel supply or hydro-
power. None of the known additions are of sufficient capacity to point to a 




 What this meant for Bush and the Americans was that there was no way to use 
German power supply as a means to discover the location of German atomic weapons 
research. A power plant dedicated to provide power to atomic research could be supplied 
from the existing power grid, and therefore the Americans could not “expect to discover 




 As the months elapsed, and as American scientists became more and more 
desperate to discovery any tangible information about the German atomic bomb program, 
suggestions for plans of action became more ambitious. By the autumn and winter of 
1942, American scientists had shifted their proposals from an emphasis on traditional 
intelligence analysis to one which can only be described as an embryonic form of 
scientific special operations. This began as relatively modest proposals, such as sending 
scientists to neutral Switzerland to collect German and French scientific periodicals. It 
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was suggested American scientists overseas could also contact European scientists who 
might have information on German progress. If the United States could send a qualified 
scientist who had strong ties to European science and European scientists, some real 
progress could be made in learning the secrets of the German bomb.    
However, it was not to be. The support for these uncomplicated missions (with at 
least a moderate chance of success) would later evolve into an elaborate and ruthless 
proposal in December 1942 to kidnap German physicist Werner Heisenberg. The idea 
was first broached in late October, when Austrian-born American physicist Victor 
Weisskopf and German-born American physicist Hans Bethe learned that Heisenberg 
would be giving a lecture in Zurich, Switzerland that December (the news came from 
physicist Wolfgang Pauli at Princeton, who heard it from German physicist Gregor 
Wentzel in Zurich, who learned it from two visiting physicists, a man named 
Wefelmayer, and Italian physicist Gian Carlo Wick, both students of Heisenberg. Thus 
went the scientific underground).
15
 Initially, Bethe and Weisskopf discussed only the idea 
of sending someone to talk to Heisenberg, to learn his commitment to the building of the 
Nazi bomb. This idea was quickly dismissed as it immediately became apparent that it 
had a major drawback. Any attempt to talk to Heisenberg about the atomic bomb would 
reveal what was perhaps the most highly-guarded secret of the war: that the Allies were 
aggressively pursuing an atomic bomb of their own. If Heisenberg was a true believer in 
the Nazi cause, speaking to him would gather very little intelligence while giving away 
the crown jewel of American wartime scientific research. Kidnapping Heisenberg was the 
only prudent action, but Bethe and Weisskopf were not intelligence operatives. They had 
no experience in planning such a risky operation, and the plan they developed, in which 
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Weisskopf himself would travel to Zurich and kidnap Heisenberg, was impractical at 
best, and more likely doomed to failure from the very start. Yet Bethe and Weisskopf 
were so afraid of the progress of German atomic science that they passed this idea up the 
chain of command, through Robert Oppenheimer and Vannevar Bush to the military 
authorities, who saw it for the foolhardy plan it was and rejected it outright.
16
 Years later, 
Weisskopf would write that he felt fortunate that “this ill-conceived plan never took 
place.” He also would wonder how he “could have proposed such a harebrained idea, let 
alone considered participating in its execution.”
17
       
By the end of 1942, it had become apparent to most American scientists that little, 
if any, verifiable or actionable intelligence had been obtained by the United States and its 
scientific leadership. In a report dated December 15, 1942, Vannevar Bush, in his role as 
the Chairman of the Military Policy Committee on Atomic Fission Bombs, informed 
Vice President Henry Wallace, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, and Chief of Staff 
General George Marshall that despite their best efforts the American scientific 
community does “not know, unfortunately, just how much progress [the Germans] have 
made.” Bush explained that the subject of German atomic research “is an exceedingly 
difficult one on which to obtain information as to enemy activity,” and acknowledged 
with resignation: “it must be realized…that almost no real information is available,” and 
any attempt to make estimates on when a German bomb would be available would be 
purely speculative. Bush’s report did include a guess, however, and it was a number that 
would have been familiar to anyone who had been involved in approximating German 
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progress in June. “It is entirely possible…that [Germany] may be six months or a year 
ahead in the over-all program due to the head start.”
18
  
Six months of intelligence work had accomplished little, and this unfortunate 
trend would continue into the first half of 1943. The problem was: American scientists 
were amateurs when it came to intelligence work. They did not possess the qualifications 
or experience to accomplish such a difficult task. In their defense, the American scientific 
leadership was well aware of their shortcomings. Early on in the process of developing 
the scientific intelligence apparatus, NDRB chairman James Conant’s assistant Harry 
Wensel suggested they ask for help: “Should anything be done in regard to bringing in 
professionals to advise on what to do and how to do it?”
19
 The “professionals” Wensel is 
referring to were the established members of the American intelligence community, the 
United States Army’s intelligence branch (G-2), the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), 
and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). While that question seems logically sound, 
particularly considering the principal problem scientists were having was due to their lack 
of experience and knowledge in all things intelligence-related (like analysis and 
operations), G-2, the ONI, and the OSS actually had little to offer.  
The established intelligence apparatus was perhaps less qualified than American 
scientists to accomplish the task of discovering the progress of the German atomic bomb 
program. There were two significant reasons for this. The first was, and still is, a 
common impediment to effective scientific intelligence: just as scientists are usually not 
also capable intelligence operatives (as has been demonstrated), so too is the fact that 
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most intelligence professionals do not possess adequate scientific knowledge to 
effectively collect and analyze scientific intelligence. An average intelligence agent 
would most likely not recognize the importance of key scientific information. 
Furthermore, educating intelligence operatives as to what to look for scientifically, 
assuming it could be done sufficiently in a short time, greatly increased the likelihood 
that information about America’s interest in atomic weapons would be leaked to the 




Vannevar Bush and Samuel Goudsmit would codify this sentiment in their 
memoirs written after the war. According to Bush, “scientific intelligence is not 
conducted well by Mata Hari methods or through agents who know no science, and there 
is just as much danger of placing scientific intelligence in the hands of those who do not 
understand as there is in placing any other part of science in the same tender care.”
21
 
Goudsmit is even less equivocal in his indictment of unqualified intelligence operatives 
conducting scientific intelligence: 
Ordinary Intelligence information yielded nothing of value. 
There were always fantastic rumors floating around about 
terrifying secret weapons and atom bombs which were duly 
reported by the O.S.S. and British agents, but invariably the 
technical details were hopelessly nonsensical. The reason was 
obvious. No ordinary spy could get us the information we wanted 
for the simple reason that he lacked the scientific training to know 
what was essential. Only scientifically qualified personnel could 
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 The second problem with the established intelligence organizations was 
bureaucratic and institutional. The American intelligence agencies carried out atomic 
intelligence as part of their general activities, and there was no concerted effort to focus 
particular attention on the German atomic bomb program. Instead, G-2, the ONI, and the 
OSS (along with several other smaller intelligence agencies within governmental 
organizations like the State Department) gathered “scraps and bits of information within 
the enemy nations that might be useful in adding to the atomic picture.”
23
 In addition, 
there was no coordination of effort among the agencies, and no unified command. G-2 
was under the direction of the Department of War, while ONI was controlled by the 
Department of the Navy, and OSS was under the auspices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In 
theory, these agencies would have been coordinated under the greater war effort against 
the Axis Powers, but in practice there were significant gaps in intelligence coverage. 
These were further exacerbated by bureaucratic infighting among the organizations, 
“frictions” (Leslie Groves euphemistically explains) that were particularly acute between 
the established intelligence organizations of the ONI and G-2, and the newly-formed 
OSS. Trust and cooperation was strained at the highest levels and almost non-existent at 
the operational level.
24
 These frictions meant the existing intelligence agencies could not 
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 Thus, by the summer of 1943 the United States military, political, and scientific 
leadership found themselves in the unenviable position of those who had spent a year 
fixated on the possibilities of a German atomic bomb, yet had little to show for it. Their 
understanding of the scientific situation in Germany was roughly the same as it had been 
in June 1942: The Germans wanted to build an atomic bomb, they had competent 
scientists, state-of-the-art facilities, all the necessary materials, and had the backing of the 
German high command. Beside this, however, American intelligence (whether conducted 
by professionals or amateurs/scientists) could provide almost nothing in the form of 
actionable information. Something clearly needed to be done to bridge the chasm 
between those trained in the sciences (those who knew what to look for) and those trained 
in the craft of intelligence (those who knew how to look). The ideal solution would be for 
a single individual or small group of individuals who could amalgamate the scientific and 
intelligence fields into one concentrated scientific intelligence organization. This 
individual or group of individuals would be well versed in the scientific fields of which 
atomic theory encompassed, while also would have a general knowledge of the 
intricacies of intelligence operations. Fortunately, the United States had such an 
individual, and he was close at hand: Brigadier General Leslie Groves. 
 
Groves Takes Charge 
 In September of 1943, Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall asked 
Groves “whether there was any reason why [he] could not take over all foreign 
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intelligence in [the atomic field].”
26
 After Groves agreed, he and Marshall notified the 
leadership of the ONI, G-2, and OSS that Groves would be heading all atomic 
intelligence from that point on, and that they should give him their full cooperation.
27
 The 
weight of Marshall’s office and the respect he had garnered while Army Chief was 
enough to mitigate the potential problems that Groves (a newly-promoted one-star 
general) could have faced from the higher-ranked officers who led the various 
intelligence agencies (both G-2 and the ONI were commanded by two-star major 
generals, while the OSS was commanded by William Donovan, also a general, but more 
importantly the highest decorated American soldier in the First World War and a close 
confidant of President Roosevelt). For the duration of the war, Groves counted on, and 
received, the full assistance and cooperation of each of the intelligence chiefs to the 
utmost of their abilities. 
 Groves, however, could not solve the most pressing problem: the lack of any 
significant information about the German atomic bomb program. Groves had followed 
the progress of the previous year’s efforts to learn about German atomic development. He 
was well aware of the futility of past efforts. The scientists, for all their limitations, had 
done all that could be done with the available intelligence that could be collected through 
passive methods (collecting information that is delivered to you, through whatever 
means; rather than information that is actively sought, mainly through agents in the field 
and clandestine operations). He believed that the only way to be sure about the progress 
of the German program was to send intelligence operatives to Europe to learn firsthand 
how far the Germans had gone from the European scientists themselves (this idea would 
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materialize later as the ALSOS Mission – see Chapters 3 and 4).
28
 Yet before this could 
occur, Groves understood that five major organizational and infrastructural challenges 
had to be overcome: 1) The full and complete consolidation of authority for atomic 
intelligence operations and analysis under his immediate command; 2) The creation of an 
efficient and streamlined command and control apparatus for the European mission that 
would include a centralized information clearinghouse to facilitate the effective targeting 
of German scientists, facilities, industrial centers, and fissile materials; 3) The 
exploitation of British scientific and atomic intelligence to its full extent; 4) Direct 
military and covert action that could slow the progress of the German atomic bomb 
program, allowing time for both the intelligence system to come up to task and for the 
American bomb program to come to completion; and, 5) The prevention, as much as was 
possible, of any information about the Manhattan Project or the American interest in the 
German program leaking to anyone outside of the need-to-know. Once these tasks were 
initiated, Groves could begin putting in place the pieces that would make up the ALSOS 
Mission. Until then, there was much work to be done. 
 
Consolidation of Power 
 Leslie Groves possessed a well-defined management philosophy. He believed in 
the paramount importance of centralization of authority, or in his words, “if there was one 
guiding principle throughout [his command of the American atomic bomb project], it was 
that those who carried responsibility were possessed of corresponding authority.”
29
 Up to 
the fall of 1942, Groves was in charge of a number of major construction projects in the 
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United States, most notably the construction of the Pentagon. He was in direct command 
of a force of one million men in the Army Corps of Engineers, who were building 
facilities in the United States at the rate of $600 million each month. Thus, Groves 
possessed the experience of leading large projects, managing significant budgets, and 
managing disparate personalities, traits that were imperative for the successful 
completion of an American atomic bomb. When he was selected, Groves was told “to 
take complete charge of the entire Manhattan Engineer District project,”
30
 instructions 
that he took to heart.  
This process would begin with his appointment in September, 1942.
31
 When 
Groves took command, he dramatically accelerated the transition of the responsibilities 
for atomic research and development from the OSRD to the War Department and the 
Army Corps of Engineers. In doing so, he converted to his control not only laboratory 
work, but also pilot plant construction and full-scale production authority. At the same 
time, a supposedly overarching control organization was created by Secretary of War 
Henry Stimson, the Military Policy Committee. Despite the fact that all of the members 
of the committee outranked Groves
32
, he quickly maneuvered himself into the leadership 
role. The committee itself was originally intended to have nine members, but Groves 
persuaded Stimson that a committee of this size would be inefficient and impractical.
33
 
Committee meetings were always held in Groves’ office, ostensibly because his office 
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was, according to Groves, “where needed papers were readily available and security 
difficulties were minimized.”
34
 Perhaps this is truly the case, but before long Groves 
began to dominate these meetings and their agendas. While the committee was intended 
to be a consortium of especially qualified men who would come to consensus, if not 
unanimity, on American atomic policy, Groves was not only the most important voice on 
policy, but before long he had made himself the sole arbiter of the future of United States 
atomic research and development. According to Groves, “as time went on and I became 
much more familiar with our operations than any of the others, it became more and more 
a question of approval and of discussion rather than of decision.”
35
      
 Groves’ leadership style could be kindly described as “hands-on”, or more 
critically as “micro-management”. Delays were not permitted, and any officer who felt 
that a problem would require the project to be delayed by as much as twenty-four hours 
must immediately report that issue to Groves.
36
 His infamous compartmentalization of 
information, primarily for security purposes, was also used so that Groves could avoid 
delays by keeping the scientists only working on their own projects, and not those of their 
peers. This meant that Groves could maintain full control over the subjects his scientists 
were researching, preventing them from spending “time and effort thinking about the 




Groves also purposely kept his staff small. He did not have a Chief of Staff or an 
Executive Officer, and for the majority of the war his office in Washington consisted of 
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only five rooms. He did not need more space, since Groves rarely spent his time “sitting 
in Washington reading committee reports, holding press conferences, or making 
speeches.”
38
 He was in constant contact with all Manhattan District operations, either in 
person or by telephone. For Groves, the theory on staff was simple, and encapsulated his 
management philosophy: “as soon as the staff gets too large, it begins to operate 
independently and trouble is certain.”
39
 As a result, Groves was reluctant to delegate 
authority to others, and only did so when he had complete trust in the both the 
competency and loyalty of that individual. The closest he came to having a second-in-
command was the District Engineer Colonel K. D. Nichols, who mainly served as an 
administrative aide, but who would maintain local operational control over a Manhattan 
Project site like Oak Ridge, Tennessee or Hanford, Washington when Groves was 
working elsewhere. While the relationship between Groves and Nichols was never 
officially defined in writing, Groves insists that, while Nichols did have wider latitude 




 Gradually throughout the war Groves would expand his responsibility and 
authority to include project security, counterintelligence, the selection of Japanese cities 
for targeting, the arrangement of logistical support from the military for bases of 
operation overseas, and, of course, intelligence on atomic research and development in 
Germany.
41
 Immediately upon accepting the job as atomic intelligence chief, Groves 
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sought and received assurances from the Army and Navy intelligence branches that they 
would redirect any atomic intelligence they collected to Groves and the MED.  He then 
personally visited the director of the OSS, Major General William Donovan to coordinate 
the activities of the OSS with the objectives of American atomic intelligence. At the 
meeting, which also included Donovan’s executive officer Colonel G. E. Buxton, 
Donovan assigned one of his top officers, Lieutenant Colonel Howard Dix, to act as 
liaison with the MED and “to ensure that all atomic information collected by OSS would 
be forwarded promptly to the Intelligence Section [of the MED].” In his effort to 
establish a personal relationship with the OSS, Groves’ hands-on approach truly paid off. 
According to Donovan, Groves was the first general officer to have ever met with him in 
his office. In all other occasions, a general had sent an aide or subordinate to meet with 
Donovan (a clear indication of the lack of respect, one of the “frictions” that existed 
between the other American intelligence agencies and the OSS). Colonel Buxton would 
later tell Groves that his personal outreach to the OSS “ensured the utmost in special 
treatment for the MED.”
42
       
 As much as he might like to, Groves could not direct the day-to-day operations of 
the research and development of the American atomic bomb and simultaneously internal 
security, counterintelligence, and foreign intelligence. He could count on Colonel Nichols 
to assist him in commanding the bomb production program. In the same way he could 
depend on a trusted subordinate, Lieutenant Colonel John Lansdale, Jr., to oversee all 
MED intelligence operations. According to Lansdale, he “had a very close relationship 
with General Groves and saw him virtually every day that he and [Lansdale] were both in 
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Washington and [they] not infrequently traveled together.”
43
 A graduate of the Virginia 
Military Institute and Harvard Law School, Lansdale was a reserve artillery officer in the 
1930s. As it became more and more likely the United States would soon enter the Second 
World War, Lansdale decided to request a call to active duty to serve in the Military 
Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff (G-2). He reported on June 
10, 1941 as a First Lieutenant assigned to the Investigation Branch, Counter-Intelligence 
Group.
44
 After distinguishing himself as the G-2 representative on the “Japanese-
American Joint Board responsible for releasing Americans of Japanese extraction on an 
individual basis from the concentration camps in which they had been confined during 
the period of hysteria immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack,”
45
 Lansdale first came to 
the attention of Groves when Lansdale was asked by James Conant in February, 1942, to 
investigate the security at the Radiation Laboratory at the University of California, 
Berkeley. Lansdale’s competency, thoroughness, and discretion in performing his duties 
convinced Groves to put Lansdale in charge of all MED security when Groves took 
responsibility for the project in September, 1942.
46
 At this point, Lansdale was still 
technically a member of Army G-2, but this would formally change in the winter of 
1943/1944 when the MED and Groves was given the task of directing all aspects of 
atomic intelligence. Groves requested and was granted Lansdale’s transfer to the Army 
Corps of Engineers so that Lansdale could devote his full time to the atomic bomb 
project.
47
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 Lieutenant Colonel Lansdale was directed to take command of each of the three 
key aspects of the MED’s atomic intelligence program: internal security, 
counterintelligence, and foreign atomic intelligence. Serving under both Groves and 
Lansdale was Major Robert Furman, who was the head of MED’s foreign intelligence 
operations. Furman, a graduate of Princeton University and a civil engineer by training, 
was a veteran of the Groves command hierarchy, having served under him during the 
construction of the Pentagon. When Groves was appointed to take control of the MED, he 
brought Furman, one of his closest and most trusted aides, with him. More than anyone 
else, Furman was responsible for directing the day-to-day atomic espionage operations 
carried out against the Germans.
48
        
 
Organizing for Action 
 Another important task for Groves was to establish an efficient organizational 
foundation for the mission to Europe. Primarily this would be the creation of a command 
infrastructure, but it would also include building a framework of intelligence information 
on the German program in order to initiate more effectively, and then to sustain, 
operations in Italy, France, and eventually, Germany. Even with intelligence 
professionals who were well-versed in the intricacies of atomic research, however, this 
was no easy task. The Gestapo, the German counter-espionage service, was able to block 
access to secret scientific and technical information. According to historian John Keegan, 
“there was little that was romantic about spying in Hitler’s Europe. The business was 
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furtive, nail-biting and burdened by the suspicion of betrayal. Many agents were 
betrayed.” Despite this, considerable information about the German rocket program (the 
V-1 and V-2) did manage to make its way to the Allies. Primarily this was due to the fact 
that these programs required test flights that could be observed by those willing to 
transmit that information to the British.
49
  
 Ironically, it was this wealth of information about German rockets that would feed 
the paranoia about the German atomic bomb program. Since very little intelligence about 
the German uranium project was collected by the United States, the perception was that 
the Germans felt the program to be so important to the war effort that they were making a 
concerted emphasis on project secrecy. They also assumed that when information trickled 
out of Europe suggesting that the German program was not as advanced as was feared, 
this was a deliberate disinformation campaign to mislead the Allies. In particular, when 
American scientists read German scientific publications that were smuggled out of 
Europe through neutral countries, they noticed that they contained a number of articles 
written by prominent German scientists on topics that, in the United States, were 
forbidden by governmental censorship (for instance, articles on atomic physics or isotope 
separation). Instead of accepting this for what it was – an indication of German lack of 
interest in atomic weapons – the American scientific intelligence community concluded 
that the only justification for the Nazi regime to allow the publication of such key 
scientific information was to trick the Allies into believing Germany had given up on its 
atomic ambitions.
50
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 Successfully differentiating between actionable intelligence, disinformation, and 
random, inconsequential data was (and still is) a major challenge for even the most 
capable and experienced intelligence analyst. Groves, Lansdale, and Furman had to meet 
this challenge with the added obstacle of operating in an intelligence environment 
(atomic physics) that was constantly changing, and because it was a newly-developed and 
evolving science, ill-defined. To their credit, they were cognizant of a common 
intelligence pitfall that could have derailed the fledgling atomic intelligence program at 
an early stage: assuming your enemy will act in the exact manner you will. In intelligence 
terminology this is called “mirror-imaging”, and in the case of the Germans, Groves 
feared that they might develop methods leading to a bomb which were dramatically 
different than those American scientists had devised. Groves and the others understood 
the theoretical, technical, and production difficulties American scientists and engineers 
had been facing, yet they recognized the “chief danger was that [the Germans] might 
come up with relatively simple solutions to the problems we were finding so difficult.”
51
 
Robert Oppenheimer told Furman that, despite the American assertion that massive 
separation plants were necessary to amass significant quantities of U-235, the Germans 
could have potentially found a way to do it more cheaply and efficiently. Isotope 
separation was a new science, and therefore the Germans might, according to 
Oppenheimer, “come up with a way to do it in his kitchen sink.”
52
 Groves worried that 
the Germans would also discover a faster and better way to produce plutonium, in 
particular because they had a distinct advantage not shared by their American and British 
counterparts: 
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It had always seemed to most of us that their best prospects lay in the use of plutonium, 
which would demand a much smaller industrial effort as well as considerably less in 
the way of time, critical equipment and materials than any other method – provided 
they were willing to ignore safety precautions. This I felt the Germans would do, for 
considering what we already knew of their treatment of their Jewish minority, we could 
only assume they would not hesitate to expose these same citizens to excessive 
radiation. Hitler and his ardent supporters, we felt, would consider this a proper use for 
an “inferior” group, quite apart from the saving in effort and materials and time.
53
        
    
 Ultimately, it was up to Furman to determine what information to ignore, what 
information to pay heed to, and what avenue of approach should be taken in regard to 
American scientific intelligence operations (of course, under the guidance of Groves and 
Lansdale). To fully prepare himself for this task, Furman met with several American 
atomic physicists to gather their advice on how to proceed. They advised him to pay close 
attention to German scientific journals in not only atomic physics, but also other fields of 
science like electronics and chemical engineering that would be integrated into any 
German bomb program. In addition, Furman was told to follow the development of 
German industry, construction, and mining in the fields relevant to atomic research, and 
to try and ascertain connections between scientific, engineering, and industrial 
personnel,
54




 Most notably, Furman met with Robert Oppenheimer, who provided him with a 
watch list of Germany’s leading scientists in the fields of atomic physics and chemistry. 
In a follow-up letter to Furman, Oppenheimer reinforced his proposition that the key to 
learning the status of the German program was its scientists. He emphasized the necessity 
of discovering “the whereabouts and activities of the men who are regarded as specialists 
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in this field and without whom it would certainly be difficult to carry out a program 
effectively.” He also argued that German raw materials acquisition and plant construction 
could be avenues of discovery. Uranium was the obvious material to keep track of, but 
according to Oppenheimer, American surveillance of German raw materials acquisition 
should not be limited to uranium, but instead the United States should also pay attention 
to German interest in graphite, beryllium, and heavy water (each of which could be used 
as a moderator).  
Also, American intelligence should look for large plant construction that would 
require conspicuous amounts of power. Perhaps a major chemical company like I. G. 
Farben, Oppenheimer wrote, could have been contracted to build such a plant. If so, this 
would present a serious obstacle to discovery, since “it would be quite possible to conceal 
the plant among other war projects.” A possible recourse could be “to investigate the 
radioactivity of rivers some miles below any suspicious and secret plant.” Scientists back 
in the United States could then determine if this was the home of a German atomic 
reactor.
56
 Of course, this method would involve agents on the ground inside Germany, 
not yet a reality at the time of Oppenheimer’s letter.  
Yet Furman knew the mission was to begin soon enough, and he had more work 
to do before it could begin with any chance of success. A key element to any operation of 
this magnitude would be to maximize the contributions (as much as they could be within 
security restraints) of the entire United States Government. Thus, armed with a letter 
from the commander of G-2, Major General Strong, Furman contacted any of the other 
governmental agencies that might be able to help him in determining the extent of the 
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German atomic bomb program. He told these agencies that he was interested in 
information on earthquakes (or other significant seismic activity), large industrial 
facilities, movements of scientists, and industrial plants with little in the way of visible 
production (a bomb factory would have a significant amount of raw materials going in, 
but nothing of substance – except, in the end, an atomic bomb – regularly coming out).
57
 
Furman also met with OSS chief Donovan in October 1943. To this point, the OSS had 
been passively collecting intelligence about the German bomb program while carrying 
out their normal clandestine activities. Furman, through the guidance of Groves, pressed 
Donovan to begin an active campaign. Donovan agreed, and created a section of the OSS 
Secret Intelligence branch to pursue information on German scientists, industrial plants, 
and research. In November he instructed Allen Dulles, who was the OSS chief of station 
in Bern, Switzerland, to seek out information on a number of Italian scientists, including 
Gian Carlo Wick and Edoardo Amaldi (see Chapter 1).
58
 Throughout the remainder of the 
war, the OSS would play an invaluable role in the scientific intelligence collection effort.             
Groves, Lansdale, and Furman were doing all they could to establish an effective 
intelligence organization in Washington, but they understood that eventual success would 
require a presence closer to the theater of operations. In January, 1944, Groves sent 
Major Horace K. (Tony) Calvert to London to establish a forward base of operations for 
the MED’s intelligence effort. Calvert, a lawyer in the oil industry in peacetime, was 
chosen for this assignment because he had significant experience in intelligence (he had 
worked under Lansdale when Lansdale was at G-2, and then followed him to the MED), 
and had an extensive background in the American atomic bomb project. As a result, 
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Groves felt “that he would be well qualified to recognize any danger spots in the German 
picture.” Groves gave him the following instructions as he departed for Europe: 
He was to gather all possible information on the various atomic energy efforts under way 
in Europe, particularly those being carried out by the Germans; to make use as far as 
possible of existing American and British channels; to keep his intelligence estimate up 
to date at all times and to report to us in Washington everything that he considered to be 
of importance. He was also expected to establish close and friendly relations with the 
Englishmen and Americans with whom we might have to deal from time to time, both in 
London and, as the situation developed, on the Continent.
 59
 
    
 Calvert arrived in London and immediately reported to Colonel George B. 
Conrad, G-2 of the European Theater of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA). 
Armed with a letter of introduction from General Strong, Calvert was able to convey the 
importance of his mission and, as a result, was given a desk in Conrad’s office where he 
could organize and analyze the raw intelligence data as it arrived. Afterwards, Calvert 
reported to John Gilbert Winant, United States ambassador to the United Kingdom. 
Unlike Conrad, Winant was only given incomplete and misleading information about 
Calvert’s mission (for security reasons, atomic information was considered need-to-
know, and Winant did not need to know), but it was enough to get Calvert the promise of 
the utmost support from the ambassador, a desk in the embassy, and the official title of 
Assistant Military Attaché. Soon thereafter, Calvert was joined in the embassy by another 
MED intelligence officer, George C. Davis, and accompanying support personnel (three 
Women’s Army Corps members – WACs – and two counterintelligence agents).
60
  
 Once the organizational details had been settled, Calvert and his team began the 
arduous task of analyzing all the known intelligence on the German program. To do so, 
they combined what had been collected and extrapolated by various methods in the 
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United States with what they could themselves collect from German refugees who had 
immigrated to London. They also studied German physics journals, interviewed anti-Nazi 
scientists in neutral countries, and perused German newspapers to obtain clues as to the 
locations of top German atomic scientists. Calvert’s team knew from Allied intelligence 
that many of Germany’s leading scientists were working on the secret rocket program in 
the research institute at Peenemünde, but they believed that no nuclear scientists were 
among them. Therefore, the majority of prominent German atomic scientists – 
Heisenberg, Hahn, Harteck, von Weizsäcker, et al – remained unaccounted for. Operating 
on the principle that if he could find some of them, those would then lead to the rest 
(since it was more than likely a program of the size required to build an atomic bomb 
would be a collaborative effort), Calvert focused his attention on locating the very top 
echelon of German atomic physics. In time, this process proved successful; American 




 Scientists were only one aspect of the overall picture. Calvert and his team also 
studied German raw materials acquisition and industrial production. They analyzed 
uranium supplies at mines and processing centers controlled by the Germans, particularly 
the mine at Joachimsthal, Czechoslovakia and a prominent uranium processing center 
outside of Berlin. By utilizing various methods of observation and analysis, such as 
studying aerial surveillance photographs for activity at the mines, measuring 
microscopically the amount of ore piled outside the mines on subsequent days, and 
knowing the general grade of the ore extracted, the team could extrapolate the mine’s rate 
of production. They then could study laboratories and industrial plants in much the same 
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way. “Lists were compiled of all of the precious metal refineries, the physics laboratories, 
the handlers of uranium and thorium, manufacturers of centrifugal and reciprocating 
pumps, power plants and other such installations as were known to exist in the Axis 
countries.” The team systematically checked each plant on the list, only eliminating it 
when it had been proven that it was not being used for atomic research and production. 
Any facility that remained on the list was thoroughly vetted in any number of ways, 
including aerial surveillance, the OSS and other intelligence agencies, and the various 
underground or partisan movements. Whatever remained after this extensive process 
would be a future target of the scientific intelligence mission. According to Groves, “by 
hard work and constant effort, Calvert was ready by the time [the scientific intelligence 
mission to France] reached Europe on the heels of the invading armies with a good list of 
the first intelligence targets, dossiers on all the top German scientists, where they worked 
and where they lived, the location of the laboratories, workshops and storage points of 
interest.”
62
    
 While Calvert was establishing the MED’s scientific intelligence operation in 
London, Furman was in Washington exploiting a new and significant source of 
intelligence. Niels Bohr, Nobel laureate and close confidant of Heisenberg’s, had 
immigrated to the United States through Great Britain in December, 1943. Bohr gave 
Furman information on a number of German scientists, including their activities, 
associations, and political persuasions (how they felt about the Nazis). Most notably, 
however, Bohr related to Furman the details of a meeting between Bohr and Heisenberg 
that took place in Copenhagen in September, 1941. What was actually said at this 
meeting is the source of some historical controversy. According to historical accounts 
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from Robert Jungk, David Irving, Thomas Powers, and Heisenberg’s wife Elizabeth
63
, 
Werner Heisenberg met with Bohr in order to deescalate tensions between German and 
Allied scientists, and ultimately to ensure atomic weapons were not used in the war by 
either side. Each account portrays Heisenberg as a reluctant participant in the German 
bomb program, and insinuated that he, along with many other prominent German 
physicists and chemists, were doing what they could within the restraints of the Nazi 
system to retard the progress of atomic research.  
 Jungk’s 1956 book Brighter than a Thousand Suns: A Personal History of the 
Atomic Scientists (published in German and first translated to English in 1958), to which 
Heisenberg himself cooperated and contributed, argued that, “although Heisenberg may 
not have longed for the eventual German collapse, he was convinced, purely as a matter 
of logic, that Germany must lose.”
64
 Jungk also contended that Germany had given up on 
building an atomic bomb as early as late summer 1941 (before the Heisenberg visit to 
Copenhagen), and that Heisenberg, known to give public statements in defense of the 
Nazi regime, only did so “in order to disguise his true sentiments” from the German 
authorities.
65
 In a letter from Heisenberg to Jungk included in the book, Heisenberg wrote 
that by the time he met with Bohr, German scientists were working to ensure Germany 
would never have an atomic bomb:  
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[the difficulties and immense resources involved in building a bomb] enabled the 
physicists to influence further developments. If it were impossible to produce atomic 
bombs this problem would not have arisen, but if they were easily produced the 
physicists would have been unable to prevent their manufacture [emphasis added]. This 
situation gave the physicists at that time decisive influence on further developments, 
since they could argue with the government that atomic bombs would probably not be 
available during the course of the war.
66
     
 
  
 Heisenberg’s recollections are based on extensive notes he wrote after the 
meeting, and according to Jungk, “are the best existing source” for what happened in 
Copenhagen in the autumn of 1941.
67
 Yet what Jungk did not know was that both Niels 
Bohr and his son Aage (who would also become a Nobel laureate in physics) had 
recorded a much different account of the events in Copenhagen, and it can be safely 
assumed that it was Bohr’s version of the story that was related to Furman in December, 
1943. Aage Bohr contends that Jungk’s and Heisenberg’s account of the meeting “has no 
basis in the actual events,” and that instead of emphasizing that the Germans had quit on 
their atomic ambitions, Heisenberg gave his father “the impression that the German 
authorities attributed great military importance to atomic energy.”
68
 In an unsent letter to 
Heisenberg written after the war, Niels Bohr wrote him that he was “greatly amazed to 
see how much your memory has deceived you in your letter to [Jungk].” He also revealed 
that during his visit Heisenberg “expressed [his] definite conviction that Germany would 
win and that it was therefore quite foolish for [Bohr and the Allies] to maintain the hope 
of a different outcome of the war,” and that Heisenberg “spoke in a manner that could 
only give [Bohr] the firm impression that, under [Heisenberg’s] leadership, everything 
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was being done in Germany to develop atomic weapons and that [Heisenberg] said that 
there was no need to talk about details since [Heisenberg was] completely familiar with 
them and had spent the past two years working more or less exclusively on such 
preparations.”
69
 Most damningly, Bohr insinuated that Heisenberg was sent to 
Copenhagen by the German authorities, and the meeting in 1941 was “boldly arranged” 
to either discover what Bohr knew about the Allied bomb program or to convince the 
Allies to give up their ambitions altogether.
70
 
 For present purposes, it does not matter what actually occurred in Copenhagen. 
What does is what Bohr told Furman in December, 1943. If it is consistent with what he 
and his son argued after the war, then Furman and American scientific intelligence were 
given valuable insight into the status of the German atomic bomb program, and its leader, 
Werner Heisenberg. 
 
What the British Knew 
 Part of creating the overall intelligence picture of German atomic research 
included exploiting resources within British intelligence. One of John Lansdale’s first 
priorities after permanently joining Groves and the MED at the end of 1943 was to 
establish a relationship with his British counterparts. In January 1944 Lansdale sent 
Majors Furman and Calvert to London to make contact with British Secret Intelligence 
and those scientists and technicians working on the British version of the MED, a 
program the British codenamed “Tube Alloys.” There they met with Sir Charles Hambro, 
a member of a prominent British banking family and an experienced intelligence 
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 Furman and Calvert also established a relationship with Michael Perrin, the 
administrative head of the Tube Alloys office, his assistant, David Gattiker, and 
Lieutenant Commander Eric Welsh, a British Intelligence officer specializing in foreign 
atomic development, particularly in Norway (he had served as head of the Norwegian 
Section for British Intelligence). Furman would soon return to Washington, but Calvert 
remained and acquired a desk (his third in London) in the British Atomic Energy Office, 
where he acted as the liaison between Groves and the British.
72
   
 The British scientific leadership had convinced their government to take the 
German threat seriously more than two years before the American scientific intelligence 
program would begin. In April, 1940, the MAUD Committee,
73
 made up of prominent 
British scientists with close ties to the government
74
, met for the first time and agreed to 
establish an aggressive program to research atomic development. They also decided 
almost immediately to start a program to monitor German development in atomic 
physics, identifying a list of German scientists who would be instrumental to any Nazi 
atomic bomb, including Heisenberg.
75
 They followed that with a study of German 
scientific periodicals, obtained through neutral countries, and a systematic search of 
course offerings in German universities for classes taught by key atomic physicists.
76
    
 In addition, the British had followed German procurement of raw materials for 
bomb development. They discovered that the Germans had captured the largest reserve of 
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uranium oxide in Europe when they occupied Belgium in 1940. This material was located 
at the refinery of the Belgian company Union Miniere, in Oolen, a small town northwest 
of Brussels. The British also learned that the Germans were trying to increase the 
production of heavy water at the Norsk Hydro facility at Vemork in occupied Norway. 
Taken together, these indicated the Germans were well-equipped to undertake an 
aggressive bomb project. Yet the British had no indication of a link between the 
scientists, the raw materials, and the large-scale industrial effort necessary to build an 




 Major Calvert’s mission as it regarded the British was to tap into this established 
intelligence infrastructure and send back to Washington any information the British 
gathered about the German bomb. Nominally, the relationship between the Americans 
and the British scientific intelligence operations was intended to be a joint partnership on 
equal footing. However, both sides assumed they would take the leading role. The British 
believed their significant experience in scientific intelligence would convince the 
Americans to let them maintain their dominant position. After they first met with Furman 
and Calvert, and realized the Americans were novices in scientific intelligence, the 
British celebrated, “in anticipation that [they] were so obviously going to be the senior 
partners in the exchange.” Yet Groves was not about to cede power to anyone, certainly 
not the British. He saw this relationship not as a two-way exchange of information, but 
instead as an opportunity for American intelligence to expand its sources of intelligence 
collection. The United States would take what it could from British Intelligence, and only 
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reluctantly send back such information as they must to ensure a continuing relationship. 
For example, the planning and preparations for the Alsos Mission were completed 
independently of British involvement. They were informed after the fact when the 
scientific chief of the Alsos Mission to France, Samuel Goudsmit, arrived in London and 
explained his mission to British scientists and intelligence officials. In a fleeting moment 
of resentment toward their American Allies, the British considered forming their own 
scientific intelligence field team, independent of and a competitor to Alsos. Yet the 
reality of the situation would soon sink in, and the British decided that “it would be best 
for Anglo-American relations if, despite our greater experience, we should seek 
American permission to join the ALSOS mission under American leadership, and thus 
become very much the junior partner.”
78
    
 
Slowing German Progress 
 When Groves assumed responsibility for the American atomic intelligence 
program, he knew that the consensus among the scientific leadership was that the 
Germans had a significant lead over the Allies in the development of the atomic bomb. 
He also understood that it would take some time for his intelligence operation to reach its 
full potential. Thus it was imperative for Groves to find a way to slow German progress 
to allow for either the American bomb project to overtake that of Germany, or for 
American scientific intelligence to grow into an effective and efficient organization (or in 
an ideal world, both).  
 Groves decided the best means to accomplish this task was through direct military 
action, specifically a dedicated bombing campaign. He felt that explicitly targeting 
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German-controlled raw materials manufacture, research facilities, and prominent 
scientists could give the Americans the time they needed to close the atomic gap. The 
primary target for bombing was the Norsk Hydro heavy water plant located about 
seventy-five miles west of Oslo, Norway. Producing an estimated 120 kilograms of heavy 
water each month for the German atomic bomb program, the Rjukan facility was a key 
component of the German quest for atomic weapons. When Groves had taken control of 
the Manhattan Project in late summer 1942, he had pushed for British covert action 
against the Norwegian heavy water plant. The British complied, and in October, 1942 
they sent four Norwegian expatriate commandos into the Rjukan area to prepare for a 
larger follow-on force which was sent into Norway on the night of November 19. The 
mission, however, ended in disaster when the gliders carrying the main force crashed in 
Norway, killing most of the commandos. Those that survived were quickly captured by 
the Germans and summarily executed.  
 British Intelligence, realizing the importance of the facility, decided to send a 
second mission in February, 1943. This time they parachuted a much smaller force, six 
Norwegian commandos, onto a frozen lake thirty miles north of the heavy water plant. 
Armed with plastic explosives, the commandos attacked the plant on the night of 
February 27 by sneaking into the plant via a cable intake that led directly to the heavy 
water containers.  The commandos were able to destroy all eighteen stainless-steel 
electrolysis cells of the High Concentration Plant, destroying a half a ton of heavy water 
without any Norwegian, or even any German, casualties.
79
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 Initial reports from British Intelligence estimated that the plant would be out of 
operation for at least two years.
80
 A day later they amended this statement, explaining 
that their earlier estimate that the plant should be considered “ineffective for at least two 
years should be altered to read ‘should not be fully effective for more than 12 months.’”
81
 
In reality, both estimates were wrong, and the plant was fully repaired by April, 1943. By 
the fall of 1943, the Norsk Hydro heavy water plant was gearing up to resume operations 
at a level commensurate with the production it had achieved prior to the commando 
raid.
82
 German scientists had shipped heavy water from laboratories in German to refill 
the cells and jump-start the rebuilding process.
83
 Frustrated by the lack of success of 
covert action, and buoyed by his newly found power as commander of American atomic 
intelligence, Groves demanded direct military action against the heavy water plant. In a 
letter to George Marshall, Major General Strong of Army G-2 explained the rationale for 
the bombing: 
Dr. Bush and General Groves consider it of highest importance that the heavy water plant 
with adjoining power plant and penstock at Rjukan near Vemork, Norway, which have 
been restored to operation be totally destroyed. The destruction of the power facilities as 
well as the actual manufacturing facilities is desired as this is the only immediately 
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 General Marshall approved the request, and on November 16, 1943, B-17 
bombers from the American Eighth Air Force set off to take Norsk Hydro out of the war 
permanently. They scheduled the attack to coincide with the plant’s lunch period, so as to 
limit the number of Norwegian civilian casualties. One hundred and forty B-17s dropped 
over 350,000 pounds of bombs on the target area, destroying the power station and fatally 
damaging the electrolysis unit that provided hydrogen to the High Concentration Plant. 
While the bombing did not completely annihilate the heavy water plant (in fact, it left 
much of it untouched), the attack convinced the German high command to decommission 
the plant and move heavy water production to a safer location inside Germany. To do so, 
the Germans planned to dismantle the plant and transport its component parts, and 
whatever heavy water remained, to a secure location hundreds of miles to the east. The 
plant components and its valuable heavy water would be vulnerable until they reached 
the safety of German soil, and this gave Allied intelligence a unique opportunity to 
reduce significantly the threat of German heavy water.
85
 
 British Intelligence learned through the Norwegian resistance that the Germans 
were shipping the heavy water in barrels by rail back to Germany. To do so, they had to 
first transport the railcars by ferry across Lake Tinnsjø, one of the largest lakes in 
Norway. A Norwegian commando was able to sneak aboard the ferry, the SF Hydro, 
prior to its departure and plant plastic explosives along its hull. On February 20, 1944, the 
plastic explosives detonated and the Hydro sank, sending German freight cars and thirty-
nine barrels of heavy water to the bottom of the lake. Twenty-six of the fifty-three 
passengers and crew drowned (not counting the Germans escorting the railcars, all 
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Norwegian civilians), but in the minds of Groves and Allied intelligence this was 
acceptable collateral damage in the battle for atomic supremacy.
86
   
 In addition to the Norwegian heavy water facility, Groves advocated a bombing 
campaign against a number of key German scientific and industrial targets. This would 
include research facilities such as the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics, the Kaiser 
Wilhelm Institute for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry, and other scientific 
centers where atomic bomb research was thought to be conducted. Groves’ list also 
included industrial plants where technologies or materials tangential to atomic research, 
yet still intrinsic to its success, were produced, such as high explosives. Unlike the 
Rjukan bombing mission, however, the physical destruction of the plants was only a part 
of the overall goals of the campaign. To be sure, Groves hoped that bombing could 
damage these facilities “to put them out of commission for a considerable period of 
time,” but another goal, and perhaps it could be argued this was the primary goal, was to 
reduce the scientific capabilities of German atomic physics. To put it another, less 
euphemistic way (and the way it was presented to General Marshall), “the killing of 
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 If Groves did not have to worry about negative repercussions, it is likely he would 
have specifically targeted every prominent German scientist, laboratory, uranium mine, 
and atomic bomb-related production facility in occupied Europe. Yet he did not have that 
latitude. It was not for lack of authority.  Groves at that point could have asked for, and 
received, permission to attack almost any target he felt necessary to beat the Germans to 
the bomb. Instead, the primary factor limiting Groves’ actions was the fear that by 
appearing to give too much attention to German atomic development, Groves might tip 
off the Germans to America’s own bomb program. If the Germans discovered the United 
States was attempting to build an atomic bomb, they were certain to redouble their efforts 
to build their own. In addition, they would also take steps to conceal the German program 
from observation and espionage. The United States was having a difficult enough time 
learning about German atomic development as it was. If the German atomic bomb 
program went underground, it would make a difficult task even harder, and perhaps 
impossible. Thus, Groves was forced to find a delicate balance between aggressively 
pursuing intelligence on German atomic development while maintaining the secrecy of 
his own program.  
 Groves and the Americans were given a direct lesson in the need for discretion in 
the immediate aftermath of the commando raids on Norsk Hydro. In March, 1943, a 
Swedish newspaper published a report on the raid and the German response. The article 
speculated that the target of the raid was heavy water, and reported that European and 
Americans scientists were working on the production of a new, secret weapon using the 
heavy water as a means to achieve a massive explosion. By April, the story had moved 
across the Atlantic as the New York Times published an article about the raid entitled 
92 
 
“Nazi ‘Heavy Water’ Looms as Weapon.” Subtitled “Plant Razed by ‘Saboteurs’ in 
Norway Viewed as Source of New Atomic Power,” the Times article reported that heavy 
water had “hidden atomic power that can be used for the deadly purposes of war as well 
as the happier pursuits of peace,” and that it “apparently has become a source of anxiety 
for those Allied leaders who plan attacks against enemy targets.” Moreover, the article 
identified the potential uses of heavy water in producing an atomic bomb: “Heavy water 
or, more correctly heavy hydrogen water, is believed to provide a means of disintegrating 
the atom that would thereby release a devastating power.”
88
 
 Groves was able to contain the damage, mainly through the help of Harold Urey, 
the discoverer of heavy water, who scrambled to tell anyone in the press who would 
listen that heavy water could not be militarized.
89
 Groves convinced the Times not to 
follow up the story by appealing to their patriotism, but this experience left a lasting 
impression. When direct military force was used to bomb key German atomic targets 
(whether scientists, research facilities, or industrial plants), Groves made sure the 
missions were part of a larger bombing campaign to conceal the scientific, atomic-related 
targets. The B-17s that attacked Norsk Hydro, for example, were joined by several other 
flights of bombers which attacked targets throughout western and northern Europe to 
mask the intent of the primary target.  
 A major consideration in keeping the Germans in the dark about the American 
bomb project (and thus the American atomic intelligence program) was, of course, 
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security and counterintelligence, both of which were under the direction of John 
Lansdale.
90
 Lansdale had built the MED’s security and counterintelligence apparatus 
while he was still assigned to G-2, since the War Department’s Counterintelligence 
section was responsible for internal security for the first year of the project. With the full 
approval of General Strong and General Groves, Lansdale built an intelligence 
organization at headquarters, G-2, and also in the office of each Service Command 
(Corps of Engineers, Quartermaster Corps, Medical Corps, Signal Corps, Chemical 
Warfare Service, Ordnance Department, Military Police, Finance, Transportation, etc) 
and the Western Defense Command. Each of these offices operated entirely outside 
regular military channels, and Lansdale maintained separate records and chains of 
command from a liaison officer in the Service Commands who reported to Lansdale, and 
then Lansdale to Groves. In Lansdale’s words, “within a comparatively short time we had 
several hundred officers and agents in this nameless adjunct to the Military Intelligence 
Service.”
91
 Thus, the MED and Groves were able to utilize all the resources of the Army 
counterintelligence organization without having to disclose through regular channels the 
nature of [their] work.”
92
  
 When Groves took control of all United States atomic intelligence, he integrated 
security, counterintelligence, and foreign intelligence under one command. The timing 
was fortuitous. By the end of 1943 it was becoming increasingly difficult for Lansdale to 
carry out his duties while remaining assigned to G-2. The organization he had formed for 
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atomic security had become “so large that it was almost impossible for it to operate 
outside of regular channels any more,” and a reorganization of the War Department made 
G-2 less efficient and incompatible with Lansdale’s system.
93
 Therefore, Lansdale was 
transferred to the MED, along with detachment of officers he had cultivated in each of 
the Service Commands and the Western Defense Command. In all, 148 officers and 161 
enlisted men followed Lansdale to the MED.
94
  
 Together, Groves and Lansdale acted quickly to ensure the Manhattan Engineer 
District would remain a mystery to the Germans. They were able to designate as 
“restricted” the airspace over the three most important tracts of land to the project: Oak 
Ridge, Tennessee, Hanford, Washington, and Santa Fe/Los Alamos, New Mexico. This 
had the effect of protecting the work at these sites by forbidding flights over the 
projects.
95
 Lansdale was also able to fend off the Justice Department, who had begun an 
investigation of the DuPont Company. DuPont was a major contributor to the Manhattan 
Project and an overt, public investigation ran the risk of exposing their secret government 
work to the wrong people. Lansdale used the power of his office (in particular the power 
Groves had acquired for himself) to convince Tom Clark, Assistant Attorney General in 
charge of antitrust, to drop the investigation.
96
  
 Groves and Lansdale frequently found themselves at odds with other United 
States government agencies. This was a direct result of Groves’ management philosophy 
of wanting to avoid unnecessarily informing anyone about the activities of the MED. For 
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example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was nominally in charge of general 
security, counterintelligence, and counter-subversion in the United States. Yet Lansdale 
operated his security office across the United States since Groves had no intention of 
sharing the secrets of the atomic bomb with the Bureau.
97
 Groves was even more 
vehement about keeping the American atomic bomb program secret from the United 
States Department of State (long considered the government department least capable of 
keeping secrets from foreign powers – or anyone for that matter). He was concerned that, 
in the performance of his duties, he would be required to negotiate agreements with other 
nations, particularly Great Britain. This would apply if the United States decided to enter 
into a partnership with the British (which they did) to work together on scientific 
intelligence operations or on the acquisition of nuclear materials. Groves ordered 
Lansdale to prepare a legal memorandum providing Groves with the legal cover to use 





 By the winter of 1943/44, Groves had successfully consolidated his power, 
established an organizational foundation for future scientific intelligence efforts against 
Germany, tapped into the British scientific intelligence operation, slowed German 
progress toward their atomic ambitions, and shored up the security of the Manhattan 
Project (at least as far as the Germans were concerned. The Soviets were another matter 
altogether). There was still work to be done in each of these areas to achieve the 
perfection that Groves demanded (in himself and his subordinates). In fact, Groves would 
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continue to dedicate time and attention to each throughout the remainder of the war. 
However, as Allied forces began to march up the Italian peninsula in the spring of 1944, 








John Lansdale later recalled that he first conceived the idea for a scientific 
intelligence mission to Europe “sometime around the middle of 1943.” He believed that 
the only way to achieve an acceptable degree of certainty in regard to the German atomic 
bomb program was if the United States moved the “intelligence gathering activities into 
the very front line of the fighting activity.” Since earlier methods of discovery had failed, 
Lansdale maintained “that there was no way to get such information except after the 
occupation of areas where the research was going on.” Such a mission, he argued, could 
produce the “means of examining activities in universities, of sampling the water in 
various streams for radioactivity where the streams might have received discharge of 
cooling water from atomic piles and the like.” In addition, Lansdale worried that German 
atomic research facilities, documents, and other key intelligence sources would be 
destroyed during and after battle. Retreating enemy forces were likely to carry away or 
destroy persons, documents, or equipment of possible value to the Allies. In addition, he 
feared the effects of the “inevitable looting by victorious front line troops.” Victorious 
armies, he observed, frequently occupied large buildings, facilities, or enemy 
headquarters, scattering, damaging, or destroying scientific documents they did not and 
98 
 
could not identify as important. Lansdale insisted that it was imperative that American 
scientific intelligence got there first.
1
 
 That summer Lansdale brought his idea to Leslie Groves, who had already been 
thinking along those same lines. Together they formulated a general plan for a scientific 
intelligence mission to Italy, and presented it to Major General George Strong, the G-2, 
explaining to him that this would be the best way to exploit “sources of information that 
would become available to [the United States] as the American Fifth Army advanced up 
the Italian peninsula.”
2
 With the concurrence and support of Vannevar Bush and the 
OSRD, Strong submitted the proposal for approval to Army Chief of Staff General 
George Marshall. In his memorandum, dated September 25, 1943, Strong told Marshall 
that “while the major portion of the enemy’s secret scientific developments is being 
conducted in Germany, it is very likely that such valuable information can be obtained 
thereon by interviewing scientists in Italy.” The proposal recommended that the mission 
be made up of a commanding officer (either a Lieutenant Colonel or Colonel), no more 
than six interpreters (of various military grades), no more than six Counter Intelligence 
Corps Special Agents as investigators (also of various grades), and no more than six 
scientists (either civilian or military). According to Strong, “this group would form the 
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 Lansdale, Groves, and Strong were acutely aware that if the scientific intelligence 
mission was seen as overtly targeting atomic scientists and installations, it could alert the 
Germans, causing them to redouble their atomic research efforts and push their program 
even farther underground. Lansdale, Groves, and Strong thus decided to disguise the true 
purpose of the mission by broadening it to target all areas of German scientific research, 
not just atomic weapons. Thus, the mission was directed “to exploit to the fullest sources 
in a number of fields of technical interest.”
4
 In Strong’s memorandum to Marshall, he 
wrote, “the scope of inquiry should cover all principal scientific military developments 
and the investigations should be conducted in a manner to gain knowledge of enemy 
progress without disclosing our interest in any particular field.”
5
 Groves was so intent on 
drawing “attention away from the mission’s interest in atomic matters” he decided that, 
on paper at least, the mission should report directly to Strong at G-2. Strong would then 
relay the information to the appropriate agency, atomic intelligence to Groves, and other 
scientific intelligence to whomever was most interested.
6
  
 Despite these precautions, Groves worried that the primary goals of the mission 
would be discovered by the enemy. Part of this fear stemmed from the name of the 
mission itself. The unnamed individual or individuals in G-2 who were tasked with 
assigning code names to operations decided to name the scientific intelligence mission 
“Alsos.” Although it sounded innocuous enough, and in many cases it was assumed to be 
an obscure acronym, alsos is actually the Greek word for “grove” or “a grove of trees.” 
Someone at G-2 with a misplaced sense of humor thought it would serve as homage to 
the MED director. Terrified that the mission’s secrecy would be compromised even 
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before the mission began, Groves briefly contemplated ordering the name to be changed, 




 The next task was to choose the scientific personnel for the operation. This was 
left to the OSRD, Vannevar Bush, and Bush’s deputy, Carroll L. Wilson. In late 
September, Wilson sent Bush a memorandum outlining the scientific goals of the 
mission, and recommending a number of scientists who were qualified to serve in Alsos. 
When describing the purpose of the mission, in scientific intelligence terms, Wilson 
wrote “the purpose ostensibly, and in a very real sense, would be to send some scientific 
personnel familiar with important phases of the OSRD program to Italy for the purpose of 
interviewing Italian scientists, if and when available for such interview, both to determine 
the current status of Italian research and development and to find out as much as possible 
through such individuals concerning German work.” He then espoused the true reason for 
Alsos: “A very definite purpose of the Mission would be to find out information in the S-
1 field
8
 and presumably one or two of the scientific personnel, perhaps a physicist and a 
physical chemist, would be given sufficient information concerning the S-1 program here 
to allow them to probe intelligently for information in this field. Although this might be 
the true purpose of the Mission, it would be masked behind the façade of general 
scientific interests.” 
 Wilson’s memorandum then continued by listing the preferred traits and 
characteristics of the ideal scientist for a scientific intelligence operation. He argued that 
“the most desirable combination of qualifications would be fluency in Italian, 
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acquaintance with Italian scientists, and full clearance and knowledge of important parts 
of the OSRD program.” Unfortunately, there were very few scientists who met these 
criteria. Most of those who were cleared for secret work did not have the Italian language 
skills necessary for the operation, and Wilson believed that interpreters alone would not 
suffice: “[the reason] for wishing to have a scientist who speaks Italian fluently is that 
much of the scientific and technical terminology would be unknown to an interpreter not 
trained in scientific work.” The one exception was Major Will Allis, a MIT-educated 
physicist who was on loan from the NRDC to the War Department. Allis had grown up in 
France, spoke French, German, and Italian fluently, and was fully acquainted with the 
OSRD’s scientific programs, particularly the top secret radar project. Major Allis was a 
perfect fit for Alsos. 
 The make-up of the rest of the scientific team “would depend upon the fields in 
which [the mission is] most likely to discover information of value.” Other than atomic 
intelligence, of course, Wilson suggested the group be composed of scientists who could 
exploit enemy developments in the fields of radar, communications, guided missiles, 
rockets, explosives and general chemical developments, and controlled torpedoes. His 
memorandum provided Bush with a list of potential candidates and their qualifications, 
“some personnel who would be available for consideration as members of such a 
Mission.” The list included Dr. Isidor Isaac (I.I.) Rabi of Columbia University (a well 
known physicist who was personally acquainted with some of the Italian physicists), Dr. 
Louis Turner of Princeton (a well known physicist and undoubtedly known to the various 
Italian physicists), Dr. David Langmuir of the OSRD (who was fully acquainted with 
both the United States and British radar programs), Dr. Samuel Goudsmit of the 
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University of Michigan (a well known nuclear physicist, and although he did not speak 
Italian he knows some of the Italian physicists), Dr. Ralph E. Gibson of the Carnegie 
Institution (Chairman of the Rocket Propellant Panel of the Joint Committee on New 
Weapons and Equipment), Dr. Robert Shankland of the Case School for Applied Science 
in Cleveland, Ohio (head of the Underwater Sound Reference Labs), Dr. Alfred Murray 
of the NDRC (in college he studied Technical German for three years, and French for one 
and a half years), Dr. T. R. Hogness of the University of Chicago who was connected 
with the chemical divisions of OSRD for two years and also for about a year or more a 
member of the London Mission of OSRD covering chemical developments), Dr. George 
Kistiakowsky of the NDRC (who was in charge of the explosives research and 
development work for NDRC for two years and had directed the efforts in an extensive 
program of NDRC on explosives and propellants…Also, he undoubtedly knew, and may 
have been acquainted with, some of the Italian chemists), and Dr. John Johnson of 
Cornell University (Acting Head of the London Mission, with particular responsibilities 
in the chemical field).
9
  
 Wilson’s list of scientists provided Bush with everything he needed in order to 
assign “top grade scientific personnel” to the Alsos Mission. In a letter to Groves, Bush 
recommended George Kistiakowsky to Groves as the best candidate for the operation, 
arguing “if you have this man on the job you will need no one else, except for auxiliary 
purposes and scenery.” He also concurred with the recommendation of Will Allis for the 
mission. “The suggestion of Major Allis as one of the officers,” Bush wrote, “seems to 
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me to be excellent from his knowledge and background…I think he would make a useful 
individual to go along.”
10
 
Rounding out the scientific team was Dr. James B. Fisk of Bell Laboratories. Fisk 
had been working with the OSRD under Bush and Wilson and could be temporarily 
spared from his scientific work for such an important operation.  
 Bush and Wilson had discussed the idea of including on the mission a 
representative from the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA). The 
Committee wanted to send one of their scientists to Italy in order to discover what they 
could about enemy aircraft developments. Both Bush and Wilson felt that this was a 
prudent suggestion, Wilson arguing that the “addition of an aeronautical engineer would 
diversify the group and add further camouflage to the S-1 purpose,”
11
 and Bush 
concurring: a NACA representative “certainly will provide means for disguising the 
objects of the mission when necessary.”
12
 In the end, however, Groves and Lansdale 
decided not to include a NACA scientist. Their reasons are not entirely clear from the 
available documents, but it seems likely that they felt the potential costs outweighed the 
benefits. A representative from NACA would help to hide the true intentions of the 
mission, yet extra members meant extra security risks, and NACA was not an 
organization whose support was essential to the overall mission. 
 The same could not be said about the Department of the Navy, which requested 
inclusion in the mission in November. Lieutenant Bruce Old, a classmate of Will Allis at 
MIT and a scientist in the Office of the Coordinator of Research and Development in the 
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Navy Department, had heard through Allis of the operation being assembled for the 
Italian theater. Old spoke to Lansdale, and with Groves’ permission Lansdale asked Old 
to join the mission. In a memorandum to the Army G-2, Major General Strong, Lansdale 
explained the MED’s rationale for including the Navy in Alsos. Lansdale wrote to Strong 
that Groves was “of the opinion that minor Naval participation would be most desirable 
and that every effort should be made to arrange it so that any Naval participation would 
be under our control.” In addition, Lansdale maintained that “it was believed that any 
Naval officer accompanying the expedition should be assigned to the detachment and be 
a part of it subject to the direction of the Commanding Officer thereof, and subject to the 




 On November 10, 1943, Secretary of Navy Frank Knox formally requested Navy 
representation in Alsos. He wrote Henry Stimson, the Secretary of War, and said that 
Alsos “offers such interesting possibilities for obtaining valuable technical 
information.”
14
 Stimson agreed, and on November 16 officially approved Lieutenant Old 
as a member of the Alsos Mission.
15
 Naval participation would help to mask the true 
intentions of the mission, but more importantly the inclusion of Old would guarantee 
Alsos would receive the full support of the entire United States military.
16
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 All that remained was to choose the military commander of the mission, and for 
this Lansdale and Groves selected 43-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Boris Pash. Pash was 
the son of a Russian Orthodox priest. He had been born with the name Boris Pashkovsky 
in California but had moved to Russia as a teenager. He saw his first taste of combat 
fighting against the Bolsheviks during and after the Russian Revolution. Pash returned to 
the United States in the 1920s when it became clear that the Bolsheviks would maintain 
their control in Russia. He joined the Army Reserve and was called to duty in Army 
Intelligence in 1940 when the United States military began to mobilize. A bitter opponent 
of communism, Pash was assigned the task of investigating communist subversion in the 
San Francisco-Berkeley area, where his job required him to pay close attention to a 
number of “young scientists and technicians working in the many scientifically oriented 
establishments in the San Francisco Bay area” who were active members of the 
Communist Party (CPUSA).
17
 He first came to the attention of Lansdale and Groves 
when he became the liaison to the MED for the Western Defense Command, where his 
“thorough competence and great drive had made a lasting impression” on the MED 
director.
18
 By early 1943, Pash was “conducting a wide spread and complex investigation 
of communist activity” at the Berkeley Radiation Laboratory, following suspected 




 Pash was a perfect fit for the organization Groves was trying to create. He was 
motivated, dedicated to the mission, and perhaps most importantly, completely loyal to 
Groves: 
                                                          
17
 Lansdale, p. 28-29 
18
 Groves, p. 192 
19
 Lansdale, p. 29 
106 
 
I had had experience with General Groves while working on the Soviet espionage case. 
We had always come to a speedy meeting of minds – and there had never been a question 
as to whose mind was met! The General knew how to get results. He never tolerated the 
staff gobbledegook and beating around the bush of which there was so much in 






 Pash was officially transferred from the Western Defense Command to the MED 
in late November, 1943, but by then it was just a formality. He had been part of 
operational planning for Alsos since at least early October, and by the time of his official 
transfer the infrastructure for his command had been finalized. He would serve as the 
commanding officer of a detachment that included four scientists – Major Allis of the 
War Department, Lieutenant Commander Old of the Navy Department, and Drs. Fisk and 
John Johnson of the OSRD
21
 - four interpreters, six Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) 
officers, and an executive officer – Captain W. B. Stanard – who would manage many of 
the administrative tasks of Alsos. The CIC officers would be assigned to the mission once 
it had established itself in theater.
22
 For security purposes, of the scientists only Fisk was 




According to Leslie Groves, the Alsos Mission was unlike any intelligence 
operation previously assembled: 
Its make-up was considerably different from that of other intelligence units. It included 
people who were capable of extracting through interrogation and observation detailed 
scientific information on atomic energy. It also contained people who were generally 
familiar with the research programs and interests of both the United States and Great 
Britain and, insofar as possible, of our enemies. The members of the mission had to have 
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general knowledge of enemy equipment and they had to be prepared to seek out not only 






On November 26, General Strong brought Pash to meet Secretary of War 
Stimson, who provided him with a letter of introduction to General Eisenhower, the 
commander of Allied forces in North Africa and Italy. Stimson’s letter identified Pash as 
an officer who “has been specifically charged with the procurement of information 
concerning the scientific activities and developments of the enemy.” The letter informed 
Eisenhower that American intelligence “believed that a large amount of such information 
is available within the territories under your command.” The Secretary of War considered 
“this mission to be of the highest importance, and it is essential that it be accomplished 
expeditiously and successfully.” Stimson implored Eisenhower to “give Colonel Pash 
every facility and assistance at your disposal which may be necessary or helpful in the 
speedy completion of this mission.”
25
 Pash was also given a letter from General Strong to 
General W. Bedell Smith, Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff. This letter “contained a request 
that any needed personnel, equipment and funds be made available and that direct 
communication with Washington be arranged for [Pash].” This was a fairly significant 
departure from standard operating procedure, particularly in the case of someone as 
junior as a Lieutenant Colonel, and according to Pash “the letters were a further 
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 On December 13, 1943, the Alsos Mission assembled in Algiers and Pash 
reported to Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) and General Smith.
27
 After presenting 
Smith with the letters from General Strong and the Secretary of War, Pash told him “of 
the interest of the President in the Project [the MED] and he was given some general 
information pertaining to the project and to the aims of the mission as they relate to this 
project.” Smith promised that the mission would receive every priority, and he gave Pash 
“verbal approval and orders to send reports and communications relating to the project 
without filing copies of such reports at AFHQ.” Smith then told Pash that the Deputy G-
2, Colonel Roderick, would be his contact at the headquarters, and that Roderick had 
been instructed “to make all necessary arrangements for the mission.”
28
 
 In the short term, “necessary arrangements” meant transportation. Roderick 
provided the Alsos Mission with seats on the first available flight to Naples, where they 
arrived on December 15 and Capt. Stanard established their Alsos Mission headquarters 
in the Bank of Naples (Banco di Napoli). Smith had ordered them to report to the 
commander of the Allied Control Commission
29
 in Brindisi, Major General A. K. Joyce, 
after they had established themselves in Italy. However, once they had arrived in Brindisi 
on the 17
th
 they discovered Joyce was temporarily away from headquarters, and thus they 
reported to Joyce’s deputy, Brigadier General Maxwell Taylor. Taylor had not been 
briefed on the mission, and “he flatly stated that he would not do a thing for us unless we 
told him the whole story.” After some negotiation, Taylor agreed to have one of his 
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officers attend to their immediate needs while they waited for the return of Gen. Joyce, 
who was expected back the following afternoon. 
 In the meantime, Pash and Alsos traveled to Taranto, where Cdr. Old had 
arranged a meeting with Captain Zaroli
30
 of the United States Navy and the Allied Navy 
Command. Pash explained to Zaroli the general aspects of the mission, and believed he 
would “be very useful in establishing necessary contacts” in both the U.S. and Italian 
navies.
31
 In fact, Zaroli introduced the Alsos team to Lieutenant General Matteini, head 
of Italian Navy Ordnance, and other high officials of the Italian Navy.
32
 After leaving Old 
and Allis in Taranto to continue liaison with the navies, Pash, Fisk, and Johnson returned 
to Brindisi to meet with Gen. Joyce. Over an hour was spent with the Joyce, “during 
which time [they] went into more detail about the mission,” and after this explanation, 
Joyce was “extremely cooperative and said that he will do everything to have mission 
succeed.” He called in Gen. Taylor, explained to him the importance of the mission, and 
told him of “the need and desire to [give] priority [to] all [Alsos’s] requests.” According 
to Pash, “it was the first encouraging reaction we [received] since we left Washington, 
beside the attitude of Gen. Smith, CofS, AFHQ.”
33
 After the mission was explained to 
both generals, Alsos “received 100% cooperation and it is [Pash’s] opinion that no other 
headquarters and no other officer could give any more support than was received by both 
generals.” Both Joyce and Taylor promised “that any request made by [Alsos] and which 
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they are in position to grant will be given first priority. Subsequent events have indicated 
that they meant what they said.” 
      “Subsequent events” included a meeting, arranged by Joyce, between Alsos 
scientists and the Italian Minister of Communications that took place on December 20. 
The Minister promised to introduce the Americans to prominent Italians who might know 
something about German scientific progress. Most importantly, Joyce assisted in 
brokering a meeting on December 23 between Pash and Marshall Pietro Badoglio, head 
of the Italian Provisional Government and soon-to-be Italian Prime Minister. Badoglio 
provided Pash with yet another letter of introduction, this time addressed to all Italian 
civilian and military authorities.
34
 
 On the 25
th
, all the members of Alsos reconvened in Naples. During the week in 
Italy, Pash had established relationships with the appropriate authorities to smooth the 
way for Alsos operations, allowing “the mission to become substantially independent of 
any formal organizations in this theater.” The scientists of the mission had spent the week 
interviewing “all of the available informed individuals who have information of special 
interest.” Intelligence had been collected “regarding some German developments as well 
as a fairly complete picture of Italian research efforts and results.” While there was 
doubtlessly “further information available which [would] form an important background 
for activities in Rome,” the scientists believed it was evident “that the information of 
importance which [had] been available in Southern Italy [had by then] been given either 
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to members of [the] mission or, during the past three months, to other intelligence 
units.”
35
   
 The Italian scientists most likely to have information about the German atomic 
bomb program were Edoardo Amaldi and Gian Carlo Wick, both of whom were believed 
to be in Rome. Wick and Amaldi were nuclear physicists who had been close 
collaborators of Enrico Fermi before Fermi left for the United States. They also both 
knew Werner Heisenberg well, and could perhaps provide Alsos with key information 
about the most important of German atomic scientists. On December 28, Pash visited the 
headquarters of the military unit tasked with the capture of Rome, the United States Fifth 
Army. There he met with a Colonel Howard, the Fifth Army’s G-2, and “established very 
satisfactory relationships” with the G-2 “and associated sections of the Fifth Army.”
36
 
Together with Col. Howard and the commander of the Fifth Army, Lieutenant General 
Mark Clark, Pash developed the plan for the Alsos Mission’s operations in Rome. They 
decided that the advanced force of the Alsos Mission (Pash, Old, Allis, and the CIC 
agents – the military personnel) “will go into Rome with first occupying forces.” The 
mission would be “to secure all scientific documents and pick up such people as may be 
of value,” and to prevent their dispersal or destruction. The scientists of Alsos would 
follow when the battlefield was secured.
37
    
 The plan in place, all that remained was for Allied forces to break through 
German resistance and get to Rome. Yet the Allied armies had been slow to reach this 
goal, hampered by bad weather, rough terrain that favored the defenders, and strong 
                                                          
35
 “Non-Technical Report from Alsos Mission,” January 20, 1944, Correspondence (“Top Secret”) of 




 Pash to Lansdale, December 30, 1943 
112 
 
German resistance. The advance up the Italian peninsula was halted short of Rome at 
what was known as the Gustav Line, a series of German defensive fortifications that ran 
from coast to coast across Italy. During the first weeks of January, Pash and members of 
Alsos made frequent trips to Fifth Army Headquarters to inquire about the status of the 
war. What they heard was “discouraging as far as [their] mission was concerned. The 
campaign was in a static period and there was no hope of reaching Rome soon.”
38
 Pash 
was getting more and more frustrated. The scientists were keeping busy interviewing any 
Italian scientists and captured technical specialists, “but those early contacts indicated 
that no startling results could be expected even though some valuable scientific 
intelligence [not atomic bomb-related] was being picked up.”
39
  
There was so little for Alsos to do that Pash decided, in consultation with Fisk, to 
send Dr. Johnson back to the United States “in view of the fact that the…situation [did] 
not justify retaining both him and Fisk.” Pash also decided that if the Fifth Army did not 
break through to Rome in the very near future, he planned on sending Fisk home as well. 
He argued that “it seems that a mission of this nature does not require men of Fisk’s or 
Johnson’s calibre [sic].” Old and Allis were performing well and could handle the 
scientific tasks alone. Highly qualified scientists such as Fisk and Johnson were being 
wasted in Italy, particularly “when they are kept unoccupied for a period of time due to 
lack of available personnel for questioning…This is the situation in our case.”
40
 
 Pash regained some hope in the third week of January when he heard about the 
planned Allied amphibious landing against German forces in the area of Anzio. Code-
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named Operation Shingle, the attack on Anzio was intended to outflank the Germans 
forces of the Gustav line and open an alternate route to Rome. Buoyed by the chance of a 
breakthrough, Pash began planning in earnest: 
We have evolved a plan in connection with the probable demonstration against 
Rome…Our party has been divided into two groups. The forward echelon will be 
commanded by me and we will go on to Rome with what is known as the S Force. This 
will be an amphibious operation, and by the time you get the report I’ll either be in Rome 
or will be dead, or maybe both. Anyway, we will go in to secure as rapidly as possible the 
objectives (buildings and persons) important to our mission. Old and Allis will go with 
me. Dr. Fisk, Capt. Stanard and thee agents will come up by land with most of our 
equipment. This plan seemed the most practicable one, if we were to get to Rome in a 




      
 The Anzio operation, however, did not achieve its ambitious goals. The Allies 
established a beachhead, but indecision and inaction by mission commander Major 
General John Lucas prevented the invading forces from exploiting the advantage of 
surprise. The delay allowed the Germans to surround the Allied force, and only the most 
heroic efforts allowed the Fifth Army to hold on to its foothold at Anzio. Clearly it would 
be some time before the Allies, and Alsos, entered Rome. Yet the men of American 
atomic intelligence were not content to remain idle while military operations floundered. 
If Groves, Lansdale, Furman, and Pash could not get to Wick and Amaldi through a 
general advance covert actions were necessary. This meant calling in the OSS. 
 
The OSS Contribution 
 The OSS began working on the German atomic intelligence problem in the fall of 
1943. From early November through late December, Donovan’s appointee as the head of 
the Technical Section of the Secret Intelligence Branch, Colonel Howard Dix, sent a 





series of requests for information on Italian and German atomic scientists to Allen Dulles, 
the top OSS official in Bern, Switzerland. Dulles was asked to provide the locations of 
thirty-three scientists, three of whom were Italian (Wick and Amaldi among them) and 
thirty of whom were German. The names of the scientists were coded: Werner 
Heisenberg was “Christopher,” Otto Hahn was “Tag,” Carl von Weizsäcker was 
“Lender,” Wolfgang Gentner was “Ernst,” and so on.
42
 When Dulles had intelligence to 
provide, he sent it to Dix under the code designation “Azusa,” indicating it was atomic 
intelligence and ensuring it was promptly brought to the attention of Groves and the 
MED intelligence team. 
 Dulles cultivated a number of intelligence sources in Switzerland, but none more 
important to American understanding of the German bomb program than fifty-three-year-
old Paul Scherrer. Scherrer was a Swiss physicist and professor at the Federal Technical 
College in Zurich. He was not a scientist of the same order as Heisenberg, Hahn, or most 
of the other top German atomic scientists. Yet Scherrer had been attending many of the 
same academic conferences as they had since the early 1920s, and as a result knew most 
of them rather well, and had been close friends with some of them, most notably 
Heisenberg, for over two decades. Code-named “Flute” by the OSS, Scherrer was never a 
formal agent of the OSS (he was never paid or formally recognized for his contributions). 
He did all he could, however, to aid the Allied cause, and so doing provided Dulles, the 
OSS, and the MED intelligence team with arguably the most productive insight into 
German atomic progress. In the spring of 1944, Scherrer gave Dulles what could 
essentially be called a bomb damage assessment (BDA) of the direct attacks on German 
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scientific facilities and scientists ordered in the fall of 1943 by Leslie Groves. He told 
him that the Kaiser-Wilhelm Institute for Chemistry outside of Berlin (Otto Hahn’s 
institute) had been partially destroyed, and the scientific institutes at Munich, Leipzig, 
and Cologne had been damaged beyond immediate repair. While Heisenberg’s institute, 
the Kaiser-Wilhelm Institute for Physics, had remained untouched, Scherrer told the OSS 
that the Germans were busy constructing alternate facilities in the countryside to where 
they would move their prominent scientists to protect them from Allied attacks. Some of 
them, according to Scherrer, had already begun to disperse throughout rural Germany, as 
von Weizsäcker and others had reportedly moved to Strasbourg, in the Alsace region. In 
southern Germany, in the vicinity of the towns of Bissingen and Hechingen, the Germans 
were building a laboratory with a 200-million-volt cyclotron, presumably for eventual use 
by Heisenberg and Hahn.
43
            
 While Dulles was busy exploiting sources in Europe, the OSS and Groves were 
planning covert operations back in Washington. One such operation concocted in late 
1943 was code-named Project Larson, and was designed to infiltrate an OSS agent into 
occupied Italy to interview Italian scientists about German atomic research. Chosen for 
the mission was forty-one-year-old OSS agent Morris (Moe) Berg. 
 Moe Berg was a professional baseball player before he was a spy. His baseball 
career began in 1923 when he was signed as a shortstop for the Brooklyn Robins (later 
Dodgers) of the National League. After hitting only .186 for Brooklyn (0 homeruns and 
only 6 RBI in almost 50 games) he was sent to the minor leagues, where he languished 
until 1926 when he signed with the Chicago White Sox. The White Sox would eventually 
move Berg to catcher, and although his lifetime statistics were mediocre at best (.243 





average with only 6 career home runs), this positional change would allow Berg to 
remain steadily employed in Major League Baseball for fifteen years (his understanding 
of the game, knowledge of hitters
44
, and defensive skills made him a valued asset, despite 
his offensive liabilities). Berg moved around the league throughout his career, leaving 
Chicago for Cleveland, Cleveland for a job with the Washington Senators, then back to 
Cleveland for a year before finally settling in to finish his baseball life with the Boston 
Red Sox, with whom he would retire in 1942 at the age of 40.
45
   
 Berg’s intellectual acumen made him a legend in the intelligence community.
46
 
He attended Princeton University, where he studied modern languages, graduating with 
fluency in Latin, Greek, French, Spanish, Italian, German, and Sanskrit (during his life 
Berg allegedly learned as many as twelve languages). After graduating, Berg studied 
French at the Sorbonne in Paris, and during the baseball offseason attended Columbia 
Law School, where he earned his law degree in 1928. As a member of the Washington 
Senators in 1934, Berg was included on a team of baseball all-stars, including Babe Ruth 
and Lou Gehrig, who went to Japan on a goodwill mission to play the Japanese all-stars. 
Since Berg was a little-known third-string catcher who could barely hit, it surprised 
baseball insiders that he was asked to join the team. What they did not know was that 
Berg had been sent to Japan at the behest of the United States Government.  
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  After giving an eloquent speech on Japanese-American relations at Meiji 
University (in perfect Japanese), Berg set out to complete the intelligence task assigned to 
him. Equipped with a camera, Berg snuck to the roof of a Tokyo hospital and took 
pictures of Tokyo Harbor, naval installations, and other high-value military targets. In 
1942, the pilots of the Doolittle Raid analyzed these same photos before their famous 
bombing run, although most of them were too old to be of much use. When the Second 
World War began, Berg volunteered for service, and he was assigned to the Office of 
Inter-American Affairs. He was sent to Latin America in 1942, where he used his fluency 
in Spanish to persuade government officials, journalists, and businessmen to resist 
joining the Axis cause. In 1943 Berg was recruited by William Donovan and the OSS, 
and they immediately put him to use, dropping him by parachute into occupied 
Yugoslavia. There he met with both opposition forces to assess their strengths and to 
recommend to the United States which group should be supported. After meeting with 
King Peter’s Chetniks and Tito’s Partisans, Berg concluded Tito was better equipped to 
fight the Nazis, and thus American aid went to Tito.
47
 
 When Berg was assigned to Project Larson in late 1943, his task was to sneak into 
Rome to interview physicists at the University of Rome about the German atomic bomb 
project, and try to discover the whereabouts of its supposed leaders, Heisenberg, Hahn, 
von Weizsäcker, and the rest. Unfortunately, he would not get the chance to accomplish 
this mission until the following summer. General Mark Clark, commander of the Fifth 
Army and no great fan of the OSS, refused to allow Berg to enter the theater. While 
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waiting for permission to enter Italy, Berg took the time to teach himself quantum theory 
and matrix mechanics. He read German physicist Max Born’s Experiment and Theory in 
Physics
48
 and studied Heisenberg and his uncertainty principle. By no means an expert, 
Berg still had taught himself enough of the physics of the atomic bomb to understand 
what it would take to successfully build one. This knowledge would be an invaluable 
asset in the coming months. 
 
Introspection and Reorganization 
 When it became evident in early 1944 that the Allies would not break the German 
lines and enter Rome for some time, Groves decided to redeploy the Alsos Mission back 
to the United States. The first to return was Dr. Fisk in early February. Bell Laboratories 
had written Vannevar Bush, arguing that since Fisk was not being effectively utilized in 
Italy, he should be immediately reassigned. Bush wrote Groves, and told him, “I feel that 
unless there is urgent reason for his remaining in Italy, he should perhaps return to this 
country.”
49
 By the end of February, Pash and Allis redeployed to the United States, and 
by the first week of March the remaining members, including Old and Stanard, were back 
in Washington. The CIC agents, borrowed from other U.S. Army forces in the Italian 
theater, were sent back to their home units on the understanding that the same personnel 
would be reassigned again to Alsos if and when the mission was resumed.
50
  
Upon their return to the United States, the members of the mission were asked to 
produce written reports on the Italian operation. Fisk, the first back in the United States, 
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was the first to do so. Fisk was also the only member of Alsos outside of Pash who knew 
the true objectives of the mission. Thus his reports (he wrote two) included both atomic 
intelligence as well as general Italian and German scientific developments. As far as the 
general science was concerned, Fisk’s report of February 14 was essentially a 
summarization of a January 22, 1944 report compiled by Fisk, Allis, Old, and Johnson.
51
 
It stated that the Alsos Mission had discovered information that could be valuable to 
Allied forces on a number of topics, including: rockets, ordnance, guided missiles, fire 
control, explosives, chemical weapons, communications, radar, and infrared.
 52
  
In the atomic field, Fisk’s report of February 5 provided information garnered 
from Italian contacts established by Alsos. He wrote that during attempts to “obtain direct 
evidence” on German atomic research, “it was unnecessary to use any great subtlety 
[with the Italian scientists] and it never became necessary to reveal our interest in the 
matter. Without exception the individuals approached were anxious to be of assistance 
and without exception they informed us that in all war research the Germans had been 
most secretive.” Therefore, actionable intelligence was at a premium: “Hence any 
evidence which may be of interest amongst the following fragments will be indirect and 
for the most part negative.” Fisk explained that Alsos had also tried to “build up a general 
picture of German war research activity and industrial activity which might subsequently 
allow a reasonable deduction of their interest and progress [in the atomic field].” 
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Sources of information for Alsos included (among others) a Professor Wolfers of 
Algiers, a Professor Henriot, who was an exiled Belgian physicist Alsos interviewed in 
Algiers, a Professor Calosi, who had worked with the Germans and prominent Italian 
scientists in Rome before returning to Naples, and a Professor Tiberio, a former student 
and collaborator of Edoardo Amaldi in Rome. Wolfers and Henriot told Alsos that 
several prominent French physicists were tortured to death by the Germans, “presumably 
for refusal to reveal some scientific knowledge.” Wolfers reported rumors he had heard 
that the Paris cyclotron had been moved to Germany, and Henriot stated that Frédéric 
Joliot-Curie was in Paris and might be working on fission (the two reports seem mutually 
exclusive, but that did not seem to faze the scientists), He also said he did not think the 
Germans were working on an atomic bomb, but Fisk believed Henriot “does not know for 
he had no evidence one way or the other.” Tiberio was reported to have told Alsos that he 
had talked to Amaldi in Rome in June 1943, and that Amaldi had told him “that Germans 
have tried nuclear explosive [sic] but have not succeeded.” Finally, Calosi stated “that the 
Germans had said a number of times that only those things which were in hand at the 
beginning of the war would be of any material use in the prosecution and final outcome 
of the war.” He felt that this was the German “guiding philosophy,” and he did not think 
“the Germans had in the course of development any ‘fantastic new weapon.’”
5354
  
This was the extent of atomic intelligence collected by the Alsos Mission in Italy. 
Making matters worse, in an exit interview with Robert Furman, Fisk warned that even 
this meager information should be considered suspect. He told Furman that Henriot got 
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his intelligence from the scientific “grapevine” and Fisk felt he “was not in possession of 
much recent information.” Fisk also thought Henriot was “not a good judge of what 
might be going on” since he had preconceived ideas about the impossibility of atomic 
weapons. He argued that Wolfers was not a serious source of information since it was 
most likely that Wolfers was just passing along intelligence that “probably comes from 
Henriot.” Fisk then indicated that the scientists interviewed were not considered top rate 
(they were “not of the Fermi school”), and that the University of Naples, where 
professors Calosi and Tiberio worked, was “definitely a second rate university according 
to American standards.” In all, Fisk told Furman that until Alsos entered Rome, very little 
concerning the German atomic program would be discovered, and perhaps not even then: 
“No one was found in southern Italy who was fundamentally interested in fission 
research. No one was studying the literature thoroughly. No one had written back to the 
German scientists who were writing on fission to question their thoughts.” According to 




Fisk believed the Germans were wise to exclude the Italians from atomic research 
“as unreliable.” The Italians in the south could not make a viable contribution to the 
German atomic research effort. The “Italians never expressed the thought that something 
ought to be done about fission during the war,” and the idea of an atomic bomb “was 
looked upon as fantastic and inconsequential.” Fisk described to Furman a meeting with 
Italian scientists in which one scientist stopped the conversation in order to inform other 
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(supposedly qualified) physicists “how fission would work in a bomb.” Unfortunately, 
“his explanation showed he was not very well informed.”
56
 
Despite the paucity of intelligence on the German atomic bomb program, 
however, Groves and Lansdale were not discouraged. From the first suggestion of a 
scientific mission to Europe in the summer of 1943, they understood it was unlikely that 
any information of value would be available in Italy. Alsos was intended as a dress 
rehearsal or prototype for later missions in France and Germany, or in Lansdale’s words, 
as a “training process.”
57
 Both he and General Groves perceived Alsos in Italy “as a 
unique opportunity to give [Alsos] a dry run or exercise to prepare it for the effort to 
acquire information about the German atomic program after the Allied landings in 
Europe.”
58
 By this standard, the Alsos Mission in Italy was, to Groves and others, “most 
successful.”
59
 It had shown that this type of operation, never before attempted, was 
feasible. Its success in working in the field, establishing the necessary contacts, and 
exploiting intelligence sources demonstrated that Alsos would be able to collect valuable 
atomic intelligence when it became available to them in the future. 
In addition, Alsos had done enough in other scientific fields to convince the 
scientific and military leadership that it was a worthy program. On February 29, 
Vannevar Bush recommended to Groves that based on the mission’s results, Alsos should 
be continued. Bush felt “that this has been a decidedly interesting experiment, and 
although the specific results of interest to your project have been few, some of the 
information obtained by the Mission which relates to work of the NDRC has been most 
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significant and one or two items have, in my opinion, justified the whole enterprise.”
60
 
Bush’s Executive Assistant at OSRD, Carroll Wilson, also believed that “although the 
results were rather meagre [sic] as far as your particular interests were concerned, both 
the direct and indirect results in other fields certainly repay the effort involved in 
organizing and conducting the Mission.”
61
 Not surprisingly, Furman and Pash agreed, 
each recommending the continuation of Alsos in memorandums to Groves on March 6.
62
 
Furman argued that Alsos was so important that even if the scientific and military 
hierarchy decided to end their sponsorship of the mission, “the continuance of the 
mission behind the invasion forces entering Rome and the organization of a mission to go 
behind the Allies’ invasion of Europe should be undertaken by this office if the efforts of 
Col. Pash to secure the support of other offices for this mission fail.”
63
   
On the basis of Bush’s recommendation, the experience Alsos gained in Italy, and 
the recommendations of Lansdale, Furman, Pash, and the rest of his team, Groves wrote a 
memorandum to new Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Major General Clayton Bissell
64
 on 
March 10, 1944, requesting the continuation of the Alsos Mission. Groves argued that the 
mission had withdrawn “from the Mediterranean Theater after completing its objective 
insofar as the situation in the Theater permitted.” He explained to Bissell that “the 
presence of specially trained and unusually qualified specialists proved to be of positive 
assistance to the regular G-2 agencies, who took advantage of the ability of the technical 
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personnel to make a proper scientific evaluation of available information.” After briefly 
detailing the non-atomic scientific discoveries of Alsos, Groves recommended that “the 
Alsos Mission should continue its present plan of operations in Italy,” including a 
“prompt entry into Rome when it falls under Allied control to secure individuals and 
documents.” Finally, Groves argued that “a similar scientific mission with the same 
general objectives should be made ready for use in other European territory as soon as the 
progress of the war permits.”
65
    
Three weeks later, Bissell wrote to Chief of Staff George Marshall recommending 
the organization of Alsos for scientific intelligence on a permanent basis. Bissell believed 
the “high value of the recent scientific intelligence mission” demonstrated that the 
program should be continued in other theaters in a similar manner. Although the invasion 
of Western Europe was not imminent, Bissell argued that since opportunities for 
scientific intelligence rapidly disappeared on the battlefield (due to destruction by 
retreating forces, looting, etc), it was imperative that the mission be organized in advance 
and “held in readiness.” This meant that personnel would need to be permanently 
assigned to the mission in order to work efficiently at a moment’s notice.
66
 The 
reorganized mission would require new scientific personnel, ideally scientists who could 
remain with the mission for the duration of the war. These would be selected by Groves 
                                                          
65
 Leslie Groves to Clayton Bissell, “Report of Alsos Mission, March 10, 1944, Correspondence (“Top 
Secret”) of Manhattan Engineer District, 1942-1946, RG 77, M1109, Roll 4, NARA II   
66
 This mainly applied to the supplementary personnel, such as CIC agents and interpreters who were 
borrowed from other units in the field 
125 
 




The delay between Groves’ request for the continuation of the Alsos Mission and 
Bissell’s letter to Marshall was caused by bureaucratic disputes, not any question as to 
the usefulness of the mission. During March, several members of the Army General Staff 
proposed to Marshall a plan to centralize all scientific and technical intelligence under 
one organizational command. While this new umbrella organization would have brought 
together in one place all the units concerned with this very specific type of intelligence, it 
would have effectually decentralized atomic intelligence. Leslie Groves would no longer 
have had immediate control of atomic intelligence operations, and they would have 
instead become one component of a broader scientific and technological intelligence 
effort.
68
 However, the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War understood that the 
existing structure was well suited to the effective collection of atomic intelligence, and so 
on April 4, Marshall and Secretary Stimson approved the request for maintaining Alsos 
as an independent organization.
69
 
The following day, Major Furman informed Groves of Marshall’s approval, and 
told him that “a similar organization with the same general objectives will be made ready 
for use in other European territories immediately and sent to an active theatre as soon as 
the progress of the war permits.”
70
 Groves, Lansdale, and Furman had already begun 
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planning in anticipation of approval, and in this they were joined by Deputy Assistant 
Chief of Staff, G-2, Colonel John Weckerling, Bissell’s point man for Alsos. Weckerling 
would be in charge of assigning the military intelligence personnel for the mission, and 
on April 8 he designated Colonel C. P. Nicholas to represent G-2 in the day-to-day 
supervision of the project. Nicholas had worked with MED intelligence in the past, and 
specifically Robert Furman during parts of the Italy mission.
71
 That same day, 
Weckerling, in Bissell’s name, informed the Navy Department and the OSRD of 
Marshall’s decision and officially invited their participation in the next incarnation of 
Alsos.
72
 For the OSRD and its chairman Vannevar Bush, this was merely a formality. He 
was heavily invested in the mission’s success and would do whatever was necessary to 
assist Alsos. However for the Navy, it took almost a month of deliberation before they 
agreed to assign a member to the new mission on May 6. The Navy would decide to lend 




In the meantime, Groves and the MED intelligence leadership had other 
problems. Several members of the Alsos Italy scientific team, most notably Dr. Fisk, had 
argued against retaining Boris Pash as military commander of the mission. According to 
Furman, Fisk told him that Pash had “no understanding of the scientific part of the 
mission,” and Fisk believed the commanding officer “should have a broad understanding 
of the various fields of scientific activity which could be based upon engineering or 
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scientific education.” This in itself did not bother Groves, for Pash was not chosen as 
commanding officer for his scientific knowledge, but instead for his intelligence 
experience, aggressiveness in the field, and loyalty to Groves. More problematic was 
Fisk’s other criticism of Pash, which directly questioned his leadership. Fisk argued that 
Pash abused the power he had been granted by the letters of introduction he was given by 
Stimson, Strong, and the Italian Prime Minister. He believed that Pash “exhibited these 
credentials unnecessarily at times which caused embarrassment to those in the mission 
and showed lack of good judgment.” Furthermore, while Fisk acknowledged Pash’s 
“persevering drive” and “enthusiasm” for his job, it was “this enthusiasm plus lack of real 
understanding as to the scientific objectives that caused him to make some errors…where 
excitement was certainly to be gained but likelihood of getting knowledge of enemy 
activities was rather remote. The risk involved in taking these chances did not appear to 
be worth the little knowledge that could be obtained.”
74
 
Major Allis agreed with much of what Fisk said, particularly the recommendation 
that the commanding officer of Alsos should be a scientist. Commander Old “concurred 
generally in this thought,” while Dr. Johnson argued that personal relations are highly 
important for the success of the mission and the commanding officer should have “the 
quality of congeniality” in order to relate to the mission’s scientists. 
As a result of these comments, combined with “cautiousness or perhaps suspicion 
on the part of Colonel Weckerling toward Lt. Col. Pash,” Col. Nicholas decided to 
proceed “carefully before accepting Col. Pash as Commanding Officer.” According to 
Furman, “while the remarks made by the scientists were made in an unofficial manner 
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and meant to be harmful, the appointment of Pash was nearly blocked.” In reality, 
General Groves could have made a quick phone call and Pash would have been instantly 
reappointed, but Furman opted not to ask Groves to make this call and instead wait to see 
what Nicholas would decide. In the end, Nicholas reinstated Pash, with the caveat that the 
new mission organization would have “a more defined latitude of operation for the 
Commanding Officer who will confine himself to implementing and facilitating the 
plans” of a head scientist. The Dean of Scientists, who would later be officially called the 
Chief of Scientists, would be “responsible for carrying out the scientific investigations 
and making the necessary reports.” In essence, the scientist would tell Pash where he 
needed to go, Pash would get him there, and then the scientist would investigate 
scientifically.
75
     
It is possible that Nicholas was swayed in his decision to keep Pash as 
commanding officer by a memorandum Pash sent him in early April. Whether Furman 
told Pash about the comments of the scientists, or Pash correctly perceived the attitudes 
of the scientists is uncertain, but Pash provided Nicholas with recommendations for the 
future Alsos operations that effectively answered many of his concerns. He argued that 
the “scientific members of the mission should control, to the extent that tactical 
conditions permit, the type of information sought and the selection of places in which and 
the persons from which the information should be obtained.” Pash recommended that a 
member of the scientific group be designated as the “senior member of the group who 
will coordinate the activities of the group and whose decision will be accepted as final.” 
This head scientist would “convey to the commanding officer of the mission the needs of 





the scientific group,” and all requests for action “will come either through him to the 
commanding officer or will be called to his attention by the commanding officer.”
76
  
By the beginning of May, the organizational infrastructure of the new Alsos 
Mission was beginning to take shape. Alsos would have a Commanding Officer (Pash), a 
Chief Scientist, and a newly-established informal Advisory Committee that would assist 
in creating an overall intelligence plan, coordinate requests for information from other 
governmental agencies, and facilitate the movements of Alsos throughout the European 
Theater. The Advisory Committee would consist of representatives of the Director of 
Naval Intelligence, the Director of the OSRD, the Commanding General of the Army 
Service Forces, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. This committee would concern 
itself with scientific intelligence of the non-atomic variety.
77
 
The mission itself was designed to “follow the advance of Allied forces into 
occupied territory, remaining the necessary time after the enemy’s defeat and making 
necessary visits and contacts in order to collect intelligence of the enemy’s scientific 
developments.” It would consist of two groups, independent, but working together to 
accomplish the overall mission. A military and administrative group, consisting of the 
commanding officer, his executive (who acted as an administrative assistant), and the 
mission’s interpreters, would be joined by a scientific group, consisting of the scientific 
chief (a civilian scientist), plus “such additional military and civilian scientists as are 
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attached to the mission with G-2 concurrence by the Director, OSRD, the Commanding 
General, Army Service Forces, and the Director of Naval Intelligence.”
78
 
As far as the day-to-day operations of the mission were concerned, the position of 
Scientific Chief was the only real departure from previous practices in Italy. This 
individual would have four main responsibilities: 1) to create the general plan in all its 
scientific aspects both with regard to objectives and personnel; 2) to prioritize the 
objectives with the assistance of the OSRD, the members of the first Alsos Mission, and 
the Army and Navy scientists on the current mission; 3) to evaluate the reliability and 
importance of intelligence sources; and 4) to determine the most effective approach to 
sources. The office of the Scientific Chief would also be tasked with keeping complete 




On May 15, 1944, 41-year-old nuclear physicist Samuel A. Goudsmit was named 
by the OSRD as the Scientific Chief of the Alsos Mission. Goudsmit was a Dutch-born, 
naturalized American physicist who had earned his PhD in the Netherlands under world-
renowned scientist Paul Ehrenfest. After he received his doctorate, Goudsmit moved to 
the United States and took a position as a Professor of Physics at the University of 
Michigan, Ann Arbor. When the war began, Goudsmit was recruited by the OSRD and 
the Radiation Laboratory at MIT to direct American radar research. He was a candidate 
for the Alsos mission to Italy, and his qualifications made him a natural fit for Scientific 
Chief. 
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For one thing, he was an exceptional scientist who had been on the cutting edge of 
nuclear physics for almost two decades. Since he had spent his early years in Europe, he 
spoke a number of languages fluently, including Dutch, French, and German. Also 
because of his Dutch ancestry and education, Goudsmit personally knew most of the 
French and German scientists whose research Alsos was tasked to investigate. He was 
also highly motivated. His parents, who he had last seen in 1938 when he returned to the 
United States from Europe for the final time before the war, were executed by the 
Germans in the Holocaust. Most importantly, however (at least as far as Groves and 
MED intelligence were concerned), was the simple fact that Goudsmit was not in any 
way involved in the Manhattan Project. He understood the principles of atomic fission, 
but he knew nothing about the progress of the American bomb program, and therefore 
could give away nothing to the enemy if he were to get captured. In Goudsmit’s words, 
he was “expendable.”
80
   
The same day as his officially appointment as Alsos Scientific Chief, Goudsmit 
sent Col. Nicholas a memorandum describing what he envisioned his job to be. Goudsmit 
wrote that “the purpose of Scientific Intelligence is to obtain knowledge about scientific 
war research in enemy and enemy occupied territory.” The mission of Alsos should be 
limited to war equipment in the early stages of research, and “does not include 
information about enemy equipment which is already in use.” To make this operation a 
success, “it is necessary to gather information about the location of research workers in 
enemy territory,” and to discover intelligence “about the research laboratories of large 
industries as well as educational institutions.” Goudsmit would also emphasize the 
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importance of investigating German scientific publications for clues “on what types of 
research are not considered secret,” and “what kind of university courses and research 
investigations receive special emphasis in enemy territory.”
81
  
In all, Goudsmit’s ideas about the purpose and operational philosophy of Alsos 
were consistent with those of Vannevar Bush and the MED intelligence team. In fact, the 
relationship that would eventually develop between Goudsmit and Pash was much more 
amicable and, as a result, much more effective, than the relationship between Pash and 
the scientists of the first Alsos Mission. The two became close friends, and continued 
their friendship through Goudsmit’s death in the late 1970s. What made this relationship 
work when the others did not cannot be known for certain. Perhaps Pash evolved in his 
view of the utility of scientists on the battlefield, no longer considering them as 
“idiosyncratic ‘longhairs’” who he would have to lead “by the hand to keep them from 
blundering into trouble.”
82
 Perhaps Pash knew how close he had come to being replaced 
on the mission and made every attempt to stay in Goudsmit’s good graces. Perhaps 
Goudsmit was just better equipped to handle Pash’s own shortcomings. At any rate, the 
two got along well, and according to Goudsmit after the war, “almost from the very 
beginning of operations in France, a clear understanding was reached concerning the 
division of responsibility between the military and the scientific groups of the Alsos 
Mission.” He believed the arrangement between he and Pash “worked out perfectly. 
Never did the military group question the judgment of the scientific group as to the 
importance of a target, and never did they fail to execute the operations as needed and 
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planned.” He concluded: “The Alsos method, it must be emphasized, succeeded only 
because of the close cooperation and mutual trust of the military and the scientists.”
83
    
At about the same time Goudsmit was receiving his appointment, in mid-May 
Pash traveled to Great Britain where he established the London Office of the Alsos 
Mission. It was in London that Pash met one of the key officers of the MED intelligence 
team for the first time, Tony Calvert (now a Major), who had been supplying him and the 
mission with information throughout the Italian campaign. Pash was impressed with 
Calvert, finding him “sharp, intelligent and at ease in any situation.” Together, Pash and 
Calvert spent several days formulating the plans for the Alsos Mission’s move to the 
Continent.
84
 While in London, Pash also reported to Lt. Gen Bedell Smith, who had been 
brought to Europe from Algiers to become the Chief of Staff, European Theater of 
Operations (ETO). Much like the Italian mission, Pash had been supplied with a letter 
from Secretary Stimson to Gen. Eisenhower, commander of the ETO, asking for the 
general’s full assistance to Alsos. Pash believed Eisenhower’s and Smith’s support would 
be imperative for the mission to succeed since the Alsos Mission was, in essence, a 
“bastard unit” – under Washington for operational control, but reliant on the ETO for 
administrative and logistical support.
85
 This situation could have been a nightmare for 
Pash and Alsos, but because of Smith’s familiarity with the mission and his strong belief 
in the necessity of the mission’s objectives, he did all he could to facilitate Alsos’s 
success. 
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On this trip Pash would also contact Brigadier General Royal B. Lord (the Deputy 
Chief of Staff, ETO) Brigadier General Edwin L. Sibbert (G-2 of First U.S. Army 
Group), Brigadier General T.J. Betts (G-2 of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary 
Force, or SHAEF), and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, ETO Colonel Bryan Conrad. 
Conrad, who Pash described as “broadminded, aggressive,” and “good humored,”
86
 
would be “extremely helpful” in achieving the creation and maintenance of Alsos 
contacts with other U.S. Government and U. S. military officials. According to Pash, 
every request submitted to Conrad was quickly granted, and “his able and willing 
assistance was instrumental in the accomplishment of the initial phase of the Mission’s 
activity.” Later, in early June when the mission began the planning to shift their 
operations across the Channel to France, Conrad was so helpful to the mission’s 
movements and logistics that Pash would call him “my guardian angel.”
87
 
Yet the mission to France would have to wait. On June 4, 1944 Rome finally fell 
to the U.S. Fifth Army, and Pash immediately traveled to Rome to take advantage of the 
breakthrough. Following directly behind the forward combat elements, Alsos moved into 
Rome at eight in the morning, June 5. The battlefield was still insecure (the Germans still 
controlled the northern half of Rome), but Pash and Alsos were able to make it through to 
Edoardo Amaldi’s personal residence. After taking custody of Amaldi, Pash and Amaldi 
“talked about American scientists he knew and about whom I had been briefed.”
88
  
The Alsos Mission at this time, however, had severe limitations. Only Pash and 
the military element were actually in Italy, and it would take the mission two weeks 
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before they could put a scientist in Rome. Alsos had established a foothold in the Italian 
capital, and Pash was able to take control of the appropriate Italian laboratories and 
scientific facilities, but no Alsos member then in Rome had the scientific credentials to 
exploit the information available.
89
  
Fortunately, Moe Berg did. Robert Furman had the foresight to send him to 
London in May with the orders to move on to Rome when the situation allowed. Furman 
provided him with a list of prominent Italian scientists the MED wished him to interview, 
and on June 6 he began his mission in the home of Amaldi. Berg also managed to 
interview Gian Carlo Wick, and in a June 12 cable to OSS headquarters, he relayed his 
findings. Neither Amaldi nor Wick could provide direct information about the progress of 
the German atomic bomb program, but WIck did give Berg, the OSS, and the MED 
intelligence team valuable information about the locations and activities of some of the 
German atomic scientists, particularly Heisenberg. Wick, a former student of 
Heisenberg’s, had kept in close correspondence with the German physicist throughout the 
war. He showed Berg a letter he had received from Heisenberg dated in January of that 
year, in which Heisenberg revealed his laboratories had been moved to a “woody region” 
in the “southern part of Germany.”
90
 While this was highly nonspecific, it did confirm 
what the Americans had learned from Paul Scherrer, and brought Alsos a step closer to 
reaching the crown jewel of their scientific intelligence mission. 
While Berg interviewed the Italians, Pash returned to London on June 10 to 
prepare the Alsos Mission for the move to France in the wake of the Normandy invasion. 
He left behind the CIC agent that had traveled with him to Rome, Agent Perry Bailey, to 
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maintain an Alsos presence until Pash’s executive officer, Major Richard Ham, could 
arrive there to establish a permanent Alsos office. Joining Ham by mid-June would be Dr. 
John Johnson and Robert Furman, both sent by Groves to continue the investigation into 
“military intelligence reports, scientific personnel, research centers and other institutions” 
in Rome and the surrounding areas.
91
  
Upon his return, Pash learned of a planned change in administrative structure that 
threatened to undo Leslie Groves’ careful consolidation of power in the field of atomic 
intelligence. Pash was told by Brig. Gen. Betts (G-2, SHAEF) that SHAEF was creating 
an advisory committee, known as the Combined Intelligence Priorities Committee 
(CIPC). The CIPC would consist of the members of the British Joint Intelligence 
Priorities Committee and an equal number of American representatives, and would be 
responsible for the evaluation of requests for technical or scientific intelligence 
throughout the theater.  They would then prioritize these requests based on CIPC’s 
perception of their importance. To Pash, this would add a layer of bureaucracy that could 
delay, or even prevent, Alsos from accomplishing its mission.  
To mitigate the potential damage to Alsos’s effectiveness, Pash dealt with CIPC 
in two ways. First, he stacked the American contingent committee with Alsos members. 
Bryan Conrad was asked by SHAEF to designate the two Army representatives, and Pash 
convinced him to choose Tony Calvert and Pash. One of the Navy members was Captain 
H. T. “Packy” Schade, Alsos’s own senior Navy scientist, and Samuel Goudsmit was 
placed on the committee to represent the OSRD. Second, Pash moved to sever atomic 
intelligence from the purview of CIPC. He went to Bedell Smith and convinced him, and 
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then Gen. Betts, that atomic matters should be handled outside of the bureaucracy of the 
CIPC. Instead, any action that required permission or logistical support would be 
submitted directly to SHAEF “for consideration and necessary action.”
92
   
 Throughout the remainder of June and into July, Alsos continued to prepare for 
its move to the Continent, securing logistical support from theater combat units and 
supplementing its personnel with additional scientists and military officers. Major Ham 
arrived in London and was quickly dispatched to Rome to establish the Mediterranean 
Section of the Alsos Mission. Scientific Chief Samuel Goudsmit had arrived in early 
June, and his unit was comprised of scientists from the Navy (Capt. Schade, Captain 
Wendell Roop, and Commander Jacob DenHartog), the War Department’s New 
Developments Division (Dr. Mark May and Dr. Hans Reese), and the Army Service 
Forces (Colonel Martin Chittick, Dr. Thomas Sherwood, Lt. Colonel Edwin Foran, Lt. 
Colonel Richard Ranger, and Captain William Cromartie).
93
 Pash’s former executive 
officer in the Western Defense Command, Lt. Colonel George Eckman, had been 
assigned to the mission and would serve in London as the Deputy Chief of Mission. 
Eckman had served with Pash long enough that he could be depended upon to represent 
Pash and Alsos with CIPC, the British, and the American military hierarchy. Rounding 
out the administrative/military group was Captain Robert Blake (who was a tested 
combat veteran), Lieutenant Reginald Augustine (who had background knowledge of 
Western Europe and who was fluent in several European languages), and Tony Calvert, 
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who has “made himself so valuable in developing the needed intelligence that [Pash} 





             The Alsos Mission in France began in earnest when Pash received an urgent 
message from Washington on August 5 reporting that Frédéric Joliot-Curie (referred to as 
“J” in Pash’s official reports)
95
 was thought to be at L’Arcouest in the Paimpol Area on 
the Brest Peninsula. On August 9, Pash and CIC agent Gerry Beatson flew to Normandy 
and spent most of the next two days trying to get into L’Arcouest with elements of the 8
th
 
Army Corps. Pash and Beatson joined with Task Force “A”, the unit assigned to reduce 
German resistance at Paimpol and vicinity, and entered L’Arcouest on the morning of 
August 11. There they discovered the house of Joliet-Curie “to be totally cleared of all 
furniture and personal effects and the structure itself left in a very poor and dirty 
condition.” It was clear that the most important French atomic physicist had not been 
there in quite some time.
96
 
 The following day Pash and Beatson moved on to Rennes in order to establish a 
base of operations there for the scientific group to wait until the liberation of Paris. There 
they established billets and rations for the arriving Alsos scientists. While in Rennes, 
Alsos investigated the University of Rennes and “discovered a number of catalogues and 
other papers that provided information pointing to possible future targets,” including the 
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town of Strasbourg in the Alsace region.
97
 Tony Calvert and Alsos interpreter Private 
First Class (PFC) Nathaniel (Nat) Leonard systematically inspected the various offices 
and laboratories of the university. They discovered manuscripts, catalogues, and other 
literature relating to the science departments of several universities under German 
control, including German publications dated as late as March, 1944. According to Pash, 
the documents captured “were to prove of considerable value, particularly in developing 
locations of German scientists and areas in which certain types of scientific research were 
being conducted.”
98
   
 On what was most likely August 23,
99
 Pash left Rennes with an advance party of 
Alsos, consisting of Calvert, Beatson, and Leonard, to link up with the U.S. 38
th
 Cavalry 
Troop, whose assignment was to break through to Paris. On August 24 they found the 
38
th
 Cav, but quickly realized they would not be the first to reach Paris. Alsos pushed on 
to Longjameau, where they joined the French 2
nd
 Armored Division for the final push 
into Paris. Just before 9 a.m. on August 25, Pash’s team entered Paris behind three 
French tanks. The first American unit, and only the fourth Allied vehicle to enter Paris 
since the fall of France in 1940, was a jeep with Pash, Calvert, and the two enlisted CIC 
agents of the Alsos Mission. 
 That afternoon Alsos moved to secure their primary target in Paris, Dr. Joliot-
Curie. It was assumed that he would most likely be located in his laboratory in the 
College de France, on the Rue des Ecoles in central Paris. Pash made two attempts to 
break through to the university, but both failed due to heavy sniper fire and some 
remaining German resistance. Pash then retreated to the French Army headquarters where 
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he tried to borrow French armored vehicles to push through the snipers, his request was 
refused. Deciding that any further delay in securing Joliot-Curie was unacceptable, Pash 
and his team braved the snipers and by five in the afternoon they made it through to their 
objective. Frédéric Joliot-Curie was in American hands.
100
     
 Joliot-Curie and the scientists in his laboratory had been making homemade 
explosives (Molotov cocktails) for use by the French Resistance. He willingly spoke to 
the Americans and expressed his belief that the Germans had made little progress on 
uranium and they were not close to making an atomic bomb,
101
 although Goudsmit would 
later write that “it was plain that he knew nothing of what was going on in Germany.”
102
 
He did provide Alsos with confirmation of intelligence they had collected previously, 
including the fact that two German scientists, Erich Schumann and Kurt Diebner, had 
visited Joliot-Curie and wanted to move his cyclotron and other scientific equipment back 
to Germany. Instead, the two Germans kept the equipment in place and relocated to Paris 
to continue their research. A number of other prominent German physicists had also 
come to Paris, including Walther Bothe, a nuclear physicists at the Kaiser-Wilhelm 
Institute for Medical Research, Abraham Essau, the head of physics in the German 
Ministry of Education in the Reich Research Council, Erich Bagge, a specialist in isotope 
separation, experimental atomic physicist Werner Maurer, and Wolfgang Gentner, an 
authority on cyclotron operations who had worked with its inventor, Ernest Lawrence, in 
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 While not positive information about the progress of the German 
program, it was positive information about the existence of a program, or the Germans 
“would not have found it expedient to use Joliot’s laboratories.”
104
 
 By the end of August, the full contingent of Alsos scientists had reached Paris, 
and Pash opened the Paris office of the Alsos Mission on the 27
th
. By this time it had 
become apparent that the current personnel of Alsos did not have the physical capabilities 
to exploit all of the newly available intelligence targets and so Pash requested additional 
assets. Through the assistance of Vannevar Bush and the OSRD, these personnel 
additions were approved, and by August 31, the Alsos Mission had grown to seven 
operations officers and thirty-three scientists, both civilian and military.
105
  
 In early September, Pash left the scientific team in Paris as the British and 
Canadian armies were driving the Germans out of Belgium. Because this would make 
available certain key intelligence targets in Belgium, in particular the offices of Union 
Miniére Du Haut-Katanga, the Belgian mining firm that had shipped hundreds of tons of 
uranium to Belgium from the Congo, Pash felt it was necessary “to send a detachment of 
the Mission to Brussels and Antwerp to secure and consolidate the most important targets 
and to make arrangements for scientific personnel to exploit these targets.”
106
 Their 
mission would be simple: “get to Belgium without delay, determine where any stocks of 
refined uranium ore are located and in what amount, and seize any available supplies.”
107
 
On September 5, a small unit consisting of Pash, Lt. Augustine, CIC Special Agents Carl 
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Fiebig and Beatson, and interpreter Nat Leonard began their move from Paris to Belgium. 
Because their targets were in British occupied territory, and since contact with the British 
in regard to the activities of the mission had not yet been established, Col. Conrad 
accompanied them. Pash and his group linked up with a British Task Force in Brussels 
and reported to its commander, a Colonel Strangeways. Through Conrad, whose 
“assistance was extremely beneficial and helpful and was responsible for the immediate 
cooperation” of Strangeways, Alsos was given permission to secure the offices and 
records of Union Miniére.
108
 Mr. Gaston Andre, the head of uranium at Union Miniére’s 
main office, gave Alsos valuable information about the movement of Belgian uranium to 
Germany during the war. He told Alsos that, before the war, the Germans bought less 
than a ton of refined uranium each month, but since June, 1940, “orders from a number of 
German companies had increased spectacularly.”
109
 In all, more than 1,000 tons of 




 The ore shipped to Germany was, at least for the moment, beyond the reach of the 
Alsos Mission. Yet from Andre they had also learned that close to 150 tons of uranium 
had last been reported at Union Miniére’s plant in Oolen, Belgium, and “might now be in 
the process of evacuation ahead of the oncoming Allied war machine.”
111
 On September 
8, Pash reported these findings to Washington, and in response Groves immediately 
dispatched Furman to Brussels “with instructions to secure and ship the critical material.” 
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He arrived in Brussels on September 17
112
, and the following day Furman and Pash met 
with Bedell Smith at SHAEF headquarters to plan the recovery mission. Also at the 
meeting was Major General Kenneth Strong of the British Army, the G-2 for SHAEF. 
Strong sent a message to the G-2 of the British 21
st
 Army Group (the unit currently 
operating in the Brussels/Antwerp/Oolen vicinity) informing him that Pash “was on a 
mission of vital importance and that all necessary facilities were to be made available to 
him.” This would allow Pash to operate in the British sector “without having to explain to 
any other person on the [British staff], or in the field, the nature of the Mission.”
113
  
 From September 19 to September 25, Pash and his Alsos team search Oolen for 
the Belgian ore, sometimes coming within 200 yards of the German front lines while 
dodging sniper and mortar fire. On September 25 they located the 68 tons of the “desired 
material” and arranged for it to be shipped to the United States. They also learned that 
more than 80 tons of refined uranium had been shipped to France just prior to the German 
invasion. From September 26 to October 5, a force consisting of Pash, Furman, Major 
Vance, and Augustine (now a Captain) searched the southwestern French countryside for 
the missing ore.
114
 In Pash’s memoir, he explained the mission’s difficulty: 
    My coded report to Washington provoked repeated exhortations to locate the lost 
eighty tons of uranium. But searching for freight cars that had been somewhere in France 
four years before was not that easy, especially since half of France was not yet under 
complete Allied control. 
    So Alsos at the moment was supposed to mount an operation to secretly remove the 
uranium stocks from Belgium, to hit our Eindhoven targets when that city should fall into 
Allied hands, and to undertake a thorough reconnaissance of northern and southern 
France, the latter still under confused German and Free French control, in search of 
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elusive freight cars. In addition, we had to supply adequate support for our scientific 




Despite these long odds, Pash and Alsos were able to find half of the material in 
Toulouse, France. Pash and Furman returned to Paris, but Maj. Vance, Capt. 
Augustine, and Special Agent Fiebig remained in southern France to search for 
the remaining uranium. Although Alsos continued to receive information that the 
ore was in the area, however, it would never be located.
116
 Pash and Alsos would 
later discover that the recovered uranium ore from Oolen and Toulouse would be 
used by the Manhattan Project to construct Little Boy, the atomic bomb dropped 
on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945.
117
 
 Throughout the remainder of October and into the beginning of November, Alsos 
continued to exploit scientific intelligence sources in France, Belgium, and (briefly) in 
Holland. While doing so, Pash and Goudsmit planned for future operations in areas yet to 
be captured by Allied forces. Since first entering France, one city on the border of France 
and Germany had been of particular interest to the members of the Alsos Mission: 
Strasbourg. In August, when Pash arrived on the Continent, he heard bits and pieces of 
information at the University of Rennes about a new institution built by the Germans in 
Strasbourg. This was enough to make it a future target of Alsos, but in Paris the Mission 
was provided by the OSS with a catalogue of the university that indicated that three 
prominent German atomic scientists were working  and teaching there: Rudolph 
Fleischmann, Werner Maurer, and most importantly, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker. 
Pash wrote that Alsos scientists studied the catalogue as though it were “a spicy French 
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novel – with photographs.”
118
 According to Goudsmit, “everything seemed to point to the 
fact that the Germans were trying to transform the French institution into a model 
German university and that Strasbourg was a key target for us.”
119
 In late September, 
during a quick incursion into Holland during the failed Operation Market Garden, Alsos 
interviewed Dutch scientists at the Philips Laboratory in Eindhoven who told them that 
atomic research was, in fact, being conducted at the University of Strasbourg. More than 
that, Alsos discovered that special equipment for atomic research had been built at Philips 
and had been shipped to the university.
120
    
 As the American Sixth Army Group moved eastward in November, it became 
clear that Strasbourg would soon be in the hands of the Allies. The Alsos Mission might 
at long last have the opportunity to discover some concrete evidence about the progress 
of the German atomic bomb program. Everyone involved with Alsos eagerly awaited the 
advance of the Allied armies, from Vannevar Bush, Leslie Groves, and John Lansdale in 
Washington, to Pash, Furman, Goudsmit, and the junior members of the team in the field. 
On November 25, 1944, the Germans army abandoned Strasbourg, and the men of MED 
intelligence, led as always by Boris Pash, entered the city that would finally hold the key 
to unlocking the mysteries of Germany’s atomic bomb.      
 
                                                          
118
 Ibid, p. 87 
119
 Goudsmit, p. 66 
120






We both let out a yell at the same moment, for we had both found papers that suddenly 
raised the curtain of secrecy for us. Here, in apparently harmless communications, was 
hidden a wealth of secret information available to anyone who understood it. No, it was 
not in code. The papers were not even secret. They were just the usual gossip between 
colleagues, here and there a minor indiscretion, a hint, nothing really objectionable from 
a secrecy point of view – just ordinary memos such as we had all sent to our own friends 
and colleagues when we were in the U.S.  Names were not even always spelled out, or 
only the first names were given. Obviously such notes would have told nothing to the 






 This chapter begins with the Allied capture of the city of Strasbourg. In 
Strasbourg, the Alsos Mission discovered of a cache of documents that strongly indicated 
that the Germans were not likely to develop an atomic bomb in time to influence the 
outcome of the war. This is not a new story. In fact, it is now an integral part of Second 
World War historiography, included in both specific histories of the German atomic 
program as well as in general histories of the war.
2
 The first nine pages of this chapter, 
however, are necessary in order to provide the reader with this important narrative, so 
that what follows – the reconstitution and reorganization of Alsos, and their missions 
throughout 1945 – can be understood in the proper context. Operation Harborage, the 
Oranienberg bombing mission, and the capture and detention of German scientists have 
been mishandled by historians of this subject. It is the intention of this chapter to correct 
the narrative in two substantial ways. 
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 First, the current historiography gives only passing attention to the Harborage 
operation, ostensibly because it was planned but never carried out. This chapter will 
demonstrate that the idea of the mission itself, along with its planning, is fundamental to 
the understanding of the mindset of American intelligence and military officials. Second, 
the events after Strasbourg have been traditionally presented as the ending, or the 
wrapping-up, of the Alsos Mission and the American atomic intelligence effort against 
the Germans – as the conclusion to a particular period in history. This chapter, and the 
dissertation as a whole, argues that the events of 1945 were not an end, but a beginning: 
the beginning of the transition of American atomic intelligence from an emphasis on the 
German atomic bomb to an intelligence program which would focus instead on the 
atomic energy developments of the Soviet Union.         
 
Strasbourg 
 On the morning of November 25, 1944, the leading elements of the Alsos 
Mission, consisting of Boris Pash and CIC agents Carl Fiebig and Gerry Beatson, entered 
the ancient city of Strasbourg. They immediately moved to secure the University of 
Strasbourg offices and laboratories. Once these were under control, Pash and his team left 
the University of Strasbourg facilities under the guard of U.S. Army personnel and set out 
to track down the German scientists in their homes. Their first stop was the home of 
German physicist Rudolph Fleischmann, where they were told by a neighbor that their 
quarry had left the city the day before. Alsos had equally poor luck at Carl von 
Weizsäcker’s house, as well as the other members of the Alsos target list. It appeared as 
though the German scientists had fled the city to escape the approaching Allied armies. 
148 
 
And it seemed the long-awaited mission to Strasbourg, a city where Groves, Bush, and 
the leadership of the Manhattan Project intelligence team had placed such high hopes, 
would end in failure.
3
      
 The scientific group, headed by Scientific Chief Dr. Samuel Goudsmit, had 
remained behind in Paris to await word that Pash had captured the German scientists. 
Instead, Goudsmit learned that the Germans were gone. He reluctantly passed this 
unfortunate news to Vannevar Bush, who was then in Europe for a brief visit. The 
message of the failure at Strasbourg would reach Leslie Groves through Robert Furman 
three days later: “Pash wired from Strasbourg that friends there have departed.”
4
 
 As it happened, by the time Groves received this news, the situation in Strasbourg 
had significantly changed. While Pash was disappointed by his initial failure to capture 
the German atomic scientists, he refused to accept defeat. On the same day he had 
unsuccessfully searched Fleischmann’s home for the prominent German physicist, Pash 
learned that another German atomic scientist was in the city.
5
 Although not particularly 
well-known or prestigious, this man was still on Pash’s master list of German scientists 
of interest, and they immediately hunted him down. Nervous and evasive, the German 
refused to give Alsos any information. Yet just as Pash was ready to wrap up the 
questioning, the German scientist asked if he could go to the Strasbourg Hospital the 
following day. The scientist explained that some of his laboratory work was performed at 
the hospital, and Pash’s intelligence instincts, honed by years of work in 
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counterintelligence and Alsos, convinced him that the hospital could be the key to turning 
a failed operation into an overwhelming success. 
 The following morning, November 26, Pash and his team stormed into the 
hospital director’s office and demanded to see Fleischmann’s atomic laboratory. This was 
a bluff: Pash had no real concrete information that Fleischmann or anyone else was at the 
hospital conducting atomic research. But the bold move paid off. The cowed hospital 
director led Pash to a separate wing of the grounds where he discovered Fleischmann and 
five other German scientists on his list. The Germans had been hiding in the hospital and 
were wearing medical clothing to pass themselves off as hospital staff. Of the atomic 
scientists, only von Weizsäcker was missing, and he had indeed left before the city was 
captured by the Allies.
6
     
 In response to this news, Goudsmit and DuPont chemist Fred Wardenberg (an 
Alsos scientific member) immediately set out for Strasbourg. Delayed by fierce German 
resistance in the area, which at one point threatened to push the Allies out of Strasbourg, 
Goudsmit arrived on December 3, and found that Pash and Robert Furman (who had 
experienced less difficultly than the scientists negotiating German fire and arrived days 
earlier) had already collected thousands of German scientific documents. Together, 
Goudsmit, Wardenberg, and Furman began a systematic interrogation of the German 
scientists and some of their support personnel, such as von Weizsäcker’s secretary.  
In the end, these interviews provided very little in the way of actionable 
intelligence. Fleischmann and the German scientists refused to give Alsos any clues to 
either the location of the German atomic research center or its status, and the support 
personnel, while more open with their interrogators, were ignorant to the activities of 
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German atomic physics. Fortunately for Alsos, the captured documents and personal 
correspondence found by Pash in offices, laboratories, and homes provided the mission 
with the intelligence breakthrough they had hoped Strasbourg could deliver. For one 
thing, the documents revealed the locations of the remaining German atomic scientists on 
their target list. One piece of paper had the letterhead of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for 
Physics (Werner Heisenberg’s institute), and it showed that the key target had been 
evacuated from Berlin to the small village of Hechingen in Württemberg. The paper even 
provided the precise address and telephone number for the secret German laboratory. 
Other documents hinted that von Weizsäcker and Karl Wirtz, an expert on heavy water 
and isotope separation, had joined Heisenberg in Hechingen, and that Otto Hahn’s 
laboratory had been moved to the town of Tailfingen. Letters from scientists originating 
in the German communities of Stadtilm in Thuringia and Bisingen in Württemberg, as 
well as references to secret caves in Haigerloch, gave Alsos a number of future targets.
7
  
Far more important than even the location of Heisenberg and the other German 
atomic scientists was the intelligence gained through the Strasbourg documents regarding 
the status of the German atomic bomb program. According to Pash, this was “probably 
the most significant single piece of military intelligence developed throughout the war.”
8
  
Through documents and correspondence the Alsos team was able to discern that 
Germany was having major difficulties with the separation of uranium isotopes, and had 
yet to separate U-235 in any amount even remotely significant for bomb manufacture. In 
fact, the documents showed that the Germans, as late as August, 1944, had only just 
recently begun their atomic pile (reactor) work, and were still some ways away from 
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achieving a self-sustaining chain reaction, a benchmark the American project had 
achieved almost two years earlier. The Germans were still unsure of the correct reactor 
design, and their early experiments had not given them hints to the problems that Enrico 
Fermi’s team in Chicago had had to overcome before they could get the American reactor 
online. According to Goudsmit, “in short, they were about as far as we were in 1940, 
before we had begun any large-scale efforts on the atomic bomb at all.” Despite the fact 
that the documents also showed that the German leadership had given the project a high 
priority, and that the German Army was taking part in the research, “as far as the German 
scientists were concerned, the whole thing was still on an academic scale.”
9
      
 For the Alsos Mission’s Scientific Chief, “the conclusions were unmistakable.” 
The documents and letters captured at Strasbourg “proved definitely that Germany had no 
atomic bomb” and would not be able to produce one before the end of the war. There 
were not even far enough along in their research to present a danger from radiological 
attack.
10
 Goudsmit would later joke about the dismal state of the German program: 
“Sometimes we wondered if our government had not spent more money on our 
intelligence mission than the Germans had spent on their whole project.”
11
    
 Boris Pash was convinced as well. He would write in his memoirs that at 
Strasbourg, “Alsos exploded the Nazi super-weapon myth that had so alarmed Allied 
leaders…Alone, that information was enough to fully justify Alsos.”
12
 He and Goudsmit 
decided to deliver the Strasbourg results in person to the Allied headquarters in Vittel, 
France, where Vannevar Bush had come up from Paris to get the results of the mission, 
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and where Pash could use the secure communications system to send the report to 
General Eisenhower and to General Groves. As they made the drive to Vittel, Pash could 
not help thinking: “Alsos has exploded the biggest intelligence bombshell of the war! 
Now every American and British leader in the know would sleep more comfortably.”
13
 
 Goudsmit explained to Bush what the Strasbourg documents revealed, and after 
Goudsmit effectively answered some of Bush’s questions, Bush too was a believer. He 
met with General Bedell Smith in Paris, who outlined Eisenhower’s plan for the 
remainder of the war. Smith asked Bush if he needed to press Eisenhower to speed up the 
attack plan, risking heavier casualties but ensuring the war’s end before the Germans 
could use an atomic bomb. Bush, confident in the Strasbourg results, explained to Smith 
that the Americans were well ahead of the Germans in the atomic field. “In fact,” as Bush 
would explain in his memoirs, “we were so far ahead that their effort, by comparison, 
was pitiful.”
14
 He would later estimate that the Germans had only achieved “five percent” 
of what the Americans had accomplished in atomic research and development.
15
 Bush 
told Smith that Eisenhower, if he so desired, “could take a couple more years, if 
necessary” to win the war. “There would be no German atomic bomb.”
16
 
 Leslie Groves, who directed all American atomic intelligence, would be the final 
arbiter of the Strasbourg intelligence. While he did not get to see the raw data provided in 
the documents and correspondence, Groves had come to trust Pash, Goudsmit, and 
certainly Bush. Based on their recommendation, he reported to General Bissell the 
Strasbourg findings, explaining that the intelligence was “the most complete dependable 
                                                          
13
 Ibid, 159 
14
 Vannevar Bush, Pieces of the Action (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1970), p. 115 
15
 Vannevar Bush, Modern Arms and Free Men (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1949), p. 206 
16
 Bush, Pieces of the Action, p. 115 
153 
 
and factual information we have obtained bearing upon the nature and extent of the 
German effort in our field.” Groves continued: “Fortunately, it tends to confirm our 
conclusion that the Germans are now behind us.”
17
 While this language was somewhat 
guarded, Groves was more steadfast about his beliefs in his memoirs. He states that “all 
evidence from Strasbourg clearly pointed to the fact that, as of the latter part of 1944, the 
enemy’s efforts to develop a bomb were still in the experimental stages, and greatly 






If any doubt remained that the Germans were not close to building an atomic 
bomb, that question was permanently dispelled by Office of Strategic Services agent Moe 
Berg in December, 1944. Either in late-November or early-December (the exact date is 
unclear), Allen Dulles in Bern learned that the German physicist, and assumed to be 
leader of the German atomic bomb project, Werner Heisenberg, would be in Zurich, 
Switzerland on December 18 to give a lecture to professors and graduate students at the 
university. The invitation for the lecture was issued by a friend of the OSS Paul Scherrer, 
who was also most likely the origin of the intelligence on Heisenberg. Regardless of the 
exact details, Groves and Furman saw an opportunity to either confirm the Strasbourg 
results, or if Heisenberg and the Germans were actually in the process of creating an 
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atomic bomb, to permanently remove Heisenberg from his leadership position in German 
atomic physics. 
Berg arrived at the lecture hall at the Federal Technical College on the day of 
Heisenberg’s visit. In the guise of a physics graduate student, he found a seat in the 
audience behind Otto Hahn and Carl von Weizsäcker, who had accompanied Heisenberg 
to Zurich. Berg carried a pistol in his pocket; his mission, as was briefed to him by 
Robert Furman before his departure, was to kill Heisenberg if he became convinced the 
Germans were close to building an atomic bomb. Killing Hahn and von Weizsäcker 
would be an added bonus, unanticipated by MED intelligence, but certainly an act that 
would be welcomed by Furman and Groves.  
Heisenberg’s lectured on the advanced physics principle of S-matrix theory, a 
topic far removed from atomic bomb manufacture, and covered matters that exceeded 
Berg’s basic physics knowledge. Nonetheless, Berg’s cover held long enough for him to 
be invited to Scherrer’s dinner party for Heisenberg that followed his lecture. At the 
party, Berg heard Heisenberg announce that he believed the war was all but over, and that 
Germany would almost certainly lose. Later in the evening, Berg arranged it so that both 
he and Heisenberg left the party at the same time. They walked back to their quarters and 
discussed Heisenberg’s latest physics research (Berg’s linguistic skills were so refined 
that Heisenberg apparently did not detect any trace of an American accent). At the end of 
their walk, Berg had determined that the German atomic bomb program did not exist in 
any way that could threaten the Allies during the war. Based on this conclusion, and 
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 When Groves placed in charge of gathering all foreign atomic intelligence in 
September 1943, his primary task was to ascertain the progress made by Germany in the 
research and production of atomic weapons. The Alsos Mission, which was launched in 
December, was the culmination of this mandate: Its sole purpose was to discover the 
extent of the German progress towards the development of an atomic bomb. By the end 
of 1944, Alsos had successfully accomplished this objective. Why, then, wasn’t the Alsos 
Mission disbanded following the completion of the Strasbourg operation, and its 
members reassigned to units or scientific projects where they could have a positive 
impact on the effort to end the war? Major Robert Furman assumed this would be the 
case. In the autumn of 1944, just prior to the Strasbourg mission, the officer Groves 
trusted most to run the day-to-day operations of his foreign intelligence organization 
wrote Groves that, “as soon as it is indicated that there has been no German progress in 
the project field, I will, at the proper time, close the mission down as far as the project is 
concerned and return our personnel to the United States.”
20
 Alsos Scientific Chief Samuel 
Goudsmit had also been given the impression that the mission would end when the 
United States was convinced the Germans had no bomb. In a letter to his wife dated 
December 10, 1944, Goudsmit hinted that the “unsuspected success” of the Strasbourg 
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operation would mean a “short trip home.” He was so sure Alsos would be terminated 
that he speculated he might make it back to the United States “just around X-mas,” 
maybe even at the same time the letter reached his wife.
21
  
 But the Alsos Mission would not be disbanded. In fact, the United States 
Government decided to increase the manpower and resource allocation for Alsos and to 
formalize its organizational structure in the first months of 1945. In January, the Alsos 
Mission was given, for the first time, its own Table of Organization and Equipment 
(TO/E) “with a definite allowance of personnel and specific items of equipment.” The 
mission would no longer have to borrow equipment from American combat units in order 
to continue to function.
22
 It was also allotted additional administrative personnel, most 
importantly a Deputy Mission Chief and a Deputy Scientific Chief who would serve as 
administrative lieutenants to Pash and Goudsmit. These deputies would “staff the Mission 
headquarters [in Paris] at all times,” allowing Pash and Goudsmit to continue leading 




 By February, the Alsos Mission had established two forward bases that 
supplemented the main mission office in Paris. Alsos Forward South (AFwdS) in 
Strasbourg was commanded by Captain Reginald (Reg) Augustine, and Alsos Forward 
North (AFwdN) was established in Aachen under the command of Major Russ Fisher. 
The plan was to shift the forward bases farther into Germany in accordance with the 
movements of the Allied combat units, in order to “approximately conform to the 
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concentration of German scientific and industrial centers.”
24
 Pash decided to keep the 
main Alsos office in Paris for several reasons. First, since Alsos would have to operate 
within the zones of three different Army Groups, each of whose activities were 
coordinated and commanded by SHAEF (whose headquarters were located outside of 
Paris at Versailles), it made sense for the Alsos Mission to maintain continual contact 
with Gen. Eisenhower’s office. In addition, most of the other Allied organizations 
essential to Alsos’s success had their theater headquarters in Paris, including the Office of 
Scientific Research and Development, the Navy Technical Mission, and the Office of 
Strategic Services.
25
 Finally, the Paris office served as a communications hub for Alsos. 
Messages from the Pentagon (in most cases from Groves) came to the theater through the 
ETOUSA headquarters in Paris, and the Alsos office allowed the mission “to maintain 
the initiative in dealing with Washington.”
26
 
The reason the U.S intelligence leadership had decided to keep the Alsos Mission 
in the field was that American atomic intelligence had shifted its primary focus. Since 
Pash and Goudsmit had discovered the insignificance of the German atomic bomb 
program at Strasbourg, the Alsos Mission had shifted its operational attention to 
preventing the Soviet Union from acquiring the means to build its own atomic weapons. 
To be sure, there were some in Washington who wished to capture all the remaining 
German uranium, laboratories, and atomic scientists in an effort to remove, with absolute 
certainty, any doubt about the German atomic program. Yet in the last months of the 
European War, Alsos would engage in operations designed to deny the Soviet Union the 
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knowledge, men, and materials necessary to become an atomic power: namely, capturing 
German uranium ore, locating secret laboratories, and interning prominent German 




The Soviet Union’s Interest in Atomic Weapons 
 Early in the war, the United States Government learned of Soviet interest in the 
American atomic bomb program. American officials understood that the Soviet Union, 
“through its Embassy officials and espionage agents in the United States has been active 
for a long time trying to elicit as much information as possible concerning the project.”
28
 
When Leslie Groves was given command of the Manhattan Project in the summer of 
1942, he was told that the Soviet Union had an ongoing operation to discover the secrets 
of American fission research. He was instructed to maintain a strenuous 
counterintelligence program, designed, of course, to keep the Germans in the dark about 
the project. Yet an equally important task was “to keep the Russians from learning of our 
discoveries and the details of our designs and processes.”
29
 
 The majority of information about the Soviet espionage efforts came from none 
other than Lt. Col. Boris Pash. In his counterintelligence work as an officer in the 
Western Defense Command, Pash established an elaborate system of investigation into 
communist espionage activities surrounding the American bomb program. According to 
John Lansdale, by early 1943 Pash was “conducting a wide spread and complex 
investigation of communist activity” primarily located at the Radiation Laboratory of the 
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University of California, including “intense investigations of the activities of several 
Communist Party members” who were working on the Manhattan Project. Pash and his 
team followed the suspected Soviet agents, and installed microphones in their houses and 
the places they frequented.
30
  
 Through these methods, Pash was able to discover that several members of the 
Berkeley Radiation Laboratory had passed secret information to Steve Nelson, a member 
of the National Committee of the Communist Party, USA, and leader of the Communist 
Party in Alameda, California. Nelson, who had been the political commissar of the 
Abraham Lincoln Brigade of the Republican Army in the Spanish Civil War, spent the 
first years of the Second World War directing the efforts of the Federation of Architects, 
Engineers, Chemists, and Technicians (FAECT), a communist front organization, which 
was “making extraordinary efforts” to organize the laboratory at Berkeley. According to 
Groves, these activities were designed “to the extent of securing and training perspective 
employees” for espionage work.
31
 Nelson had been observed on several occasions 
meeting with members of the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco and the Soviet Embassy 
in Washington, presumably to pass along information received from project scientists.
32
 
 Throughout the war, suspected Soviet espionage was investigated across the 
United States, from the laboratories in California to the Metallurgical Laboratory at the 
University of Chicago to scientific research centers at Columbia University in New York. 
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In each case, communist scientists (or at least scientists with communist sympathies) 
were observed meeting with members of the Soviet diplomatic delegation or with the 
leadership of the Communist Party, USA. Along with the MED intelligence 
counterintelligence team, the Federal Bureau of Investigation tracked the Soviet 
operation nationwide. According to FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, “during the period that 
the Army has been engaged in the supervision of this experimentation, numerous efforts 
have been made by the Soviets to obtain the highly secret information concerning the 
experimentation and this Bureau has been actively following such Soviet efforts.”
33
 
 The Soviet Union also demonstrated its interest in atomic weapons through 
“unsuccessful attempts to secure uranium concentrates in [the United States] both 
through private firms and officially through the Lend-Lease Administration.”
34
 Although 
the Soviet Purchasing Commission alleged the uranium was for uses not related to 
uranium fission, Groves was suspicious enough to initially deny their January, 1943 
request for twenty-five pounds. After the Soviets complained to the Lend-Lease 
Administration in March, Groves grudgingly acceded to their demand, agreeing to send 
one kilogram (2.2 pounds) of lower-quality uranium metal. Even then, Groves did not 




 Completing the intelligence picture on Soviet intentions were American scientists 
who had traveled to the Soviet Union during the war and had returned to report their 
interactions with their Soviet counterparts. According to Groves, Soviet scientists were 
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“unduly curious in their questioning of American scientists visiting Russia concerning 
our work on uranium fission.” In addition, American scientists told the MED intelligence 
team that the Soviets had constructed their own cyclotron, an indication of at least a 
nascent atomic weapons program.
36
 
 Taken together, Soviet espionage attempts, combined with Soviet interest in 
fissionable materials acquisition, the construction of a cyclotron, and interrogation of 
American scientists, presented Groves and MED intelligence with a considerable 
counterintelligence problem throughout the war. The Germans were, of course, the 
primary focus of counterintelligence efforts. Yet, as John Lansdale explained, “from the 
beginning, Russia was regarded, from an intelligence standpoint, as an enemy.”
37
 Since 
the Germans had been eliminated as an atomic threat after the Alsos Mission’s 
discoveries at Strasbourg, Groves, Lansdale, Furman, and Pash could concentrate their 
full efforts on the impending Soviet threat. 
 
 
The French Problem 
 In 1940, when the fall of France to the German Army was imminent, Frédéric 
Joliot-Curie sent several of his fellow French atomic scientists to Great Britain to prevent 
them from being captured by the Nazis. He wanted to prevent, as much as he could, 
French atomic secrets and key atomic materials from falling into the hands of the 
Germans. Along with the scientists, Joliot-Curie sent France’s entire stock of heavy water 
(at the time, the largest in the world), all of their research reports, and two grams of 
                                                          
36
 Groves to Wallace, et al, August 23, 1943 
37
 Lansdale, p. 7 
162 
 
radium to Britain. Some of these men continued on to work for the British atomic bomb 
program in Montreal, Canada, which worked in coordination with the American 
Manhattan Project. Others came directly to the United States, where they worked with 
American scientists to further Allied research into nuclear development. All of these men 
remained in close contact with one another during their time of exile in Canada and the 
United States, and all indicated their intention to return to France once it had been 
liberated from German occupation. 
 This repatriation would begin shortly after the Allies established a firm foothold 
in France in the late summer of 1944. The first to return was Pierre Auger, a French 
physicist who had worked on the atomic reactor project in Montreal. He was followed 
shortly thereafter by Jules Gueron in October. Gueron had worked with American 
scientists and had learned a great deal about the American atomic bomb program. In 
November, French scientists Han von Halban, also a member of the British portion of the 
Allied atomic bomb project, requested a return to France to see and report to Joliot-Curie. 
The British agreed, and Halban met with Joliot-Curie and disclosed to him “vital 
information concerning the Project,” including information concerning “data and research 
that had been developed by American funds and effort.” 
38
 
The issue at hand was Frédéric Joliot-Curie. After the fall of France, he had been 
actively involved in the French Resistance movement and had assisted the underground 
by developing technical methods for sabotage and communications. Once France was 
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liberated, Joliot-Curie, the preeminent scientist in all of France, was appointed Director 
of Scientific Research in the Provisional French Government.  
He was also a communist. As a supporter of the Resistance, Joliot-Curie joined 
the Communist Party in the spring of 1944 and publically announced his membership in 
the Party in August. According to Alsos Mission notes taken during the interview of 
Joliot-Curie in September following the liberation of Paris, the French physicist had 
“very strong political views and frankly declared that he is a ‘communist.’”
39
 As a 
prominent figure in the newly liberated France, Joliot-Curie was even elected as a 
member of the French Chamber of Deputies – as a member of the French Communist 
Party.
40
 Complicating matters even further was the fact that Frédéric’s wife, Irene Joliot-
Curie, was considered “undoubtedly more dynamic politically than her husband.” In a 
word, American intelligence understood Irene to be a “fanatic,” who had been a 
communist for years, surrounded herself with “scientists of the extreme-left,” and who 
had used her influence over her husband to push him into the communist party.
41
  
Taken together, the Joliot-Curie’s presented a real problem for Leslie Groves and 
American atomic intelligence. Their political affiliation forced Groves to assume that any 
secret atomic information learned by the French would immediately be passed along to 
the Soviet Union.
42
 This meant that not only would Groves have to pressure the British to 
prevent any further exchange of information between French expatriate scientists and the 
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Joliot-Curies, but he would also have to pay close attention to the progress of the French 
military forces as they began to push into Germany. If the French Army was allowed to 
capture German atomic facilities, materials, or scientific personnel, it would 
detrimentally affect American security as much as if the Soviet Union directly assumed 
control of those laboratories, uranium supplies, or atomic physicists.  
Fortunately, Groves had an organization already in place in Europe that was 
uniquely trained and equipped to secure outstanding German nuclear resources: The 
Alsos Mission. Under the leadership of Boris Pash and Sam Goudsmit, it would spend the 





The Alsos Mission in Germany 
 In February, 1945, the Allied armies began to make their long-awaited push into 
Germany. The Americans, British, and French entered from the west and advanced 
toward the Rhine, while the Soviets invaded Pomerania and Silesia in the east. By March, 
the Allied forces in the west had crossed the Rhine and were pushing toward Alsos’s first 
major German target, the university city of Heidelberg, which housed the Kaiser Wilhelm 
Institute for Medical Research. As Alsos waited for Heidelberg to fall to the Allies, 
General Groves in Washington was devising a plan to deny the Soviet Union a key 
German atomic resource.  
165 
 
 At the Yalta Conference of February 4, 1945, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister 
Churchill, and Premiere Stalin agreed upon the post-war occupation and partition of 
Germany. Although most of the Alsos Mission’s objectives were located in the 
American, British, or French zones of advance, the town of Oranienberg, located about 
fifteen miles north of Berlin, would be in the Soviet Zone of occupation, and this 
presented a real problem for Groves and MED intelligence. Oranienberg was the home of 
the Auergesellschaft Works, a German industrial plant that was “manufacturing by highly 
secret processes certain special metals to be used for the production of as yet unused 
secret weapons of untold potentialities” – Auergesellschaft produced uranium for bomb 
research.
43
 The Alsos Mission, which could only advance as quickly as the Allied armies, 
would not be able to reach the factory before the Soviet Army. According to Groves, 
“there was not even the remotest possibility that Alsos could seize the work,”
44
 and so he 
decided it would be necessary to destroy the plant before these important materials fell 
into Soviet hands. 
 On March 7, Groves sent one of his officers, a Major Francis J. Smith, from 
Washington to London to explain the mission, in person, to General Carl “Tooey” Spaatz 
of the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF), commander of the Strategic Air Forces 
in Europe. Spaatz was told in a memorandum from Chief of Staff Marshall to expect 
Smith, who would advise him of the “reasons for bombing a certain vital target.” 
Marshall warned Spaatz that the “matter is of the highest order of secrecy,” and implored 
him to refrain from informing anyone, including his own officers, of the true purpose of 
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 Spaatz was convinced of the importance of the secret mission, and 
immediately created an operational plan for the destruction of Oranienberg. 
 On March 15, 1945, Spaatz dispatched 612 B-17 Flying Fortresses and B-24 
Liberators of the Eighth Air Force to destroy the Auergesellschaft Works. Escorted by 
782 fighter aircraft, the bombers dropped 1684 tons of incendiary and high explosive 
munitions
46
 of “varying sizes up to 2000 lbs” on Oranienberg “with a wide range of 
fuzings including long delays” so that dust and smoke would not “obscure the target for 
the formations which followed.” Four days later, on March 19, Spaatz wrote General 
Marshall and informed him that “the results of the attack on the special target at 
Oranienberg are excellent.” Post strike reconnaissance of the target area flown the day 
after the attack showed “virtual destruction” of the Auergesellschaft Works, and it 
appeared “that substantially all of the buildings within the special target area are gutted or 
burned out,” and photographs showed that all parts of the plant located aboveground had 
been completely destroyed. “In general,” Spaatz wrote, “it is fair to say we are extremely 
pleased with the indicated results” of the attack.
47
 The Soviets would not get their factory. 
 Of course, the true purpose of the mission would be obvious to anyone paying 
attention. Oranienberg had no real strategic value to Allied war aims, and the 
Auergesellschaft Works was the only legitimate target in the city. Groves had always 
made a concerted effort to disguise American interest in atomic research from the 
Germans, and now he was faced with having to make the same calculated decisions 
regarding the Soviet Union. Therefore, to screen the real purpose of the Oranienberg 
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mission from the Soviets, Groves recommended, Marshall approved, and Spaatz planned 
a simultaneous and equally heavy attack against the small German town of Zossen, home 
of the German Army headquarters. The attack, which consisted of 735 bombers, achieved 
its intended purposes, and according to Spaatz “drew most of the attention and in itself 
presented a plausible cover plan for the Oranienberg operation.”
48
 As an added, and 
unexpected, bonus, Groves would learn after the war that the Zossen raid severely 




 About the same time Spaatz was reporting the bombing assessment to Marshall, 
Allied forces captured Heidelberg. The Alsos Mission, riding on the heels of the 
advancing combat forces, immediately moved into the city to secure the laboratory of 
Walther Bothe, a prominent German nuclear experimental physicist. He and his 
laboratory were located in the physics department of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for 
Medical Research, and when Alsos arrived Bothe quietly accepted his capture. He 
willingly spoke to Sam Goudsmit about the German atomic program, and told Goudsmit 
about the research work done in his institute during the war, and showed him “reprints, 
proofs and manuscripts of all the war-time papers which were written under his 
direction.”
50
 Bothe also revealed, or at least confirmed, the location of the remaining 
German atomic scientists. Otto Hahn had been evacuated from Berlin to Tailfingen, a 
small town about forty miles south of Stuttgart, near Hechingen (all in southern 
Germany). The German experimental uranium reactor (atomic “pile”) had been removed 
from the Berlin area and shipped to the town of Haigerloch, also in the vicinity of 
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Hechingen. In Hechingen itself were Max von Laue and the crown jewel of Alsos targets, 
Werner Heisenberg. Clearly, the future operations of the Alsos Mission would center on 
southern Germany, in and around the city of Hechingen.
51
 
 Bothe also confirmed to Goudsmit the sorry state of the German atomic bomb 
program. In Bothe’s laboratory was the only German cyclotron in operating condition (in 
contrast, the United States had twenty of these key machines for nuclear research).
52
 He 
reported a shortage of heavy water, the only major source of which was destroyed by 
Groves when the United States bombed the Norsk Hydro plant in Norway. Finally, Bothe 
told Goudsmit that the total German effort on atomic bomb research consisted of only a 
handful of scientists. His group in Heidelberg, Heisenberg in Hechingen with ten other 
subordinate physicists, a man named Dopel in Leipzig (who was assisted by his wife), a 
man named Kirchner in Germisch, Germany with two assistants, and a physicists named 
Stetter in Vienna with five others. Otto Hahn, according to Bothe, was working on 
chemical research not associated with the German nuclear program.
53
 
 On March 30, Pash moved the Alsos Forward South Base from Strasbourg to 
Heidelberg in order to bring the administrative structure of the mission closer to the front 
lines. Joining Pash in Heidelberg was Major Ham, who would assume control of 
administration and planning in the southern area so that Pash and Goudsmit could 
continue field operations.
54
 Soon after the base was established, Pash learned that George 
Patton’s Third Army was rapidly advancing through central Germany and that the city of 
Stadtilm, in Thuringia, would soon fall into the hands of the Allies. Alsos believed that 
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the Germans had built a secret experimental atomic pile there, in a laboratory created by 
Army Ordnance. They also had information that led them to believe the laboratory 
housed two prominent German atomic scientists, Kurt Diebner and Walther Gerlach (who 
Sam Goudsmit described as the “chief co-ordinator of nuclear research” in Germany). 
 During the first week of April, Alsos moved into Stadtilm and located the Army 
Ordnance laboratory. There they discovered the German uranium pile in the cellar of an 
old schoolhouse. In the center of the cellar the Germans had dug a deep pit, and had 
planned to build a reactor of uranium oxide blocks surrounded by heavy water. 
According to Goudsmit, the whole operation was “on the scale of a rather poor university 
and not of a serious atomic energy project.” While Alsos was able to capture several 
German physicists and their families, the mission’s two primary targets, Diebner and 
Gerlach, were gone along with most of their materials and equipment. The captured 
researchers told Goudsmit that Gerlach had been gone for some time, but Alsos had just 
missed Diebner, who had left only two days earlier. Apparently the Gestapo, just prior to 
the fall of the city, had taken Diebner, his materials, and his research documents and 
relocated them to Bavaria where the captured scientists assumed he would be asked to 
resume his research.
55
   
 Pash, Goudsmit, and the Alsos Mission had little time to dwell on their 
disappointment at missing out on the two German scientists. During the same time Alsos 
was searching the Army Ordnance laboratory in Stadtilm, Leslie Groves was dealing with 
a major diplomatic problem in Washington. The Yalta Conference had divided Germany 
into three zones of occupation. Later it was decided to include a fourth zone for the 
French out of territory originally intended for the United States. This proposed French 
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zone would include the four towns (Hechingen, Tailfingen, Haigerloch, and Bisingen) 
where it was believed the majority of the remainder of the German atomic bomb program 
was located, including almost all of the top German nuclear scientists. By late March, the 
French Army was poised to move into this area. To Groves, this would be a disaster. His 
knowledge of Frédéric Joliot-Curie’s politics had convinced him “that nothing that might 
be of interest to the Russians should ever be allowed to fall into French hands.”
56
  
 After consulting with George Marshall, on April 3 Groves wrote a letter to 
Secretary Stimson, pleading with him to intervene with the State Department, which was 
responsible for the readjustment of the American zone’s boundaries. Groves asked 
Stimson to convince the State Department to retain in the American zone the 
“quadrilateral of Freiberg, Stuttgart, Ulm, Friedrichshafen” (within which were the four 
target cities).
57
 Stimson passed this request on to Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, 
arguing that it was of the “highest importance” that the United States kept this important 
territory.
58
 However, despite protests from the Secretary of War, the Army Chief of Staff, 
and the head of the Manhattan Project, the State Department refused to consider moving 
the boundaries without a full explanation of the reasons why the request was being made, 
something Groves would never give.
59
 At any rate, it was unlikely the French would 
agree to any reshuffling of the assigned territory. They were “extremely anxious” to 
move into the area, since the Vichy French Government in exile was located in the 
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vicinity of Lake Constance in the southern portion of the disputed territory.
60
 Abandoning 
all hope of moving the zones of occupation, Groves was forced to initiate a dramatic 
measure to accomplish his purposes: Operation Harborage.
61
    
 Operation Harborage was designed to get Alsos into the key target cities before 
the French forces so that they could “capture the people [they] wanted, question them, 
seize and remove their records, and obliterate all remaining facilities.”
62
 The plan called 
for the Alsos Mission to be attached to a reinforced corps (two armored divisions, an 
airborne division, and all of the necessary logistical support) which would cut diagonally 
across the front of the French lines. Groves sent John Lansdale to Europe to make the 
necessary arrangements for Harborage. Lansdale left Washington on April 6, and arrived 
in Paris on the 8
th
. He immediately reported to General Bedell Smith in Rheims and 
described to him the nature of the mission, explaining to him that the “apparent 
untrustworthiness and bad associations of many of the French personnel” made it 
imperative that U.S. forces captured the area before the French. Lansdale told Smith that 
the mission was “deemed by the War Department highly important,” but that Gen. 
Eisenhower would have final discretion on whether or not the mission could be executed 
without detrimentally affecting the overall strategic picture. Gen. Smith told Lansdale 
that Boris Pash had already briefed him on Harborage. Smith had already sent Pash to 
confer on the plan with the 6
th
 Army Headquarters. 
 On the 10
th
, Lansdale, Pash, and Major Furman returned to SHAEF headquarters 
and spoke to Major General Kenneth Strong, G-2 of SHAEF, and his assistant Brigadier 
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General Ford, both of the British Army. They discussed the intelligence data, and General 
Strong agreed that the information on the target cities “was definite and clearly indicated 
the presence of research activities in the area.”
63
 Lansdale and Pash were then brought 
into a staff planning meeting of top commanders to discuss Operation Harborage. Bedell 
Smith presided over the meeting, which included General Harold Bull, Operations 
Officer (G-3) for SHAEF, General Strong, General Craig (the head of the Operations 
Division, General Staff, War Department), and John McCloy, the Assistant Secretary of 
War. After each man had been given the opportunity to speak on the proposed operation, 
General Smith stated that since the 6
th
 Army was at that moment required for defenses 
purposes in the south (while the main U.S. thrust was in the north), he could not 
recommend, at that time, the mission to General Eisenhower. He did say, however, that 




 Pressed by Lansdale, Smith also agreed to hold the 13
th
 Airborne Division in 
reserve to drop into the area in “support” of the French once the French Army began their 
advance (General Bull promised the 13
th
 could be ready to move within 72 hours). This 
could give Alsos the time necessary to move into the key cities and capture the target 
personnel, facilities, and materials. Finally, failing either of those options, Smith agreed 
to order a bombing mission against the targets so that nothing of value was left for the 
French. Lansdale’s priority was to seize the German assets, but if that were impossible he 
felt it was absolutely imperative to ensure they were “destroyed to the fullest extent.”
65
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 Four days later, on April 14, Pash, Furman, and Lansdale learned that these 
contingency plans would be unnecessary. The strategic situation in northern Germany 
had changed dramatically. Gen. Eisenhower decided to hold up the western Allied forces 
short of Berlin, and instead of continuing to press forward the armies would spend some 
time reinforcing their flanks. As a result, Eisenhower decided to put the original 
Harborage plan in operation. Once the French began moving again in the south, the 
assigned corps of Operation Harborage would sweep across their front and capture the 
target cities. Smith told Pash and Lansdale that he believed that the operation could 
happen in as soon as two weeks, although it could be longer.
66
 
 While Alsos waited for Operation Harborage to commence, Lansdale and Pash 
learned that an American force, in particular the 83
rd
 Infantry Division, was closing in on 
the town of Stassfurt, in eastern Germany. Alsos investigations at Brussels in September, 
1944 had indicated that the supply of uranium captured by the Germans in Belgium (as 
much as 1200 tons)
67
 had been sent to storage at the Wirtschaftliche Forschungs 
Gelleschaft (WIFO) salt mine in Stassfurt. The city would soon become a part of the 
Russian zone of occupation, so it was essential that Alsos get there first. 
 Under the direction of General Groves in Washington, Lansdale established an 
improvised joint American-British task force to capture the Stassfurt uranium. The 
American members were Lansdale, Pash, Tony Calvert (whose intelligence had first 
discovered the ore had been shipped to Stassfurt), several Alsos CIC agents (unnamed in 
the documents), and Major J. C. Bullock, who Groves had transferred from the 
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Manhattan Project to the Alsos Mission “for the express purpose of recovering” the ore.
68
 
The British contingent included Sir Charles Hambro, a top advisor to the British 
Government on raw materials (in particular uranium), Michael Perrin, the assistant 
director of British Tube Alloys (the British equivalent of the Manhattan Project), and 
Perrin’s assistant David Gattiker. The importance of the mission was demonstrated by the 
prestigious composition of the task force.
69
 
  On April 15, Lansdale, Pash, Bullock, and Sir Charles Hambro met with 
Brigadier General Edwin Seibert, G-2, 12
th
 Army Group to discuss the proposed 
operation (Stassfurt was in the 12
th
 Army Group’s area of operations). They explained to 
Siebert the importance of the mission, emphasizing that “it would be necessary that we 
act with the utmost secrecy and greatest dispatch” in order to beat the Soviets to the 
material. Siebert, however, was “very perturbed” at the proposal, and “foresaw all kinds 
of difficulties with the Russians and political repercussions at home.” He told the group 
that he would have to clear the mission with the commanding general of the 12
th
 Army 
before he could agree to anything. Fortunately for Alsos, that commanding general was 
Omar Bradley. When he heard of the mission’s objectives and Siebert’s hesitation, he 
reportedly told his G-2 “to hell with the Russians” and immediately authorized the plan. 
Siebert sent them on their way with the necessary letters of authority to all the American 
field commanders in whose areas Alsos would be operating.
70
 
 On April 17, the task force proceeded to Calbe, a town which housed the 
command post of the 83
rd
 Infantry Division. There they met with a Colonel Boyle (either 
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the division chief of staff or the G-2)
71
, who directed them to a Captain de Masse, the 
chief of the division’s G-2 section responsible for the interrogation of civilians. Captain 
de Masse had already been to the WIFO plant, located in a small town called 
Leopoldshall, about three kilometers from Stassfurt, and knew the Director (“Schultz”) 
and the Manager (“Schumann”). The Alsos team and Capt. de Masse picked up Schultz 
and Schumann on their way to the plant, and brought with them a copy of the plant’s 
inventory record collected from Schumann’s home. It is fortunate he had a copy, because 
when they arrived at the plant they discovered it had been badly damaged by both Allied 
bombing and looting from French and Italian workmen. “The records were hopeless 
strewn about the place.” With the manager’s record, however, the mission was able to 
discover approximately 1100 tons of uranium ore.
72
   
 The material was in barrels stored in above ground sheds and, according to 
Lansdale, “had obviously been there a long time, many of the barrels being broken open.” 
The following day, Lansdale left the rest of the task force at the plant “to take inventory 
and guard the place” and proceeded to the headquarters of the 9
th
 Army to arrange to 
have two truck companies assigned to Alsos to transport the material to the nearest 
railhead within the American zone of occupation, Hildesheim. On April 19, Lansdale 
returned to the plant and began to coordinate the transfer of the materials. Many of the 
barrels, however, were broken and others were in such a weakened condition that they 
could not be transported. Therefore, Lansdale, along with Bullock and Hambro, located a 
paper bag factory in the area and confiscated 10,000 “large heavy bags” in which the 
uranium would be transported. By that evening, the material was repacked and on its way 
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to Hildesheim. Lansdale had sent Calvert ahead to receive the material, and by the end of 
the month the uranium was on its way to Great Britain and then the United States.
73
   
 In the meantime, German resistance in the south had begun to deteriorate so 
quickly that the French had been moving much more rapidly than expected. On April 21, 
the Americans discovered the French had pushed beyond the line at which they had been 
ordered to halt, and we moving rapidly toward the target cities (apparently the French 
were intent on getting to the town of Sigmaringen, where the Vichy French Government 
was located). Col. Pash, who had returned to 6
th
 Army headquarters following the 
completion of the Stassfurt operation, acted immediately. General Jacob Devers, 
Commanding General of the 6
th





 and he quickly set off for the first target city, Haigerloch.  
 The Alsos Mission, with the assistance of the combat engineers, captured 
Haigerloch on April 23, in advance of the French. As the engineers “were busy 
consolidating the first Alsos-directed seizure of an enemy town,” Pash sent investigative 
teams throughout Haigerloch to locate the German research facilities. They discovered a 
secret German laboratory in a cave “in the side of an 80-foot cliff towering above the 
lower level of the town,” and “ingenious set-up” that gave it almost complete protection 
from both aerial reconnaissance and bombing.
75
 In the cave Alsos discovered a German 
experimental reactor, an atomic pile, that had been brought there from the Kaiser 
Wilhelm Institute in Berlin in February. The pile was equipped with a graphite moderator 
but did not have any uranium in it. The next day a British scientific intelligence team, 
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escorted by John Lansdale and Robert Furman, arrived to help the Alsos scientists 
evaluate and analyze the reactor. The British included Sir Charles Hambro, Michael 
Perrin, and David Gattiker from the Stassfurt operation, but also Commander Eric Welsh, 
of British scientific intelligence, and Wing Commanders Cecil and Norman, both of 
British Secret Intelligence.
76
 The scientists measured the pile and quickly determined that 
it was “simply not big enough” to have been self-sustaining.
77
 
 Sir Charles agreed to take responsibility for the dismantling of the pile, so 
Lansdale and Pash moved on to Hechingen. Pash had already sent the task force ahead of 
him, and they had captured the town nearly unopposed. The primary target in Hechingen 
was an old wool mill that now housed the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics. Within 
fifteen minutes of their arrival, Alsos secured the mill/Institute and establish a command 
post. Quickly they began to capture some of the key scientists on their target list, 
including Carl von Weizsäcker, Erich Bagge, and Karl Wirtz. Alsos thought they would 
find Werner Heisenberg at Hechingen also, but they learned from their captives that he 
had left two weeks earlier via bicycle to join his family in the small town of Urfeld in the 
Bavarian Alps. 
 The following morning, Pash led a reconnaissance team into Tailfingen, where 
they captured a large chemistry laboratory and took into custody Otto Hahn and Max von 
Laue. Hahn agreed to give them all of his secret reports and documents on the entirety of 
the German atomic bomb program, and they confirmed what Alsos had known since 
Strasbourg: the German program barely existed. On April 26, Lansdale, Welsh and Perrin 
interrogated Von Laue, Weizsäcker, Wirtz, and Hahn. The Americans and British were 
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“particularly interested in finding the heavy water and the uranium oxide which must 
have been used in the Haigerloch pile.” After a long session of questioning, during which 
the German scientists denied all knowledge of where the material was located, Karl Wirtz 
finally agreed to show Alsos the hiding place of the heavy water and uranium. The heavy 
water was in steel barrels in an old mill about five kilometers from Haigerloch, while the 
uranium had been buried in a field on a hill overlooking Haigerloch. Both materials were 
collected and sent on trucks to Paris for later shipment to Great Britain and the United 
States.
78
 The next day, April 27, the German scientists were sent to Heidelberg for further 
interrogation. Before they left, Von Weizsäcker told Alsos that he had hidden his secret 
papers behind his house. Sam Goudsmit, who had caught up with the mission by that 
time, fished the papers out of a cesspool in Von Weizsäcker’s property. Enclosed in a 
metal drum, these papers were a complete set of German atomic bomb documents (and as 




 With the exception of Heisenberg, Walther Gerlach, and Kurt Diebner, Alsos had 
captured every significant German atomic scientist. The German atomic pile, and all of 
the remaining fissile material was in American or British hands, and all related equipment 
and documents had been kept away from the French and Soviets. In addition, the entire 
operation had been conducted while only 12 hours ahead of the forward advance of the 
French Army. As Alsos moved to Tailfingen, French Moroccan troops were entering 
Hechingen. The same French force entered Tailfingen the day after it was captured by the 
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 By the end of April, as General Groves attested, “Alsos was heavily 
engaged in mopping-up activities.” With the majority of scientists captured, and with the 
fissile material and secret documents secured, “our principal concern at this point was to 
keep information and atomic scientists from falling into the hands of the Russians.”
81
 
This would mean one final mission for Alsos. 
 
To The Finish 
 On April 28, the entire Alsos Mission contingent returned to their Heidelberg base 
(Alsos Forward South) to plan and prepare for their final operation. It was thought that 
Gerlach and Diebner were most likely in the vicinity of Munich, while Heisenberg was in 
Urfeld. Pash decided to split Alsos into two task forces. One, commanded by Major 
Richard Ham, would proceed to Munich to hunt Gerlach and Diebner. The other, 
commanded by Pash, would go after Heisenberg. Both groups left Heidelberg the 
morning of April 30. 
 Major Ham’s Munich operation included, among others, Capt. Augustine, Dr. 
Carl Baumann (an Alsos scientist), three CIC agents, and three enlisted drivers. On May 
1, the Alsos group entered Munich at 1030 a.m. and proceeded to make contact with 
American forces. That afternoon, Ham and Baumann went to the home of the first target, 
Walther Gerlach. While Gerlach was not at home, his wife accompanied the group to the 
university where the physicist was located. At the University of Munich, Gerlach was 
found in the basement of the Physics Laboratory, seized, and taken back to his house for 
interrogation. From this questioning, Alsos discovered the location of their second target, 
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Kurt Diebner. The next day, May 2, Ham’s team located Diebner in the town of 
Schongeising, approximately 20 miles southwest of Munich, and brought him under 
guard back to join Gerlach in Munich. On May 3, the two German scientists, along with 
their personal documents, were evacuated from Munich back to AFwdS at Heidelberg. In 
all, the Munich operation was “a rapid and successful one,” Ham concluded. “Personnel 
targets of interest to the Mission were secured and evacuated according to plan.”
82
   
 The Alsos contingent commanded by Pash had a much more difficult time 
capturing Heisenberg. The town of Urfeld lay within the area of the “Bavarian Redoubt,” 
where the fanatical, true-believer Nazis were supposed to make their last stand. It was not 
yet in Allied hands. Pash, however, had been hunting Heisenberg for a year and a half by 
this time. He was not about to let the fact that Heisenberg was behind German lines, 
twenty miles ahead of the advanced elements of the 7
th
 U.S. Army, stop him from 
capturing his ultimate prize. On May 2, Pash and his team approached Urfeld and 
discovered the bridge to the town had been destroyed and no vehicles could get through 
to the city. He decided to dismount his 11-man force
83
, and rounded up another ten men 
from a reconnaissance patrol to move by foot across the mountains into Urfeld. They 
took the town, without resistance, around 4:45 p.m. An hour later, “a small force of 
Germans” attempted to enter the town, but was repelled by Pash and his unit. According 
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 That evening, a German general came to see Pash and attempted to surrender his 
entire division to Alsos. Pash told him that the general would have to wait until the 
morning, since Pash did not want to wake up his commander, who was right behind him 
with a larger force. The German general bought the story, but just as he left the command 
post, a second German commander entered and also attempted to surrender his forces to 
Pash. This commander (the rank is not clear from the documents) indicated to Pash “that 
there was a force of approximately 700 men in the surrounding mountains” ready to give 
themselves up to the Americans. Pash was a bold and courageous officer, but even he 
knew that his force of 21 stood no chance of survival once the Germans discovered his 
true strength, and to remain in Urfeld “would have jeopardized the execution of the 
mission.” Thus, “after bluffing the Germans in an indication of force, the Alsos unit 
withdrew on foot to its starting point” and returned to their vehicles.  
 That night, the bridge to Urfeld was repaired by American combat engineers, and 
the next day Pash returned to Urfeld supported by an infantry battalion of the 142
nd
 
Infantry Regiment. As the town was being secured by the Army, the Alsos Mission found 
Heisenberg in his office, bags packed, waiting to be captured. He was immediately sent 
back to Heidelberg to join the other German scientists.  
Pash reported the capture in his dryly worded mission report: “the personality 
target was picked up and evacuated.”
85
 Leslie Groves was more expositive in his analysis 
of the Urfeld operation: 
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Pash’s last effort typified the boldness with which he carried out every one of his 
operations, and clearly demonstrated his ability to stick to his objective, which, in this 
case, had been to catch Heisenberg. Heisenberg was one of the world’s leading physicists 
and, at the time of the German break-up, he was worth more to us than ten divisions of 





Farm Hall and the End of Alsos 
 The war in Europe ended five days after the capture of Heisenberg. The German 
surrender “had thrown wide the gates to [Alsos] scientists, whose interests remained 
intense in research centers, document centers, laboratories and other places where 
research could have been carried out.” Alsos teams were sent throughout Europe to 
secure loose ends and to ensure nothing was left for the Soviets. They were active “in all 
parts of Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Italy, and, as guests, in Holland, Belgium, 
and France.”
87
 However, against the wishes of many within the intelligence field who 
saw the true merit in an organization such as Alsos (see Chapter 5), the Alsos Mission 
was broken up shortly after the end of the Second World War. “The 144 men and women 
who were with the mission on V-E Day (28 officers, 43 enlisted men, 19 scientists, 5 
civilian employees and 19 CIC agents) were gradually reduced by attrition until, on 




 The only outstanding question by the summer of 1945, therefore, was what to do 
with the German scientists. Groves did not want them to come to the United States, 
where they “would inevitably learn a great deal about our work and would not for some 
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time make any contribution in return.” More importantly, Groves did not want them to 
come under Soviet control, “as with their background they would be of great value to the 
Russians. Ten of them (Erich Bagge, Kurt Diebner, Walther Gerlach, Otto Hahn, Paul 
Harteck, Werner Heisenberg, Max von Laue, Carl von Weizsäcker, Karl Wirtz, and Horst 
Korsching) were therefore sent to England and secretly detained at an estate in Farm 
Hall, fifteen miles from Cambridge while Groves, the American authorities, and the 
British decided what to ultimately do with them.  
From July through December, 1945, the scientists’ conversations were 
clandestinely taped, and some of the conversations, most notably between Heisenberg 
and his colleagues, confirmed Groves’ worst fears. On several occasions, Heisenberg was 
heard telling his colleagues that, if the British or the Americans did not intend to allow 
him to do what he called “proper physics” in Germany, or if the living conditions in 
Germany were subpar, he would consider working with the Soviets.
89
 On another 
occasion, Heisenberg is heard discussing the potential lure of working in the Soviet 
Union: “But if in a year of six month’s time we find that we are only able to eke out a 
meagre [sic] existence under the Anglo-Saxons, whereas the Russians offer us a job for 
say fifty thousand roubles [sic], what then? Can they expect us to say: ‘No, we will refuse 
these fifty thousand roubles [sic] as we are so pleased and grateful to be allowed to 
remain on the English side.’”
90
  
To prevent defections, the Americans and the British decided the only prudent 
solution was to return the scientists to western Germany, but to ensure that the working 
conditions there for them “would be such that they could not be tempted by Russian 
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 On December 22, 1945, the scientists were notified that they were going to be 
sent back to Germany. The Americans and British had spent the better part of the summer 
and fall constructing and improving laboratory facilities in their zones of occupation so 
that Werner Heisenberg and the rest of the German atomic scientists would feel content 
in their working environment. To their credit, the American and British effort achieved 
its purpose: “not a single one of these men left for the East despite the quite attractive 




                                                          
91
 Groves, p. 338 
92






There is no reason why we should not know, reasonably well, what is afoot; and if we do, 
much of the value of surprise is lost. But we are not going to know enough as things now 
stand. Since the war a Central Intelligence Agency has been created, but it has been under 
the command of military men whose careers lay elsewhere, it creaks at the joints, and it 
has not yet amounted to much…We need a modern intelligence agency in every sense of 
the word, using modern methods as they were partially developed during the last war, not 
a musical-comedy affair of a stodgy refuge, not even the half-successful affair we now 
have, but an organization qualified to meet our needs in this kind of world. It can cut 
down the threat of surprise attack. It does not cost much; by all means let us have it. We 
ought to know how to build it, after the experience of the last war, for we did not do 
badly at all on intelligence work then, after we got our hand in and learned how to do it. 
But the really able men who functioned then have largely scattered into civilian life, the 
type of ability needed is rare, and the work is not attractive. The task can be done, by an 
individual of great mental and organizational capacity, having ample authority and the 
full backing of the President of the United States. As we value our peace of mind we had 





The Dismantling of American Wartime Intelligence 
 Discussions about the nature of post-war U.S. intelligence began almost a year 
before the Second World War ended. In October, 1944, Office of Strategic Services 
Director William Donovan met with President Roosevelt to recommend a permanent, 
centralized intelligence agency placed under the direct supervision of the president. 
Donovan understood that the OSS was created as a wartime agency designed to support 
the military directly, and was thus placed under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
His new peacetime agency, he argued, should focus on national and not just military 
intelligence. The executive branch, with the assistance of both the War and Navy 
Departments and the Secretary of State, should coordinate the new organization. 
President Roosevelt, who had come to trust Donovan’s experience and insight, agreed in 
                                                          
1
 Vannevar Bush. Modern Arms and Free Men (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1949), p. 135 
186 
 
principle to Donovan’s plan, but Roosevelt’s death on April 12, 1945 put the OSS 
director’s proposal in jeopardy.
2
 
 Donovan’s close friendship with President Roosevelt had protected him from the 
bureaucratic infighting that characterized the relations between American intelligence 
agencies during the Second World War. Army and Navy Intelligence, the Department of 
State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
3
 had formed intelligence organizations 
long before the start of the war, and only Roosevelt’s favor had kept the upstart OSS on 
relatively equal footing. Roosevelt’s death, and Harry Truman becoming President, 
meant that Donovan would have to fight the parochial interests of each of these agencies 
without his powerful patron. This difficult situation was only made more complicated for 
Donovan by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Harold Smith, who was in charge 
of drafting the post-war budget. Smith had his own vision of how U.S. intelligence 
should be organized and, in a meeting with Truman just two weeks after Roosevelt’s 
death, convinced the new President to postpone any decision about post-war intelligence 
organization until studies could be undertaken by “specially trained experts in this field” 
from the Bureau of Budget.
4
 Truman was open to the idea of a “sound, well-organized 
intelligence system,” and he agreed that “plans needed to be made.” But he argued that 
“it was imperative that [the United States] refrain from rushing into something that would 
produce harmful and unnecessary rivalries among the various intelligence agencies.”
5
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 Truman’s indecision and delay had two significant consequences. First, it led to 
months of acrimonious debate among the leadership of the OSS, the War Department, the 
Navy, State, and the FBI over the future of American intelligence. Second, it placed an 
inordinate and disproportionate amount of power in the hands of the Bureau of the 
Budget and Harold Smith, who had the President’s ear and who could thus shape the 
form of the post-war intelligence apparatus. Donovan recognized the significance of 
Smith’s position and appealed to him for a centralized intelligence agency. On August 
25, Donovan wrote the budget director and explained that “there is no permanent agency 
to take over the functions which OSS will have then ceased to perform” once it was 
terminated. Those functions, Donovan argued, are “essential in the effective discharge by 
this nation of its responsibilities in the organization and maintenance of the peace,” and 
thus it was imperative that the President decide upon a solution “before the War Agency 
[the OSS] has disappeared so that profit may be made of its experience and ‘know how’ 
in deciding how the new agency may best be conducted.” Donovan warned Smith against 
further delay: “It is not easy to set up a modern intelligence system. It is more difficult to 
do so in time of peace than in time of war.”
6
  
 By this time, Donovan was hearing rumors in Washington that Smith intended to 
recommend that the OSS be liquidated and its component parts spread among several 
intelligence agencies, which was the opposite of Donovan’s conception of a centralized 
peacetime intelligence organization. Thus, along with his letter to Smith he included a 
statement of principles, “the soundness of which [he believed had] been established by 
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study and by practical experience.”
7
 The paper argued that all major powers except the 
United States had long-established, standing, and worldwide intelligence services that 
reported to the highest levels of their governments. Before the Second World War, he 
continued, the United States had no foreign secret intelligence service, and “it never has 
had and does not now have a coordinated intelligence system.” The United States was 
therefore forced to rely on friendly nations to supply it with foreign intelligence, and a 
centralized, permanent intelligence agency such as Donovan envisioned “would remedy 
this defect in peace as well as war so that American policy could be based upon 
information obtained through its own sources on foreign intentions, capabilities and 
developments as seen and interpreted by Americans.” The agency would be independent 
of any department of the government, “since it is obliged to serve all and must be free of 
the natural bias of an operating Department,” and would operate under the direction of 
the President. It would have an independent budget granted directly by Congress, and “as 
the sole agency for secret intelligence” should be responsible for espionage, counter-
espionage, and special operations “designed to anticipate and counter any attempted 
penetration and subversion of our national security by enemy action.”
8
 
 Smith did not respond to Donovan’s paper. Two weeks later Donovan tried a 
different approach. On September 4, he wrote to Sam Rosenman, Special Council to 
President Truman, in the hope that Rosenman could help him counter the influence of the 
Bureau of the Budget director. Donovan wrote that the plan to “allocate different 
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segments of the [OSS] to different departments” would be “an absurd and unsatisfactory 
thing to do.” He admonished the myopic thinking of the administration, and argued “it’s 
time for us to grow up, Sam, and realize that the new responsibilities we have assumed 
require an adequate intelligence system.” Donovan closed his letter by warning 
Rosenman that President Truman would assuredly learn in time that the United States 
needed such an agency, and he hoped Rosenman could help him establish one in time “to 
take over a very useful legacy.”
9
  
 A week later, Donovan took his argument directly to President Truman. In a 
memorandum dated September 13, 1945, Donovan presented his case in a final plea for a 
centralized intelligence agency: 
1.   I understand that it has been, or will be, suggested to you that certain of the primary 
functions of this organization, more particularly, secret intelligence, counter-espionage, 
and the evaluation and synthesis of intelligence – that these functions be severed and 
transferred to separate agencies. I hope that in the national interest, and in your own 
interest as the Chief Executive, that you will not permit this to be done. 
 
2.   Whatever agency has the duty of intelligence should have it as a complete whole. To 
do otherwise would be to add chaos to existing confusion in the intelligence field. The 
various functions that have been integrated are the essential functions in intelligence. One 





 Despite Donovan’s entreaties, on September 20, 1945, President Truman signed 
Executive Order 9621, officially terminating the Office of Strategic Services and 
spreading its functions throughout the government. Authored by Harold Smith and the 
Bureau of the Budget, the executive order transferred the research and analysis functions 
of the OSS to the Department of State and the operational functions to the Department of 
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War. The Secretary of State was given the power to choose what parts of the research and 
analysis branch of OSS (at the time known as the Interim Research and Intelligence 
Service) he thought could benefit the State Department and dispose of any other 
personnel, materials, records, of funds he deemed unnecessary. The portions of OSS the 
Secretary of State would decide to keep would become the Department of State’s Office 
of Research and Intelligence (ORI).
11
  
 The OSS operational units placed under the Secretary of War would be organized 
into an agency called the Strategic Services Unit (SSU). Brigadier General John 
Magruder, the former Deputy Director of Intelligence for the OSS, was appointed as its 
director. The War Department intended the SSU to be a temporary agency, a bridge 
between the OSS and whatever permanent intelligence organization the Truman 
administration would establish. They therefore decided not to integrate the SSU into their 
own established intelligence service, G-2, instead opting to maintain it as an entirely 
separate agency under the Office of the Secretary of War. Magruder was tasked with 
ensuring that the talents and operational experience of the OSS did not disappear along 
with their parent organization. In a memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of War 
John McCloy,
12
 Magruder was instructed “to insure that the facilities and assets of OSS 
are preserved for any possible future use, so far as not presently to be liquidated in any 
event by reason of the termination of hostilities.” Magruder would be forced to downsize 
the manpower of his unit, a natural repercussion of the end of combat operations, 
particularly when so many members of the United States Military in the Second World 
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War were drafted or had only enlisted for the duration of the conflict. Yet, in doing so, 
McCloy insisted that the institutional knowledge of the OSS “must be preserved so far as 
potentially of future usefulness to the country.”
13
 
 This was no easy task, as the natural attrition of peacetime would begin to take its 
toll. As of September 30, 1945, the OSS operations units maintained a force of 10,390 
personnel, 5,713 overseas and 4,677 in the United States (6,964 Army personnel, 734 
Navy personnel, and 2,692 civilians).
14
 Of these, 9,058 were transferred to the SSU on 
October 1. By October 19, that number had been reduced to 7,640, and nearly 3,000 of 
that figure were in the process of separation. At the end of October, Magruder estimated 
that overall SSU personnel strength would be further reduced to 1,913 by December 1.
15
 
 Worried that his unit would slowly wither away while Washington failed to act, 
Magruder pressed McCloy to expedite the creation of a permanent intelligence 
organization. In a memorandum to McCloy, Magruder echoed the recommendations of 
his former boss, William Donovan, and called for a national foreign intelligence 
organization that would serve as the principal agency within the United States “for the 
comprehensive analysis and synthesis of information concerning foreign nations.” He 
insisted that this agency should be formed quickly, with its own independent budget, and 
with the capabilities of procuring foreign intelligence by clandestine means. In his 
memorandum, Magruder explained why such an organization was imperative: 
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The need for such a foreign intelligence service has long existed and has been heavily 
underscored by the national experience during the war just ended. The implications of the 
pivotal position which the United States occupies in world affairs, and the incalculable 





 Assistant Secretary of War McCloy sympathized with Magruder’s position. In 
fact, most of the top American policymakers, from the Departments of War, Navy, and 
even State, were advocates of a more centralized, permanent intelligence organization. 
The delay in action was caused by a fundamental difference of opinion on which agency 
should oversee the intelligence functions of whatever permanent institution was 
eventually formed. The Department of State, as the principal agency tasked with the 
formulation, development, management, and execution of United States foreign policy, 
argued that it should take over the postwar leadership of foreign intelligence. The military 
services, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued that they should at least be equal 
partners with State in the formulation of postwar intelligence (if not the leading voice). 
After all, the military services had far more experience in intelligence matters. The first 
US Naval Attaché was sent to London in 1882, the Office of Naval Intelligence was 
created in 1884, and the Army’s intelligence branch – the Intelligence Group in the War 
Department – was established in 1885. Military intelligence had been the predominant 
force in foreign intelligence during the Second World War.  
 On January 22, 1946, President Truman broke the impasse. He designated the 
Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, along with a personal representative of the 
President
17
, as the National Intelligence Authority (NIA). He directed that “all Federal 
                                                          
16
 John Magruder to John McCloy, “National Foreign Intelligence Agency,” October 20, 1945, CIA-RDP90-
00610R000100130013-9, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration 
II (NARA II), College Park, MD 
17
 Admiral William Leahy became the President’s representative 
193 
 
foreign intelligence activities be planned, developed and coordinated,” by the NIA “so as 
to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to 
national security.” Within the limits of available funding, the NIA members would “from 
time to time assign persons and facilities from your respective Departments” to 
collectively form a Central Intelligence Group (CIG). The CIG would be headed by a 
Director of Central Intelligence, appointed by the President, who would be “responsible 
to the National Intelligence Authority, and shall sit as a non-voting member thereof.”
18
 
 The Director of Central Intelligence was tasked with the correlation and 
evaluation of intelligence relating to national security, “and the appropriate dissemination 
within the Government of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence.” The 
CIG and the Director of Central Intelligence were given no independent budget, 
personnel, or collection capabilities of their own, but instead the CIG would operate with 
personnel and facilities borrowed from the participating departments, and the Director 
would be required to obtain approval from the NIA for nearly all decisions regarding 
intelligence functions. In addition, the existing departmental intelligence agencies would 
continue to collect, analyze, and disseminate “departmental intelligence.” Finally, the 
Director of Central Intelligence would be advised in his role by an Intelligence Advisory 
Board (IAB), which would consist of the heads of the departmental intelligence agencies, 
or their representatives. There was very little that was independent or centralized with 
this new intelligence organization
19
 
 On January 23, the day after Truman’s directive, Rear Admiral Sidney Souers was 
appointed as the first Director of Central Intelligence. Souers had been the Assistant 
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Director of the ONI during the final eighteen months of the war. He became the director 
of an organization that had been given general functions and principles, but these 
remained only broadly defined. The first task for the NIA and Souers was to answer some 
of the key questions of policies, procedures, manpower, and resources left unresolved by 
the President.
20
 In early February, Souers provided the NIA with a “Proposed Tentative 
Organization of the Central Intelligence Group” in which he proposed “the necessary 
tentative charter and sufficient personnel to activate the organization and begin 
operating.”
21
 The NIA responded with NIA Directive No. 1 on February 8, “Policies and 
Procedures Governing the Central Intelligence Group,” which mandated that the CIG 
“shall be considered, organized and operated as a cooperative interdepartmental activity,” 
with equal participation from all associated departments.
22
 The directive also required 
that all “recommendations” made by the Director must be referred to the IAB for 
“concurrence or comment.” Anything approved unanimously by the IAB could be 
enacted by the Director, but if any member of the IAB did not concur, the Director was 
required to submit to the NIA his “recommendation” and the basis for “non-
concurrence,” at which point the NIA would make the final determination. Souers was 
also told to estimate the personnel and funding required from each of the departments for 
the balance of the fiscal year, and to predict what they might be for the next fiscal year as 
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well. The funds and personnel would be made available to the CIG “as approved by this 
authority and within the limits of available appropriations.”
23
 
 The first NIA directives narrowed some of the broadly-defined framework of the 
CIG, but the future of one key agency, the SSU, was yet to be decided. The tentative 
table of organization for the CIG approved by the NIA called for the contributing 
departments to provide personnel for clandestine operations, but as of Magruder’s 
memorandum of February 14, 1946, the SSU had not been included in any of these early 
plans. In a memorandum titled “Establishment of Clandestine Collection Service for 
Foreign Intelligence,” Magruder warned against further delay. He argued that it would 
not be possible for the SSU to continue effective operations in its interim status. Lack of 
long term planning and commitments have “seriously affected its logical development.” 
Personnel had already “begun to melt away,” and this loss had been “particularly heavy 
among key personnel.” Ominously, he contended that “unless early disposition is made of 
the assets represented by SSU it will undoubtedly become necessary to effect curtailment 
if not liquidation of its remaining personnel and facilities.”
24
 
 On March 27, Souers brought the issue before the NIA,
25
 and in NIA Directive 
No. 4, “Policy on Liquidation of the Strategic Services Unit,” issued on April 2, the 
National Intelligence Authority announced their decision: They would put off the 
decision until later in the year. Arguing the complete liquidation of the SSU should not be 
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undertaken until “it is determined which of its functions and activities are required for the 
permanent Federal foreign intelligence program, and should therefore be transferred to 
the Central Intelligence Group or other agencies.” The NIA was to make a final decision 
“as promptly as possible and prior to 1 July 1947.” An interdepartmental committee was 
formed to survey the SSU and make recommendations to the NIA, but it would not be 
until October when the SSU was fully integrated into the CIG, and then only a limited 
number of SSU personnel would be transferred to the new agency.
26
 
 In the meantime, Director Souers began to formulate a plan for the development 
of the CIG’s capabilities for intelligence on the Soviet Union. On April 29, Souers sent a 
memorandum to the NIA explaining that, based on the NIA’s informal concurrence, a 
Planning Committee had been formed “to utilize the facilities of all interested 
Government agencies for the production of the highest possible quality of intelligence on 
the U.S.S.R.” Consisting of representatives from the CIG, State Department, MIS (G-2), 
the ONI, and A-2 (Army Air Force Intelligence), the committee drew up a plan to 
“coordinate and improve the production of intelligence on the U.S.S.R.” Acknowledging 
the “urgent need” to develop actionable intelligence on the Soviet Union “in the shortest 
possible time,” the Planning Committee established a Working Committee tasked with 
producing a compilation of known strategic intelligence on the Soviet Union called the 
Strategic Intelligence Digest (SID). The SIDs would then be distributed to the member 
agencies and used to create Strategic Intelligence Estimates (SIEs) “as required to meet 
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 In June, Souers resigned as Director of Central Intelligence, and was replaced by 
47-year-old Lieutenant General Hoyt Vandenberg, who had been the director of 
intelligence for the War Department General Staff up until his appointment with the CIG. 
The NIA felt that the appointment of a new director gave them a chance to redefine the 
functions of the Director of Central Intelligence “which will give him the necessary 
authority to augment the Central Intelligence Group so that he may effectively perform 
his assigned missions.” In the proposed NIA directive of June 29 (NIA 4), the Director of 
Central Intelligence was authorized to act as “the agent” of the NIA in coordinating 
foreign intelligence.
28
 However, Admiral Leahy objected to the use of the word “agent” 
in the earlier draft, fearing it might imply “unwarranted freedom of the Director of 
Central Intelligence to act for the National Intelligence Authority.” Vandenberg, 
conscious of the interdepartmental tensions from his time in War Department 
intelligence, acknowledged that the wording was “undesirable” and explained that it was 
only intended to give him the authority to act to ensure that the NIA’s policies and 
objectives were correctly implemented. To avoid any further controversy, the NIA 
reworded the draft in order to make it clear that the NIA would not be “relinquishing its 
supervision and control, and to protect from unauthorized interference the rights of 
departmental intelligence agencies to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate 
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 In effect, the NIA membership was ensuring that American 
intelligence would remain, for at least some time, decentralized and fragmented. 
 This would begin to change a year later with the passage of the National Security 
Act of 1947.
30
 Signed into law by President Truman on July 26, 1947, this legislation 
created an independent Air Force and united the military services under a Secretary of 
Defense. In addition, the bill established the National Security Council, a body designed 
to centralize and coordinate national security policy in the executive branch. A final key 
provision of the National Security Act of 1947 was the formation of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, America’s first centralized, independent intelligence organization 




 While in theory the National Security Act of 1947 and the creation of the CIA 
should have solved many of the issues the intelligence community had faced since the 
end of the Second World War, it did not immediately fix some of the most pressing 
problems. The CIA experienced growing pains before it became an effective centralized 
intelligence organization. For one thing, the CIA had considerable difficulties 
coordinating its operations and analysis with the departmental intelligence agencies. On 
December 12, 1947, the National Security Council created the Intelligence Advisory 
Committee (IAC), a successor to the IAB which maintained many of its former body’s 
worst characteristics, particularly the rampant parochialism of departmental intelligence 
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chiefs. The IAC was composed of seven members: the Director of Central Intelligence 
(the IAC Chair), the heads of intelligence from the Departments of State, Army, Navy, 
and Air Force, the Joint Staff, and the Atomic Energy Commission. NSC Intelligence 
Directive No. 1 mandated that the Director of Central Intelligence obtain the views of the 
IAC before making any recommendations to the National Security Council “pertaining to 
the intelligence activities of the various departments and agencies.” If one of the 
members did not concur, the problem would then be referred to the NSC for mediation. 
In essence, the NSC directive gave the departmental intelligence agencies a de facto veto 
power over CIA operations that involved any other U.S. organization. Fortunately for the 
CIA and American national security, the IAC met infrequently in its first two years of 
existence. CIA officials learned early on how to circumvent the IAC by avoiding formal 
meetings and not issuing formal statements. Instead, they used informal relationships to 
obtain the necessary approvals. This made operations manageable for the CIA, but it 
limited interagency cooperation.
32
   
 To their credit, the members of the National Security Council were aware that the 
CIA was not operating as effectively or efficiently as it could be. In January, 1948, the 
NSC and the Director of Central Intelligence Roscoe Hillenkoetter decided it would be 
wise to allow an outside group to examine carefully the policies and procedures of the 
CIA to determine where deficiencies existed and to suggest remedies. The NSC 
commissioned a three-member group, headed by former OSS official Allen Dulles. The 
other two members of the committee were William H. Jackson, who served on the 
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intelligence staff of General Omar Bradley in the Second World War,
33
 and Mathias 
Correa, an assistant to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal during the Second World 
War. The group analyzed the CIA beginning in the winter of 1948 and presented their 
findings in a report submitted on January 1, 1949. 
 The Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, more popularly known as the Dulles Report, 
found that the National Security Act of 1947 had created “a framework upon which a 
sound intelligence system can be built,” but that the CIA had not yet developed an 
effective means for coordinating intelligence activities and judgments relating to national 
security.
34
 The failure of the CIA to coordinate operations with departmental agencies 
had serious consequences: 
Unless the Central Intelligence Agency performs an essential service for each of [the] 
departments and coordinates their intelligence activities, it will fail in its mission. The 
Central Intelligence Agency should not be merely another intelligence agency duplicating 
and rivalling [sic] the existing agencies of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force. It should 
not be a competitor of these agencies, but a contributor to them and should help to 
coordinate their intelligence activities. It must make maximum use of the resources of 
existing agencies; it must not duplicate their work but help to put an end to existing 
duplication by seeing to it that the best qualified agency in each phase of the intelligence 




The CIA, however, was not carrying out its coordinating responsibility: 
The principal defect of the Central Intelligence Agency is that its direction, 
administrative organization and performance do not show sufficient appreciation of the 
Agency’s assigned functions, particularly in the fields of intelligence coordination and 
the production of intelligence estimates. The result has been that the Central Intelligence 
Agency has tended to become just one more intelligence agency producing intelligence in 




                                                          
33
 Jackson would later become the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence in 1950 
34
 Allen Dulles, William Jackson, and Mathias Correa, “The Central Intelligence Agency and National 
Organization for Intelligence: A Report to the National Security Council” (The Dulles Report), January 1, 
1949, CIA-RDP86B00269R001100090002-8, CREST, NARA II, p. 2-3 
35
 Ibid, p. 26-27 
36
 Ibid, p. 11 [emphasis added] 
201 
 
The Dulles Report indicated that the CIA had to change before it could become a truly 
effective centralized intelligence organization. 
 The United States Congress was also concerned about the functionality of the 
American intelligence system. In June, 1948, the Task Force on National Security 
Organization, a part of the First Hoover Commission,
37
 began hearings to determine the 
effectiveness of the intelligence community in the United States. The task force was 
headed by Ferdinand Eberstadt, a policy advisor to the government who had assisted in 
the drafting of the National Security Act of 1947. Their report, which was released to 
Congress on January 13, 1949 and is popularly known as the Eberstadt Report, argued 
that the national security organization of the United States created by the National 
Security Act of 1947 was “soundly constructed, but not yet working well.” The task force 
was particularly critical of the lack of coordination (and sometimes adversarial 
relationship) between the CIA, the military, the State Department, and the Atomic Energy 
Commission, which led to departmental intelligence estimates that often were “subjective 
and biased.” The military and State Department were singled out for failing to share 
information with the CIA, and military intelligence was criticized for a glaring lack of 
professionalism.
38
 The Eberstadt Report, like the Dulles Report, served to reveal broad 
inefficiencies within agencies and lack of cooperation between agencies that threatened 
the national security of the United States. 
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The Decline of American Scientific Intelligence 
 Scientific intelligence in postwar America was severely hampered by a critical 
shortage of qualified scientists in government service. When the war ended, many of the 
nation’s scientists left government service and returned to their civilian careers. Most of 
the top scientists went back to their academic posts. Many junior scientists left to 
complete their advanced degrees, or to begin their academic careers. Universities were 
willing to hire junior government scientists at positions far higher than they could have 
received before the war, particularly those who had worked on the atomic bomb.
39
 
Industry would also play a detrimental role in manpower shortages. Scientific research 
and development had become lucrative during the war, and thus major American 
industrial firms were competing for the services of experienced scientists. 
 Complicating matters further, the government was limited in its ability to recruit 
new scientists to government service by the lack of suitably trained personnel. During the 
war, the draft board did not give deferments to science students, even those in graduate 
school. Vannevar Bush, in a report to President Truman in 1945, estimated that the war 
prevented 150,000 potential scientists from obtaining their bachelor’s degrees. The war 
also kept close to 10,000 scientists from earning their doctoral degrees (a number 
equivalent to all scientific PhD’s granted in the United States between 1898 and 1927).
40
 
By 1955, Bush argued, the shortfall in scientific doctoral degrees would be close to 
17,000. Since 1940, and the passage of the Selective Service Act, there had been 
“practically no students over 18, outside of students of medicine and engineering in Army 
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and Navy programs, and a few 4-F’s, who have followed an integrated scientific program 
in the United States.”
41
 According to Bush, because Selective Service policies did not 
take into account the “Nation’s vital needs” for scientists,
42
 the United States entered the 
post-war period “with a serious deficit in our trained scientific personnel.”
43
 
 The reasons for the exodus of scientists from government service were varied. 
During the war, most scientists came into government because of a sense of patriotism, or 
at least a belief that the Axis needed to be defeated at all costs. As science became 
centralized under the OSRD and the MED, nniversity laboratories were commandeered 
for national research and scientists temporarily ignored questions of patents and 
individual achievement for collective effort. The scientists were willing to endure the 
regimentation of government science, the loss of personal freedoms, the inability to 
continue their personal research, and the de-emphasis on basic science in order to help 
the Allies win the war. That goal accomplished, they were ready to return to private life. 
Some wanted the ability to resume publishing their scientific discoveries, something 
governmental security policy prevented them from doing. Others were swayed by the lure 
of higher salaries in industrial laboratories, or by the opportunity to move into executive 
and administrative positions (with even higher salaries). Government science restricted 
the number of personnel who could reach management, and still those positions offered 
much lower salaries than did industry.
44
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 A major concern for American scientists was the state of basic science after the 
war. For its entire history, the United States had looked to Europe for the leadership in 
basic science, and this trend continued up until the beginning of the war (see Chapter 1 
for an analysis of the European, and especially German, contribution to the sciences). 
With the infrastructure of European science in ruins due to the war, the United States 
would be forced to develop its own foundation of basic science in universities, industry, 
and private institutions (such as Carnegie or Rockefeller). American scientists believed 
that the fundamental scientific knowledge developed in the decades prior to the war had 
been exhausted, and that only a concerted effort to make up for this loss could put 
American post-war science on a firm footing. This would require a return to private life.
45
 
 These incentives pulled scientists from government service back into universities 
and industrial laboratories. However, there were perhaps more powerful factors that 
pushed American scientists away from government work. Anti-communism and anti-
intellectualism, later personified as McCarthyism, severely embittered the relationship 
between science and the government. Soon after the end of the war, prominent American 
scientists were subjected to illegal surveillance by the FBI, interrogation from the House 
Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), accusations by the media that they were 
communist sympathizers or spies, and federal indictments for disloyalty. According to 
MIT physicist and historian of science David Kaiser, “the early years of the Cold War 
were not a pleasant time to be an intellectual in the United States.”
46
     
 Theoretical physicists were hit particularly hard by this Cold War hysteria. HUAC 
publically accused more than a dozen theoretical physicists of communist infiltration of 
                                                          
45
 Bush, Science, p. 13-14; Price, p. 32 
46
 David Kaiser, “The Atomic Secret in Red Hands? American Suspicions of Theoretical Physicists During 
the Early Cold War,” Representations, 90 (Spring 2005), p. 28 
205 
 
weapons projects and educational institutions. In most cases, these scientists had close 
ties to Robert Oppenheimer, who became the most public face for the abuse of scientists 
by the United States Government.
47
 Loyalty oaths to work in government alienated even 
more scientists, and the perception of guilty-until-proven-innocent became a normal part 
of a scientist’s life. Even those who wanted a career in government science were faced 
with significant difficulties. Because of suspicion by the government in the early Cold 
War era, government scientists had problems receiving security clearances for their secret 
work. By 1949, the backlog of clearance applications had reached a critical level. That 
year the New York Times reported that “somewhere between twenty thousand and fifty 
thousand scientists, engineers, and technicians” had not been cleared for government 
employment by the FBI.
48
 
  The hostile relationship between science and the government became so acute in 
the late 1940s that President Truman felt he needed to address it directly. In a speech he 
gave before the American Association for the Advancement of Science on September 13, 
1948, the President acknowledged that “it is highly unfortunate that we have not been 
able to maintain the proper conditions for best scientific work. This failure has grave 
implications for our national security and welfare.” Scientists are discouraged from 
working in government because they “want to work in an atmosphere free from 
suspicion, personal insult, or politically motivated attacks.” Truman declared that the 
situation was of particular concern for him, and cited a telegram he received “from eight 
distinguished scientists.” In the telegram the scientists “expressed their alarm” at the state 
of the relationship between science and the government, “because of the frequent attacks 
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which have been made on scientists in the ostensible name of security.” The security 
environment, as it then stood, “makes men shun Government work,” and scientists were 
reluctant to work where they would be open to “smears that may ruin them professionally 
for life.” The indispensible work of government science “may be made impossible” by 
the atmosphere of rumor, gossip, and vilification. To Truman, “such an atmosphere is un-
American, the most un-American thing we have to contend with today.” He continued: 
“It is the climate of a totalitarian country in which scientists are expected to change their 
theories to match changes in the police state’s propaganda line.” The government cannot 
force scientists back into government service, but if this conduct continues, “if we 
tolerate reckless or unfair attacks, we can certainly drive them out.”
 49 
  
  Recruiting and retaining qualified scientists for government work was not the 
only obstacle facing the establishment of an effective scientific intelligence apparatus in 
the early Cold War. Equally problematic was the indecision regarding the place of 
scientific intelligence within the broader intelligence community. The intelligence 
leadership in the United States could not decide what agency should be in charge of 
scientific intelligence, and no agency wanted the responsibility of organizing such an 
embryonic and ill-defined field. As a result, scientific intelligence was relegated to the 
status of an afterthought in the late 1940s. On January 2, 1947, the National Intelligence 
Authority, in NIA Directive No. 7, “Coordination of Collection Activities,” created the 
policies and objectives to govern “interdepartmental coordination of [intelligence] 
collection activities so that measures may be taken promptly to effect sound and efficient 
utilization of the various departmental overseas collecting and reporting activities.” That 
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is to say, the NIA assigned responsibility to different agencies for different fields of 
intelligence collection. Political, cultural, and social intelligence would be the 
responsibility of the State Department. Military intelligence would reside in the War 
Department, while naval intelligence naturally was the domain of the Department of the 
Navy. Scientific intelligence, however, was assigned to “each agency in accordance with 
its respective needs.” Although the NIA directive did mandate that intelligence material, 
regardless of what agency does the collecting, should be transmitted immediately to a 
representative of the agency “most concerned” with the information, the directive does 
not define the agency that should be “most concerned” with scientific intelligence.
50
  
 The Central Intelligence Group was not included in the NIA directive, most likely 
because the CIG was not designed to be primarily an intelligence collection organization. 
With the creation of the CIA in 1947, one might assume this new centralized 
organization, capable of intelligence collection in its own right, would then be part of any 
broader scientific intelligence collection effort. Instead, however, the National Security 
Council codified the earlier allocation of the NIA. In National Security Council 
Intelligence Directive No. 2, “Coordination of Collection Activities Abroad,” and 
National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 3, “Coordination of Intelligence 
Production,” both released January 13, 1948, the NSC reproduced NIA Directive No. 7 
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 Both the Eberstadt and Dulles Reports had identified problems intrinsic to 
scientific intelligence. The Eberstadt Report warned that the failure to discover and 
analyze scientific advances in countries like the Soviet Union might have more 
“immediate and catastrophic consequences than failure in any other field of intelligence.” 
It was highly critical of what it perceived as inadequacies in scientific intelligence, 
including biological and chemical warfare, electronics, aerodynamics, guided missile 
technology, atomic weapons, and atomic energy.
52
 The Dulles Report was equally 
critical. Acknowledging that “the field of scientific and technical intelligence is obviously 
one which may overshadow all others in importance,” the Dulles Report lamented that “at 
the present time there is no proper coordination of effort in this field.” Each of the 
military intelligence services collects scientific intelligence in accordance with its own 
needs and “produces such reports as it chooses.” For scientific intelligence, 
“responsibilities are scattered, collection efforts are uncoordinated…and there is no 




 By the beginning of 1949, the United States Government took steps to try and 
improve the coordination and production of scientific intelligence. On December 31, 
1948, General Order Number 13 established the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) 
within the CIA.
54
 The OSI was designed to be “the primary intelligence evaluation, 
analysis and production component of CIA with exclusive responsibility for the 
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production and presentation of national scientific intelligence.” It was tasked with the 
preparation of intelligence reports detailing the scientific progress of foreign nations, the 
review of basic scientific intelligence produced by other agencies, the participation in the 
formulation of the “National Scientific Intelligence Objectives,” the guidance of 
collection efforts, the assistance to interagency committees to assist coordination of 
effort, and the advising of the Director of Central Intelligence “on programs, plans, 
policies and procedures for the production of national scientific intelligence.” The OSI 




 Less than three weeks later, the NSC released National Security Council 
Intelligence Directive No. 10, “Collection of Foreign Scientific and Technical Data.” The 
directive acknowledged the ambiguity of the previous NIA and NSC guidelines for 
scientific intelligence collection, and attempted to assign certain fields within scientific 
intelligence to specific agencies. The State Department was given the primary 
responsibility for the collection “for all government agencies” of information in the basic 
sciences. The Departments of the National Military Establishment (the Army, Navy, and 
Air Force) will collect scientific and technical intelligence for their own requirements, 
“utilizing whenever practicable the facilities of the Department of State for collection in 
the basic sciences.” The CIA, through its Director, was responsible for the determination 
of which countries should be targeted for collection (in collaboration with everyone else). 
Finally, each Department was responsible for taking the “appropriate measures to obtain 
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 Unfortunately, neither the formation of the OSI nor NSC Intelligence Directive 
No. 10 provided the capabilities to address many of the problems detailed in the 
Eberstadt and Dulles Reports. While OSI helped to coordinate scientific intelligence 
within the CIA, it did very little to facilitate cooperation between agencies. Nothing done 
internally within CIA would make the various intelligence organizations more willing to 
share information and to put aside their parochial interests. The NSC clarified which 
agencies would be responsible for what kinds of specific intelligence, but in doing so 
institutionalized the decentralization of scientific intelligence. Thus, as the United States 
entered the year that would prove to be pivotal for Cold War geopolitics, it still lacked a 
coordinated and effective scientific intelligence apparatus. 
 
Atomic Intelligence 
 Atomic intelligence is a subset of scientific intelligence, and in many ways its 
postwar problems parallel those detailed above. However, there were significant issues 
that were unique to atomic intelligence that require a separate analysis. For one thing, 
there was a lack of consensus within American leadership as to how strenuously U.S. 
intelligence should target the Soviet atomic weapons program in the immediate post-war 
period. Some officials, mainly within the military and the intelligence community, 
advocated a strong and concerted policy that utilized much of the wartime infrastructure 
in the field of atomic intelligence built and developed by the MED. While others, mostly 
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scientists but also many diplomats, vehemently promoted the internationalization of 
atomic energy and atomic weapons, and argued against a world where clandestine atomic 
intelligence would be required. As a result, the development of an effective atomic 
intelligence organization was prevented by the inability to create a unified, coherent 
policy on the nature of atomic use in the first years of the Cold War. 
  
Even before the Second World War ended, the Research and Analysis Branch of 
the OSS was urging William Donovan to push for a strong post-war atomic intelligence 
program. In a memorandum dated August 18, 1945, Donovan was told that with the 
invention and use of the atomic bomb “the nation that pays most intelligence attention to 
this problem will benefit greatly and that any nation which allows itself to be lulled into 
inattention to these problems will suffer.”
57
 On September 4, the officer in the OSS that 
“handled the details of Azusa matters” in the agency concurred with the earlier 
memorandum and argued that plans should be made “to gauge atom power development 
by scientists of all countries.” The OSS, or whatever agency replaces it, should seek 
information “regarding scope of their work and their results as there will be strenuous and 
thorough investigations to develop substitutes for the uranium atom bomb, and for the use 
of atoms in the development of power.”
58
 
The Navy leadership was getting much of the same advice. On September 22, 
former Director of Naval Intelligence Captain William D. Puleston
59
 wrote a letter to 
Admiral Frederick Horne, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, arguing for a centralized 
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intelligence agency with powerful atomic intelligence capabilities. In his 22-point 
proposal to Horne, Puleston wrote that the failure to act upon available intelligence led to 
the “fiasco” of Pearl Harbor. In the same way, he contended, the inability of current 
American intelligence to know the atomic capabilities of an enemy meant that there was 
“little use to maintain either an intelligence service or a Navy, because the enemy can, by 
a surprise attack in the future, lay waste American industrial cities and probably deal an 
irreparable blow to our fleet.” He called for a centralized agency that would work with 
the departmental intelligence agencies to “establish secret agents abroad who will 
endeavor to ascertain the rate of progress of foreign nations in developing any new 
weapons and their intentions, friendly or hostile, towards the United States.” Specifically, 
Puleston singled out the Soviet Union as the primary threat to the United States. He 
argued that the Soviets were the most likely country to develop atomic weapons in the 
near future, and thus “the necessity of knowing whether or not Russia is manufacturing 
atomic bombs is of such importance that immediate measures should be taken to 
ascertain this fact.” For Puleston, these “immediate actions” included a penetration of the 
Soviet Union by young American scientists, perhaps of white Russian descent, who 
would be willing to live and work in the Soviet Union for many years in order to work 
their way into the confidences of the Soviet scientific community. Possibly some young 
Polish, Latvian, Finnish, Lithuanian, or German scientists, who would “hate the Russians 
enough” could join the American effort. Whatever the means, something had to be done. 
All the departments of the United States Government had habitually neglected foreign 
intelligence, but the advent of the atomic bomb would “compel the United States 
government to revise its attitude or to live in constant jeopardy.”
60
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 On November 14, 1945, William H. Jackson – an intelligence officer under 
General Omar Bradley in the Second World War, the future Deputy Director of Central 
Intelligence, and co-author of the Dulles Report – wrote to Secretary of the Navy James 
Forrestal. Jackson observed that “consideration of most subjects starts today with the 
conjectural effects of the atomic bomb.” With that in mind, he argued for a central 
intelligence agency to coordinate the collection, evaluation, and collation of national 
intelligence. For Jackson, intelligence was an essential function of national security, and 
could only be done effectively through a “comprehensive and integrated intelligence 
system.” If the lessons of Pearl Harbor were not sufficient to convince American 
policymakers of the urgent necessity for coordination of intelligence within the 
government, “the use of atomic energy and the threat of yet undeveloped products of 
scientific research must now supply that proof beyond shadow of doubt.” The United 
States must, Jackson insisted, achieve coordination of intelligence functions to create “a 
common understanding of the capabilities and intentions of potential enemies,” and to 
prevent a future atomic catastrophe.
61
 
 The leadership of Army intelligence had an even more aggressive approach to the 
potential Soviet threat and the lack of atomic intelligence. On August 30, 1945, Major 
General Clayton Bissell, the Army’s G-2, proposed a plan to Chief of Staff George 
Marshall for a permanent, worldwide Alsos Mission. With the concurrence of Leslie 
Groves and the MED, Bissell’s proposal called for a reorganization of Alsos to direct it 
“toward learning whether scientific, technical, and industrial advances in ostensibly 
friendly countries throughout the world constitute an imminent military threat to the 
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United States.” Operating as a small agency under the administrative direction of the 
Chief, Military Intelligence Service, the permanent Alsos Mission would work with the 
OSRD and General Groves’ office to determine collection targets and to secure 
information from foreign countries in support of OSRD and MED activities. The plan 
called for a cadre of scientists “familiar with the techniques of military intelligence 
collection” to be retained as consultants, and for the training of inexperienced scientists in 
the methodology of intelligence collection and analysis.
62
 
 While the plan for a permanent, worldwide Alsos Mission was not approved, the 
Army proposal demonstrated the determination within Army Intelligence to strengthen 
American atomic intelligence. Yet one of the primary reasons the plan was rejected, and, 
in fact, one of the major reasons for the slow progress in atomic intelligence despite those 
demanding immediate action, was the strong belief within the American scientific 
community that a secret nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet 
Union should be avoided at all costs.  
 The first calls for the internationalization of atomic energy began nearly a year 
before the end of the Second World War and more than nine months before the first 
American atomic explosion in Alamogordo, New Mexico. On September 30, 1944, 
Vannevar Bush, Chairman of the OSRD, and James Conant, Chairman of the NDRC and 
Bush’s primary deputy, wrote a memorandum to Secretary of War Henry Stimson. 
Entitled “Salient Points Concerning Future International Handling of Atomic Bombs,” it 
warned that the United States and Britain would not be able to maintain their nuclear 
monopoly indefinitely. Bush and Conant argued that it would be impossible to keep 
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complete secrecy about the science of the bomb, and so the United States should plan to 
give “complete disclosure of the history of the development and all but the manufacturing 
and military details of the bombs as soon as the first bomb has been demonstrated.” They 
contended that it would be “extremely dangerous” for the U.S. and Great Britain to try 
and develop the bomb in complete secrecy, since “Russia would undoubtedly proceed in 
secret along the same lines.” Thus, in order to avoid a clandestine atomic arms race, they 
proposed a “free interchange of all scientific information” on atomic bombs centered 
around “the auspices of an international office deriving its power from whatever 
association of nations is developed at the close” of the Second World War.
63
   
 Seven months later, the Interim Committee on the Military Use of the Atomic 
Bomb met on May 31, 1945 to address this issue. The committee, chaired by Secretary of 
War Stimson, included Under Secretary of the Navy Ralph A. Bard, Assistant Secretary 
of State William L. Clayton, Truman advisor and future Secretary of State James Byrnes, 
Bush, Conant, Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, Arthur Compton, Ernest Lawrence, 
Chief of Staff George Marshall, and Leslie Groves. At the meeting, Oppenheimer joined 
Bush and Conant in calling for disclosing all information about atomic weapons to the 
Soviets. He reasoned that fundamental knowledge of atomic physics was so widespread 
throughout the world that it might be “wise for the United States to offer to the world free 
interchange of information with particular emphasis on the development of peace-time 
uses” before the bomb was used against Japan. If the United States did so, “our moral 
position would be greatly strengthened.” Oppenheimer argued that the Soviets had 
always been “very friendly to science” and that it may be possible to cooperate with them 
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on atomic control. He felt strongly “that we should not prejudge the Russian attitude in 
this matter.”
64
   
 Arthur Compton agreed as well. He stressed the United States should work 
toward the establishment of a “cooperative understanding” with the Soviets. He favored 
“freedom of competition and freedom of research activity to as great an extent as possible 
consistent with security and the international situation.” He argued that rigid security 
over atomic science would actually be detrimental to American science in the long run, 
since it would result in a “certain sterility of research and a very real competitive 
disadvantage to the nation.” The only way to maintain the current American technical 




 After the atomic bombs were used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, American 
scientists became even more determined to influence U.S. foreign policy toward 
international control. On November 5, 1945, Vannevar Bush wrote Secretary of State 
Byrnes and reiterated his concerns. Bush wrote: “The objectives are clear. We wish to 
proceed down the road of international collaboration and understanding, to avoid a secret 
arms race, and above all to avoid a future war, in which atomic bombs would devastate 
our cities as well as those of our enemy.” Bush conceded that the Soviets were by nature 
secretive and suspicious, but still he argued that the United States should approach the 
Soviet Union with the suggestion that the Soviets join the U.S. and Great Britain to 
create, within the United Nations, a scientific organization “charged with the full 
dissemination of fundamental information on science in all fields including that of atomic 
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fission.” All of this, Bush continued, would be predicated on the formation of a UN-
constituted inspection system with scientific and technical specialists from various 
countries, which would have the right, without impediment, “to visit any laboratory or 
plant in any country where atomic fission is being carried out, to the extent necessary to 
determine the magnitude of the operation, the disposition of the product, etc.” While 
fissionable materials could, of course, be shifted to bomb production once the inspectors 
had left a country, Bush believed that this would take time, “and would be a fairly 
obvious procedure if it resulted in shutting down large power plants.” Thus, if the 
inspection program was effective, the internationalization of atomic weapons could 
remove the threat of surprise atomic attack by one nation on another.
66
  
 Bush was supported by groups of Manhattan Project scientists that had organized 
nationwide in order to promote international control. The Atomic Scientists of Chicago, 
the Association of Oak Ridge Scientists, the Association of Los Alamos Scientists, and 
the Association of Manhattan Project Scientists joined other scientists’ organizations 
around the country in the wake of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to agitate against a secret 
atomic arms race. On November 30, 1945, these groups came together to form the 
Federation of Atomic Scientists (later renamed the Federation of American Scientists), 
and spent the next two years promoting civilian and international control of atomic 
energy. Most of these scientists were in their twenties and thirties, but they were soon 
joined by older and more prominent members of the scientific community.
67
 Harold 
Urey, the Nobel Prize-winning chemist and discoverer of heavy water, argued that “we 
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must expect some sort of world government with adequate powers to prohibit atomic 
bombs. It must have the power to police the world to see that such laws are obeyed.” The 
United Nations was not yet capable of accepting this responsibility, so the United States 




 Robert Oppenheimer and Albert Einstein, the two most famous scientists in 
America in 1945, were also vocal and public proponents of international control. 
Oppenheimer, who had famously told President Truman he had blood on his hands 
following the atomic bombing of Japan, told the United States Senate on December 5, 
1945 that the U.S. should destroy the American stockpile of atomic bombs if that action 
could result in world peace. He testified to the committee that there was “a good reason 
for attempting to establish in the international control of atomic armament [patterns] of 
confidence, collaboration and good faith which in a wider application must form the basis 
of peace. There may not be a comparable opportunity again.”
69
  
Einstein formed his own organization early in 1946. The Emergency Committee 
of Atomic Scientists consisted of eight scientists who were heavily involved in the 
creation of the American atomic bomb: Einstein, Leo Szilard, Harold Urey, Hans Bethe, 
Victor Weisskopf, Linus Pauling, Philip Morse, and T. R. Hogness. Their goal was to 
warn the public of the dangers of atomic weapons, and in June, 1946, Einstein gave an 
interview to the New York Times Magazine, in which he argued that “a new type of 
thinking is essential if mankind is to survive and move to higher levels.” The atomic 
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bomb had altered the nature of the world as people knew it, and in the light of this new 
knowledge, “a world authority and an eventual world state are not just desirable in the 
name of brotherhood, they are necessary for survival.” In previous periods the strength of 
a nation’s army could protect them from destruction, but in the atomic age countries must 
abandon competition and embrace cooperation or the world faced “certain disaster.” 
Therefore, “every nation’s foreign policy must be judged at every point by one 




 The atomic scientist movement had two major policy priorities. The first was to 
remove atomic power and atomic weapons from military control. Due in large part to 
their passionate lobbying, the United States Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act of 
1946, more popularly known as the McMahon Act after its sponsor Senator Brien 
McMahon. The McMahon Act went into effect on January 1, 1947, and created the 
United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), a civilian agency which was given 
responsibility for nuclear power development and nuclear weapons development and 
control. The AEC would be given scientific and technical advice by a General Advisory 
Committee (GAC), which was made up of seven prominent atomic scientists and two 
industrialists. The membership of the GAC included Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, 
Glenn Seaborg, James Conant, I. I. Rabi (a nuclear physicist at Columbia), Lee DuBridge 
(president of the California Institute of Technology), Cyril Smith (director of the Institute 
for the Study of Metals), Hood Worthington (of DuPont), and Hartley Rowe (of the 
United Fruit Company). Collectively, the members of the GAC had been involved in 
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 The scientists’ second policy consideration was less successful. The Baruch Plan, 
named after the senior United States representative to the United Nations atomic energy 
negotiations, was America’s proposal for the internationalization of atomic energy. Based 
on a draft by Robert Oppenheimer,
72
 the plan called for a limited world government that 
would regulate atomic energy worldwide. Any attempt by a country to build atomic 
weapons would be punished – and presumably prevented – by the UN. The United 
Nations Atomic Development Authority would pursue nuclear power for the use by all 
nations, and would provide for an open scientific world in which scientific research 




 With the Baruch Plan, the United States was proposing to give up its atomic 
weapons arsenal in order to prevent others from developing a stockpile of their own. The 
Soviet Union, however, rejected the plan. They could not accept a plan that allowed for 
the preservation of America’s geographic and technological advantage while at the same 
time opening up the Soviet Union to the American-controlled United Nations. Before 
they would agree to even consider international controls, the United States would have to 
unilaterally dismantle its atomic bomb program as part of a broader plan to outlaw atomic 
weapons. Only then would the Soviets be willing to negotiate a control system. Even 
then, by “control” they meant a system of periodic inspections of national facilities that 
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would limit the authority of the UN so much it would be essentially powerless to discover 
Soviet circumvention of the treaty.
74
   
 No one was happier that the Baruch Plan failed than Leslie Groves. He had been 
arguing against the idea of international control of atomic weapons since the idea was 
first conceived. Groves believed that it was naïve to think that the Soviet Union would 
not covertly break any agreement to forgo atomic weapons development. He contended 
that to follow through on the plan to internationalize atomic weapons “would be to invite 
disaster to the United States unless [his] lack of belief in the good faith of other nations 
proves to be without justification.”
75
 Groves was therefore frustrated by the delay in the 
creation of an effective national atomic intelligence organization, and he refused to wait 
until the policymaking community realized the folly of their indecision.  
Although the Alsos Mission had been disbanded, and although most of his more 
experienced officers from the Second World War had been reservists and had by then 
returned to civilian life, Groves was able to maintain a small office of atomic intelligence 
specialists in the MED. The Foreign Intelligence Section of the Washington Liaison 
Office of the Manhattan District was staffed by a handful of intelligence officers which 
consisted of career Corps of Engineers personnel, several officers and civilians trained in 
science, and several Counter Intelligence Corps agents trained in investigative 
procedures. While they depended entirely on information from intelligence collection 
agencies such as the Strategic Services Unit, the State Department, or British 
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Intelligence, in 1945 and 1946 they were able to pull together bits and pieces of 
information to create a basic picture of the embryonic Soviet atomic weapons program. 
 From the State Department the Foreign Intelligence Section learned in November, 
1945,  that the Soviets were studying equipment for atomic bomb manufacturing,
76
 and 
that they had ordered the Czechoslovakian Government to provide them with uranium ore 
from the Joachimsthal mine (by then under Soviet control).
77
 From the British the 
Americans learned that Soviet physicist Peter Kapitza had sent a secret letter to Danish 
physicist Niels Bohr, inviting him to work on atomic fission in the Soviet Union. 
Apparently Kapitza was instructed by the Soviet leadership to deliver his correspondence 
“under conditions of absolute secrecy so as to ensure that no other government would 
have been aware that the meeting had taken place.”
78
  
 The MED intelligence team also learned from the British that several German 
scientists had gone to the Soviet Union to work in their atomic bomb program. While 
none of these men were among the top echelon of German atomic scientists (those had 
been captured by the Alsos Mission), they were competent physicists and chemists who 
would certainly be a valuable asset to a fledgling Soviet atomic weapons program. Dr. 
Nikolaus Riehl of the Auergesellschaft Plant at Oranienburg brought his entire team to 
the Soviet Union to help them produce uranium metal. Professor Gustav Hertz, a Nobel 
Prize winner in atomic physics and the discoverer of the gaseous diffusion method for 
separating uranium isotopes had flown to Moscow in the summer of 1945. Professor 
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Adolf Thiessen, the former Director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physical 
Chemistry, had arrived in the Soviet Union that fall, along with eighteen of his 
subordinates. In addition to Riehl, Hertz, and Thiessen, MED intelligence learned that the 
Soviets had recruited perhaps a hundred scientists and technicians from Austria and 
Germany to work on different elements of their bomb program.
79
  
 By February, 1946, the SSU had discovered through agents in the Soviet Zone of 
Germany the locations and activities of many of the Germany scientists. Those working 
on cyclotron operations were sent to the Crimea in the summer of 1945, and then in 
October were moved to a more permanent location on the eastern shore of the Black Sea. 
Thiessen and Hertz were reported to be also located in the Black Sea region, although as 
late as November, 1945, they were still waiting for their housing and laboratories to be 
built by the Soviets. Nikolaus Riehl’s Auergesellschaft group had yet to be located.
80
  
 The fact that the Foreign Intelligence Section was able to obtain any information 
about the Soviet atomic program is extraordinary. The lack of an in-house collection 
capability meant they were forced to rely either on the SSU – a temporary organization 
with budget and manpower problems; the State Department – a marginal intelligence 
collector at best, at worst a vocal opponent of the military, and solely concerned with its 
own parochial interests; or the British – who produced excellent intelligence but only 
provided it to the Americans sparingly, and who could cut off the flow of information at 
any time. 
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 At any rate, the formation of the National Intelligence Authority and the Central 
Intelligence Group in early 1946 should have mitigated many of the MED Foreign 
Intelligence Section’s problems. The CIG was a natural fit for Groves’ atomic 
intelligence organization: a centralized agency under the direction and authority of the 
military. Both he and Director of Central Intelligence Hoyt Vandenberg advocated its 
transfer, and both assumed its integration into the CIG was a foregone conclusion. Yet 
the passage of the McMahon Act on August 1, 1946, put that plan in jeopardy. The 
legislation mandated that the Atomic Energy Commission take over all aspects of the 
Manhattan Engineer District, and David Lilienthal, the Chairman of AEC, insisted that 
this should include the MED’s atomic intelligence operation. Groves and Vandenberg 
challenged this assertion, maintaining that the intelligence functions of the MED were 
separate from the intended scope of the McMahon Act.
81
  
 The final arbiter of this dispute between the CIG and the AEC would be the 
National Intelligence Authority, as only the NIA could approve the transfer of the 
Foreign Intelligence Section. The NIA was scheduled to have its sixth meeting on August 
21, and the fate of atomic intelligence was placed on the agenda. In the weeks before the 
NIA meeting, the representatives on both sides of the issue cultivated and refined their 
arguments. Vandenberg and the CIG created a draft NIA directive for the Authority to 
consider, which specified the Director of Central Intelligence as the primary coordinator 
of “the collection by agencies subject to N.I.A. coordination of all intelligence 
information related to foreign atomic energy developments and potentialities affecting 
national security, and to accomplish the correlation, evaluation and appropriate 
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dissemination within the Government of the resulting intelligence.” Additionally, the 
proposed NIA directive called for the official transfer of the MED intelligence section to 
the CIG along with all of its working files and personnel.
82
   
 On the day of the meeting, Vandenberg was given a series of talking points to use 
while arguing his case to the NIA. He was told to emphasize the fact that the proposed 
directive had the concurrence of the permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory 
Board and Leslie Groves. He was also given three arguments he could use to demonstrate 
that the CIG plan would not conflict with the McMahon Act and the establishment of the 
AEC. First, the AEC will deal primarily with domestic atomic energy and weapons 
developments, while the CIG will deal only with intelligence concerning foreign 
developments. Second, the CIG would supplement, rather than conflict with the AEC, 
and any intelligence the CIG collects would be disseminated, if appropriate, to the 
Commission. Finally, Foreign Intelligence Section had been considered by Groves as a 
part of his personal staff, rather than an integral part of the MED. The intelligence 
function, therefore, should not be “involved in the transfer to the Commission of the 
domestic responsibilities of the Manhattan Engineer District.”
83
  
 The NIA convened at 11 a.m. on August 21 to make their final determination. 
Arguing on the side of Groves and the CIG were Secretary of War Robert Patterson, 
Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, and of course, Vandenberg. Patterson contended that the 
Foreign Intelligence Section had nothing to do with the Manhattan Engineer District and 
therefore had nothing to do with the AEC. He believed that the NIA should have acted 
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long before this day to bring atomic intelligence under their purview, since the unit dealt 
with what he considered to be military intelligence and fell under the terms of the 
President’s directive to the NIA. He therefore felt the proposed action should be taken 
immediately. Forrestal concurred with most of what Patterson argued, and stressed that 
there was no intent to deny intelligence information to the AEC. He added that when the 
NIA was conceived it was the intent of the President to draw together all intelligence 
activities, and not to isolate or separate one unit. He concluded his remarks by stating that 
“the N.I.A. would be doing a dangerous thing to mark time on this matter.”
84
    
 The lone voice in opposition to the plan was Acting Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson, who was also the Chair of the NIA. Acheson informed the other members of 
the NIA that he had spoken to President Truman about the matter and that Truman had 
expressed to him a desire to wait to make his decision until the full membership of the 
AEC had been established (it had a chairman, but the full commission had yet to be 
appointed). Acheson was also concerned about the ability of the AEC to discover and 
acquire foreign sources of uranium ore. If this was something that was intrinsic to atomic 
intelligence, then it would be “of vital interest to the Atomic Energy Commission.” 
Acheson was not necessarily against the eventual transfer of the MED’s atomic 
intelligence contingent to the CIG, but because this was such a “complex subject” he was 
worried about “acting too hurriedly.” According to Acheson, the Atomic Energy 
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Commission, once it is fully formed, “should have an opportunity to express their 
views.”
85
    
 The NIA would finally decide to recommend to the President that he approve the 
directive to move the Foreign Intelligence Section to CIG, “with an understanding that 
any action taken by the N.I.A. will be without prejudice to future change that may be 
desired by the Atomic Energy Commission.”
86
 That way, the proponents of the move 
would get their immediate action, while the potential objections of the AEC could still be 
addressed at a later date. Admiral Leahy, the President’s Chief of Staff and 
Representative to the NIA, telegraphed the results of the meeting to Truman, who was 
away from Washington.
87
 The President, however, told Leahy and the other members of 
the NIA that he wanted to wait until he returned to Washington before making any 
decision. Upon his return, Truman opted to delay his decision further, choosing to wait 




 Frustrated by such dithering, Leslie Groves appealed directly to the AEC. On 
November 21, 1946, Groves wrote the Commission letter outlining why he believed the 
CIG would be the ideal location for his Foreign Intelligence Section. Groves argued that 
it was “vital to the security of the United States that foreign intelligence in the field of 
atomic energy be maintained and strengthened,” and “the CIG must be able to evaluate 
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the capabilities of other nations to use atomic energy in the military field,” and the best 
way to build this capacity within CIG is “unquestionably” the MED’s Foreign 
Intelligence Section. To continue the functions of MED atomic intelligence in any other 
way except under the control and direction of CIG “would be very difficult.” The Foreign 
Intelligence Section had been dependent on the collection capabilities of military 
intelligence, the SSU, and with British Intelligence. Now that the CIG controlled the SSU 
and had developed close ties with British Intelligence, “it would be a mistake to use the 
present limited Manhattan resources based upon informal liaison with the State, War and 
Navy Departments or any organization set up with the A.E.C.” The experience of his 
section, combined with the mission and operation of the CIG, “logically place them 
together,” but cooperation between CIG and the AEC would be “absolutely necessary” 
for national security. The Foreign Intelligence Section, under the control of CIG, “would 
be the best instrument to provide this coordinated effort.”
89
  
 Whether it was Groves’ plea that finally convinced the chairman of the AEC may 
never be known, but by the end of 1946 Secretary Patterson, Director Vandenberg, 
Chairman Lilienthal, and Groves had reached a compromise. The agreement, as it was 
explained by Secretary Patterson to the Ninth Meeting of the National Intelligence 
Authority on February 12, 1947, would place the MED atomic intelligence division in the 
CIG, but would allow three representatives of the AEC access to the MED files set to be 
transferred to CIG. The AEC personnel would “search these files for information 
pertaining to uranium deposits and such information [would be] retained by the 
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 The compromise would be codified in National Intelligence Directive 
No. 9, “Coordination of Intelligence Activities Related to Foreign Atomic Energy 
Developments and Potentialities.” Enacted on April 18, 1947, the directive was designed 
to establish once and for all the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to 
coordinate “all intelligence information related to foreign atomic energy developments 
and potentialities affecting the national security, and to accomplish the correlation, 




 NIA Intelligence Directive No. 9 was merely a formality, as the CIG had already 
prepared for the arrival of Groves’ intelligence section. On March 29, 1947, the CIG 
established the Nuclear Energy Group, Scientific Branch, within the Office of Reports 
and Estimates (ORE). The mission of the Nuclear Energy Group (among others) was to 
“conduct and coordinate the necessary research and evaluation of intelligence 
information and intelligence pertaining to the development of nuclear energy by foreign 
nations,” in order to “prepare estimates of the nuclear energy capabilities and intentions 
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 The ORE had been created in 1946 to provide policymakers with short- and long-
term estimates about a foreign power’s intentions and capabilities. Months before the 
creation of the Nuclear Energy Group, the ORE released the first American intelligence 
estimate of when the Soviet Union would manufacture its first atomic bomb. ORE 3/1, 
released October 31, 1946, acknowledged that their “information relating to this subject 
is meager,” but still concluded that it was probable the Soviets would develop an atomic 
bomb “at some time between 1950 and 1953.”
93
 
 The ORE had made its best guess based on very little evidence and only “past 
experience and reasonable conjecture.” Now they were getting the intelligence veterans 
of the Foreign Intelligence Section, and in July they would receive a guaranteed 
personnel allocation and Congressionally-mandated funding when President Truman 
signed the legislation transforming the CIG into the CIA. In October, the Scientific 
Branch, ORE was given a highly experienced and competent leader to guide and develop 
the office, Dr. Wallace Brode. Recommended for the position by Vannevar Bush, Brode 
had worked for Bush in the OSRD during the Second World War. Brode had a doctorate 
in physical chemistry, and so he was recruited in August, 1944, to work as a special 
consultant for the Alsos Mission in London and Paris, where he learned the intricacies of 
scientific and atomic intelligence.
94
 After the war, he served as director of the Science 
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Department of the Naval Ordnance Test Station at Inyokern, California, where he 
continued to formulate plans for scientific intelligence operations.
95
 
 With the leadership of Brode, the addition of the MED atomic intelligence 
specialists, and the institutional and organizational backing of the CIA, the Nuclear 
Energy Group of the Office of Reports and Estimates should have been an elite 
intelligence section. In reality, however, it did not live up to expectations. There were two 
primary reasons for this. The first was that, despite NIA Intelligence Directive No. 9, the 
belief that the CIA should have sole responsibility for atomic intelligence was not 
widespread throughout the United States Government. By the end of 1947, the Atomic 
Energy Commission had formed its own Intelligence Division, which was not forwarding 
information to the CIA, even when the information had been directly requested by the 
Agency. The State Department was also failing to send pertinent information in a timely 
manner. The result was a situation in which disagreements over the role and scope of the 
CIA in atomic intelligence had “Dr. Brode completely stymied. [The situation was] 
blocking his attempts to recruit and organize his staff.”
96
 
 The second reason for the failure of the Nuclear Energy Group to live up to 
expectations was internal inefficiencies and incompetence within the ORE and CIA. 
According to a report by Stephen Penrose, an intelligence officer who served in the OSS, 
and later the SSU, and finally the CIA, the Office of Reports and Estimates produced 
intelligence that commanded “little respect from the users of such reports in State, Army 
                                                          
95
 Ronald Doel and Allan Needell, “Science, Scientists, and the CIA: Balancing International Ideals, National 
Needs, and Professional Opportunities,” in Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones and Christopher Andrew ed., Eternal 
Vigilance? 50 Years of the CIA (London: Frank Cass, 1997), p. 64-66 
96
 Ralph Clark to Vannevar Bush, “CIA Situation,” December 3, 1947, United States Department of State, 
Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence 
Establishment, Document 33, Enclosure 1, history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/ 
232 
 
or Navy.” Army Intelligence had told Penrose that it had received no useful additions to 
its own information “since the [Research and Analysis Branch] of the OSS had been 
broken up.” Most damningly, the Army considered its collaboration with the CIA “to be 
largely a waste of time, particularly as regards Russian matters.” According to Penrose, 
the head of the ORE Russian division “seems content to rest upon his short visits to 
Russia as sufficient qualification of him as a Russian expert.” Penrose singled out 
Wallace Brode as “one of the ablest men” in ORE, and emphasized that Brode had been 
very critical of the “inflexible and unimaginative organizational and personnel policies” 
of ORE and CIA.
97
 
 A key problem Brode faced was the lack of bureaucratic support at the highest 
levels of the CIA. The CIA’s Director of Central Intelligence, Roscoe Hillenkoetter, did 
not have the same respect for the intricacies of scientific intelligence as did his 
predecessor, CIG Director Hoyt Vandenberg. He allowed other ORE branches to gather 
scientific intelligence, and did not provide Brode with the resources or authority to force 




 The conflict between agencies and lack of administrative support within CIA put 
“Atomic Energy Intelligence in a critical situation,”
99
 and forced the Director of National 
Intelligence to establish the Joint Nuclear Intelligence Committee (JNEIC) in November, 
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1947. The CIA would provide the chairman of the committee and all of its permanent 
logistical and analytical staff. The remainder of JNEIC would consist of representatives 
from the Department of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force, the AEC, and the Department 
of Defense’s Research and Development Board.
100
  By the end of 1947, the JNEIC had 
taken over the responsibility of estimating Soviet atomic bomb development from the 
ORE. 
 The first such estimate was released on December 15, 1947, and would essentially 
repeat the findings of ORE 3/1, released more than a year earlier. From that point, JNEIC 
released estimates of the status of Soviet atomic energy semi-annually. Their second 
report, on July 6, 1948, stated that “no information [had] been received that necessitates 
changes in the argument of [the December] report.” Because of the ineffectiveness of 
U.S. atomic intelligence, it had remained necessary for the JNEIC to rely on the 
knowledge of the American, British, and Canadian experiences in atomic energy in order 
to project estimates onto the Soviet Union. Although U.S. intelligence had received some 
new information on the Soviet program since the December report that added “somewhat 
to our knowledge of the scope and details of the USSR’s project”, it continued to be 
“impossible to determine its exact status or to determine the date scheduled by the Soviets 
for the completion of their first atomic bomb.” On the basis of the evidence, JNEIC 
estimated that the earliest date by which it is “remotely possible” that the Soviet Union 
may complete its first atomic bomb is mid-1950, although the “most probable date” was 
mid-1953.
101
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 The January 1, 1949, report repeated the estimates of the July, 1948, report almost 
verbatim. That same day, the Office of Scientific Intelligence was formed within the CIA 
to try and centralize scientific and atomic information (at least within the CIA). The 
Nuclear Energy Group, which had been temporarily removed from the Scientific Branch 
and placed in the CIA’s Office of Special Operations in March, 1948, was reunited with 
the Office of Reports and Estimates in the newly-created OSI. Wallace Brode had 
resigned as head of the Scientific Branch in October 1948 (for a myriad of reasons, many 
of which have been detailed in this chapter), and he was replaced by medical doctor and 
former professor of medicine Willard Machle, who became the first director of the OSI. 
During the first nine months of 1949, Machle did all he could to consolidate the 
collection, analysis, and dissemination of national scientific and atomic intelligence 
within the OSI and CIA, but he was equally as unsuccessful as Brode had been before 
him. The other U.S. Government intelligence agencies refused to concede their power to 




 The result was the July 1, 1949, estimate of the status of the Soviet atomic energy 
project. According to the report, the “information now available substantiates” the dates 
already estimated in the January, 1949, the July, 1948, the December, 1947, and the ORE 
estimate in October 1946: the earliest possible date was mid-1950, while the most 
probable date was mid-1953. This time, however, the estimate included “new 
information” that indicated the Soviets were pursuing one particular method, not 
indicated in the estimate, that would suggest the first Soviet atomic bomb could not be 
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 The July 1 report, which set the most probable date for a 
Soviet bomb four years in the future, was released less than two months before the 
detonation of the Soviet atomic bomb on August 29, 1949. 
 By far the clearest demonstration of the dysfunction within the CIA and the 
ineffectiveness within the broader U.S. intelligence community was the ORE report of 
September 20, 1949. The report, Intelligence Memorandum No. 225, “Estimate of Status 
of Atomic Warfare in the USSR,” predicted (if that is the right word) a first Soviet bomb 
in mid-1953 (earliest mid-1950) twenty three days after the detonation of Joe-1. Not only 
that, but the report’s release post-dated the American discovery of the Soviet bomb by 
seventeen days, and was released six days after the date (September 14) on which the vast 
majority (95%) of American experts analyzing the data were convinced the Soviets had, 
indeed, set off an atom bomb.
104
  
 On Friday morning, September 23, President Truman announced to the nation the 
news that the Soviets had become an atomic power. The United States had discovered the 
Soviet atomic detonation through a dedicated nuclear detection program, called AFOAT-
1 (for Air Force Office of Atomic Energy), that had been developed during the late 
1940s. AFOAT-1 used specially equipped WB-29s to collect airborne dust from areas 
around the Soviet Union and test it for radiation and the other chemical and physical 
byproducts of an atomic explosion. Atomic bomb detection is technological intelligence, 
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not scientific intelligence: Since the system is detecting an already developed weapon, 
and not research in the laboratory or experimental stage, the discovery of a Soviet atomic 
test can no longer be considered scientific intelligence, and is therefore outside the 
purview of this study. That being said, AFOAT-1 and the American atomic detection 
system demonstrates both the impact of science on the capabilities of intelligence 
collection, as well as the desperation of the American military leadership to do something 
to mitigate the U.S. intelligence community’s inability to collect information on the 
Soviet atomic program. In the end, the AFOAT-1 program was a minor intelligence 
success amidst larger intelligence failures.  
Almost immediately after the detection and public announcement of the Soviet 
atomic bomb, Americans began to assign blame for the intelligence failure. On 
September 29, Willard Machle, the Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence, wrote a 
memorandum to DCI Hillenkoetter providing a postmortem for the “Inability of OSI to 
Accomplish Its Mission.” Machle acknowledged that little had been accomplished toward 
correcting the inadequacies expressed by both the Dulles and Eberstadt Committees. 
These inadequacies were particularly highlighted “by the almost total failure of 
conventional intelligence in estimating Soviet development of an atomic bomb.” Machle 
lamented that “the USSR completed an atomic bomb in half the estimated time required,” 
and admitted there was “a vast area of ignorance of basic scientific research in [the] 
USSR and Satellite countries.” According to Machle, the inadequacies in national 
scientific intelligence existed because of conditions both inside and outside the CIA. 
 The conditions outside the CIA that prevented OSI from a correct assessment of 
Soviet atomic development included the refusal of the departmental intelligence agencies 
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to recognize the CIA as the central coordinating organization in the national intelligence 
structure. Additionally, Machle noted the CIA’s lack of authority to effect coordination of 
intelligence activities was due to the domination of the CIA by the departmental 
intelligence agencies through the mechanism of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. 
The only remedy, wrote Machle, was to force the departmental intelligence agencies “to 
recognize the intent of the National Security Act and the authority granted CIA 
thereunder.” 
 The underlying condition within CIA which prevented OSI from accomplishing 
its mission was the failure of the collection branches to recognize they “exist only to 
provide services” for the analysts and production offices. The Office of Special 
Operations, the CIA’s collection branch, had failed to “discharge its responsibility for 
covert collection of scientific and technical intelligence.” The OSO’s deficiencies 
included a lack of effective planning of scientific and technical intelligence operations, 
and a lack of “any mechanism for relating such planning to the needs for national 
scientific intelligence.” While OSO had their own, integrated scientific staff, they were 
used only in an advisory manner, and this made it impossible for them to affect planning 
for scientific and technical intelligence operations. Finally, “a fallacious concept of 
operational security” dangerously limited the dissemination of useful intelligence to the 
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The Central Intelligence Agency had been intended to be the premier source of 
national intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination, yet its internal departments 
could not work together, and the CIA could not work effectively with other American 
intelligence agencies. The United States Government would spend the better part of the 
next four decades trying to fix the deficiencies of their intelligence organization while 




Whistling in the Dark 
 
To the Editors of the New York Times: 
 
    The recent revelations of early leaks of atomic information to Russia reflect a state of 
mind which should fill each of us with grave concern. The general impression seems to 
be: “Russia has the bomb, therefore someone must have given her our secrets.” 
    This overconfidence in our own achievements is identical with a fatal mistake made by 
the Germans. I have before me a letter, dated July, 1943, in which a high German 
Government official reports to Goering about their rather slow progress in perfecting 
atomic bombs and atomic energy, but, he writes, we can be sure that the Americans 
“cannot have a surprise in store for us.” 
    …By all means, let us understand clearly and admit openly that the Russians 
constructed their bomb all by themselves, without any help from us or from captured 
Germans. It is very wrong to underestimate one’s adversaries. 







 The detonation of the first Soviet atomic bomb on August 29, 1949, did not come 
as a surprise to all American atomic scientists. Many who had called for the 
internationalization of atomic energy had also warned against underestimating Soviet 
scientific capabilities. On June 11, 1945, a committee of Manhattan Project scientists 
working in the Metallurgical Laboratory of the University of Chicago wrote a 
memorandum to Secretary of War Henry Stimson. The Franck Committee, named after 
its chairman, Nobel laureate James Franck
2
, consisted of Franck, physicist Donald 
Hughes, radiation oncologist J. J. Nickson, biophysicist and co-founder of the Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists Eugene Rabinowitch, physicist J. C. Sterns
3
, chemist Glenn 
Seaborg, and Leo Szilard. Their report warned Stimson that the Soviets most certainly 
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had known the basic facts and implications of nuclear power as early as 1940, and their 
scientists were sufficiently capable and experienced to “enable them to retrace 
[American] steps within a few years, even if [the U.S. made] all attempts to conceal 
them.” At most, the Franck Report continued, it would take the Soviets only three or four 
years to construct their own atomic bomb. After eight to ten years, other nations, 
including the Soviets, could equal the United States in weapons development, and even 
this assessment assumed the American program continued “intensive work in this field.”
4
          
 In September 1945, 300 Los Alamos scientists signed a memorandum about the 
future of atomic science and sent it through Robert Oppenheimer to George Harrison, 
Professor of Experimental Physics and Dean of Science at MIT and head of the Office of 
Field Service of the Office of Scientific Research and Development during the Second 
World War. The Los Alamos scientists advised against using the American experience in 
building the atomic bomb as a guide to Soviet progress in atomic weapons (or that of any 
other nation). Although it took the United States six and a half years from the discovery 
of fission to build the atomic bomb, the knowledge of the feasibility of the bomb – 
demonstrated at Hiroshima and Nagasaki – would compensate for the American head 
start. As Glenn Seaborg would later write, “the only secret about the atomic bomb was 
whether or not it would work, and that question had been answered.”
5
 As a result of this 
knowledge, the Soviet Union could forgo much of the time-consuming laboratory 
experimentation the Americans had conducted and, according to the scientists, it was 
                                                          
4
 James Franck, et al, “Political and Social Problems,” June 1945, from “Competitive Advantage of the 
United States Over Other Nations with Respect to the Atomic Bomb: Extracts from the Records of the 
Interim Committee,” Harrison-Bundy Files Relating to the Development of the Atomic Bomb, 1942-1946, 
RG 77, M1108, Roll 2, National Archives and Records Administration II (NARA II), College Park, MD 
5
 Glenn Seaborg, Adventures in the Atomic Age: From Watts to Washington (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, 2001), p. 141 
241 
 
therefore “highly probable” that another nation such as the Soviet Union could join the 
United States as an atomic power “within a few years.”
6
 In November, the United States 
Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy held hearings to formulate national policy 
on the development and control of atomic energy. One of the questions up for debate was 
the ability of the Soviet Union to match the accomplishment of the United States in 
atomic weapons. Irving Langmuir, a chemist and physicist who had won the 1932 Nobel 
Prize in Chemistry, told the committee that he believed the Soviets would have an atomic 
bomb in only three years.
7
 
 In 1946, American atomic scientists continued to warn the government and the 
American public against complacency. Physicist and geochemist Harrison Brown, who 
worked on the Manhattan Project and was the first to isolate larger quantities of 
plutonium for use in atomic bombs, wrote a book describing the dangers of atomic 
weapons early in 1946 titled Must Destruction Be Our Destiny? In his book Brown 
argued it was an “inescapable conclusion” that the Soviet Union would soon have their 
own atomic weapons. He pleaded that all Americans needed to “recognize that in another 




 In February, an article appeared in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists titled 
“Russia and the Atomic Bomb” that detailed the “high level of research in nuclear 
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physics in Russia.” The article argued that the Soviets had enough scientific and 
industrial power to develop their own atomic bombs “within a few years,” and that its 
scientists possessed the capabilities to engage in “extraordinary skillful experimentation.” 
While it acknowledged that the Soviet Union did not have the “array of great leaders” in 
atomic physics comparable to that of the United States, the article argued that the Soviets 
had enough highly qualified scientists to produce an atomic bomb in a short time, while 
relying solely upon its own scientific manpower.
9
 
 The opinions of these American scientists were informed by a deep understanding 
of the proficiency of Soviet science. Most had studied and worked with their Soviet 
counterparts in the scientific centers of Western Europe before the war. The Americans 
knew the Soviets were intelligent and capable, and came from a country with a long 
tradition of producing and supporting world-class scientists. Russia was, after all, the 
land of Ivan Pavlov, Leonhard Euler, and Dmitri Mendeleev. It was also the land of 
Abram Ioffe, a scientist who was considered the father of Russian atomic physics. At the 
turn of the century, Ioffe worked in Germany with Nobel laureate Wilhelm Roentgen, the 
discoverer of X-rays. After earning his PhD at Munich University in 1905, Ioffe returned 
to Russia and founded the Institute of Physics and Technology (Fiztekh) in St. 
Petersburg, where he supervised the instruction of an entire generation of Russian, and 
later Soviet, atomic scientists.
10
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 Vladimir Vernadsky, a Russian mineralogist who had worked at the Curie 
Institute in Paris, realized as early as 1910 that radioactivity could lead to a new source of 
energy millions of times more powerful than anything then known. He founded the State 
Radium Institute in Petrograd (St. Petersburg) in 1922 and continued to promote the 
development of atomic energy to the Soviet Government throughout the interwar period. 
Yuly Khariton earned his doctorate in theoretical physics under Ernest Rutherford at the 
Cavendish Laboratory at Cambridge in 1927, Georgy Flerov discovered spontaneous 
fission
11
 in uranium in 1940, and Lev Landau worked in Germany during the interwar 
period with Manhattan Project physicist Edward Teller and German-British physicist 
Rudolf Peierls.  
 Physicist Igor Kurchatov was also internationally known and highly respected. He 
was a protégé of Abram Ioffe, and in 1932 Ioffe appointed the then 29-year-old 
Kurchatov to direct the nuclear physics program at Fiztekh. Kurchatov was a natural 
leader, and his enthusiasm, self-confidence, and abilities overshadowed the fact that he 
was quite young for such a prestigious position. As proof of his qualifications, Kurchatov 
built Europe’s first cyclotron in 1934, which was, at the time, the only operational 
cyclotron outside of Berkeley, California.   
 Finally, the Soviet Union was the land of physicist Peter Kapitza, who had also 
worked at the Cavendish Laboratory under Ernest Rutherford. He came to Cambridge in 
1921 and remained there for over ten years, researching cryogenics and strong magnetic 
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fields, and became a Fellow of the Royal Society in 1929. In the 1930s, Kapitza formed 
the Institute for Physical Problems of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow using 
equipment provided by Rutherford (Lev Landau was its head of the Theoretical 
Division). After the war, he was instrumental in the creation of the premiere scientific 
laboratory in the Soviet Union, the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology. Kapitza 
was closely acquainted with many western scientists, including Niels Bohr, Robert 
Oppenheimer, Albert Einstein, Otto Hahn, and Victor Weisskopf, all of whom considered 
him to be among the world’s elite. Weisskopf, in his memoirs, called Kapitza, “one of the 




Soviet Science through American Policymakers’ Eyes 
 Despite the pleading of American scientists and the available evidence of the 
quality of Soviet personnel, the high opinion of science in the Soviet Union was far from 
universal. In general, the scientists who were warning the government against 
complacency had alienated themselves from those in power by advocating the 
internationalization of atomic energy. Their voices were superseded by those who held a 
much lower opinion of Soviet science, and who promoted the maintenance of an 
American atomic monopoly. American physicist Herbert York, who worked for the 
Manhattan Project at the Berkeley Radiation Laboratory and at Oak Ridge, wrote a 
memoir in 1978 in which he detailed the views of U.S. government scientists and 
policymakers toward the Soviet Union’s scientific capabilities. York worked as a scientist 
for the government almost continuously from the Second World War through the 1980s. 
After the Second World War, he continued his government nuclear work as the first 
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director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, and later would be 
appointed Chief Scientists for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (now called the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering). In between government 
work, York served as a Professor of Physics at Berkeley and the Chancellor of the 
University of California, San Diego before ending his government service as the U.S. 
ambassador to the Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations in 1979-1981. Arguably, more 
than anyone else, York had a unique perspective of the official and semi-official 
perceptions of Soviet science during the Cold War. 
 In his memoir, York concedes the lack of information about the state of Soviet 
science prohibited him, and the government, from making any concrete evaluation of 
Soviet capabilities. As a result of stringent security, Soviet progress in the sciences had 
been concealed from the rest of the world. According to York, the only Russian 
innovation Westerners were aware of was the two-seated farm tractor, “whose main 
function seemed to be to replace the church social as a place where Red Pioneer boys 
could meet collective-farm girls.” Even “true-blue” European and American communists 
did not think of the Soviet Union as a scientifically or technologically progressive nation. 
To American government scientists, the intelligence community, and the U.S. 
policymaking elite, the Soviet Union was “as mysterious and remote as the other side of 
the moon and not much more productive when it came to really new ideas or inventions.” 
York concluded his evaluation of the American perception of Soviet science with what he 
called “a common joke of the time”: The United States had time before it had to worry 
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about the Soviet Union surreptitiously bringing atomic bombs in suitcases to destroy 
major U.S. cities. The Soviet’s would first have to develop the technology of a suitcase.
13
  
 Major General John Medaris provided an even less charitable view of Soviet 
science. Medaris was the commander of the U.S. Army Ballistic Missile Agency in the 
1950s, and directed German rocker scientist Wernher von Braun in the creation of the 
American missile and satellite program. In his memoir, Countdown for Decision, Medaris 
argued that, up until the launch of Sputnik in 1957, it was fashionable to think of Soviet 
scientists as “retarded folk who depended mainly on a few captured German scientists for 
their achievements, if any.” Since the United States had captured the best and brightest 
German scientists during the war, “there was nothing to worry about.”
14
     
 The result of these views, in part, was an intelligence community that predicted an 
eight year grace period before the Soviets could produce their own atomic weapon. 
President Truman refused to respect even this conservative estimate. He was convinced 
the Soviets, or “those Asiatics” as he called them
15
, would never match the scientific 
accomplishments of the United States and build their own atomic bomb. Leslie Groves, 
the commander of the American atomic bomb program during the Second World War, 
told Congress at the end of the war that he thought it would take the Soviets at least 




                                                          
13
 Herbert York, Race to Oblivion: A Participant’s View of the Arms Race (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1970), p. 107 
14
 John Medaris and Arthur Gordon, Countdown for Decision (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1960), p. 53 
15
 York, p. 107, Rhodes, p. 373 
16
 “Did the Soviet Bomb Come Sooner Than Expected?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 5, Issue 
10 (October 1949), p. 262 
247 
 
 Groves’ estimate was based less on the capabilities of Soviet scientists, and more 
on his belief in the inability of the Soviet Union to provide Soviet science with the 
industrial support necessary to build an atomic bomb. His assessment of Soviet industrial 
weakness was formed by three interdependent factors. First, he understood better than 
anyone what the United States needed to do in order to provide the Manhattan Project 
with the means to build their atomic arsenal. Second, he knew that German industry 
during the war, considered by many to be one of the strongest in the world, could not 
provide the necessary support for its atomic program. Finally, he was told by 
representatives of American industry that the Soviet Union did not have the available 
infrastructure to provide for such a massive undertaking as an atomic bomb project. 
 Groves understood that the key to the development of a successful nuclear 
weapon was the ability to translate theoretical physics abstractions physics concepts into 
a tangible technological product. This meant creating and stockpiling adequate stocks of 
uranium and plutonium, both to provide for the immense amount of experimentation 
necessary in any atomic program, as well as to provide the fuel for the bombs themselves. 
For the United States, this process had taken huge amounts of electric power, much of 
which was provided by the rural electrification projects of the New Deal in the 1930s, 
like the Tennessee Valley Authority. Without the significant resources the United States 
put into industrial modernization before the war, the Manhattan Project would have 
lacked the sufficient infrastructural foundation to build the American atomic bomb.     
 As early as May, 1945, Groves had begun to speak to the leadership of American 
industry to gauge Soviet industrial capabilities.
17
 On May 21, Groves called a Mr. G. W. 
Read of the DuPont Company and asked him how long it would take the Soviets to build 
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a facility like the Hanford, Washington installation that provided the Manhattan Project 
with fissile material. Read told Groves that the experience of DuPont in building an 
ammonia plant in Moscow demonstrated that Soviet skilled labor and mechanics “were 
so poor that they allowed machinery to pound itself to death.” They also had difficulty 
finding capable men to run the plant once it was constructed, and he believed that the 
Soviets would not have enough men to build, or run, an effective uranium separation 
facility. Even if they were given the exact plans and blueprints for the American plant, it 
would take the Soviet Union so long to reproduce what the Americans had accomplished 




 On June 1, Groves attended an Interim Committee meeting in which prominent 
American industrialists were invited to speak on this issue. The industrialists included 
George Bucher, the President of Westinghouse, who’s company had manufactured the 
equipment for the electromagnetic process of isotope separation, Walter Carpenter, the 
President of DuPont, James Rafferty, the Vice President of Union Carbide, the company 
that manufactured and operated the gas diffusion plant at Oak Ridge, and James White, 
the President of Tennessee Eastman, the producer of chemicals for the Project and the 
company that constructed the RDX explosives plant in Tennessee. Secretary of War 
Stimson asked each of these men how long it would take for the Soviets to reproduce 
what their companies had built based on their knowledge of their own efforts and their 
understanding of the Soviet Union’s capabilities. 
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   Walter Carpenter of DuPont told the committee it had taken them twenty-seven 
months to complete the Hanford facility from when they received the basic plans. He 
explained that DuPont had to work with 10,000 to 15,000 other companies in order to 
complete Hanford on time, and without such help it would have taken significantly 
longer. Carpenter estimated that it would take the Soviet Union “at least four or five 
years” to construct this type of facility, and this assumed they already had the basic plans 
for the plant (four or five years to just build the separation plant, not a bomb). He 
believed that the Soviet’s greatest difficulty would be in securing the necessary skilled 
labor and technicians and adequate production facilities. James White stressed the 
advantage the United States had over the Soviet Union in standardized mass production 
capabilities. Special ceramics, vacuum tubes, special stainless steels, and “a great variety 
of special products” were needed in his Tennessee plant, and he doubted whether the 
Soviets “would be able to secure sufficient precision in its equipment to make this 
operation possible.” He also echoed Carpenter’s assertion that the Soviets would have 
difficulty finding enough skilled and educated personnel to catch the Americans.
19
 
  George Bucher of Westinghouse estimated that if the Soviets were able to utilize 
captured German technicians and scientists then they might be able to produce an 
electromagnetic pilot plant in as little as nine months, but it would take at least three 
years before the plant would be fully operational. He pointed out that the major problem 
the Soviets would need to overcome was that this type of plant required large numbers of 
replacement parts and “extremely accurate precision tools.” James Rafferty of Union 
Carbide told the committee about the process employed at the gas diffusion plant at Oak 
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Ridge. Metal uranium was converted to a gas and then U
235 
was separated from U
238 
by 
means of “extremely delicate barriers or screens.” The barriers are the key to the entire 
process, and the Oak Ridge plant used over five million of them to produce fissionable 
material for atomic bombs. Rafferty estimated that the Soviets would require at least ten 
years to build this kind of plant without the basic knowledge only the Americans 
possessed. It would take the Soviets five years to develop just the barrier itself. 
According to Rafferty, the biggest problem the Soviets faced was a fundamental lack of 
experimental engineers, and even if the Soviet Union was given all of the necessary 
information about the plant’s manufacture and the secrets of the barrier through 
espionage or other means, it would still take the Soviets a minimum of three years to get 
a gas diffusion plant into operation.
20
   
 As each industrialist testified, Groves became more and more confident of his 
estimation that it would take the Soviet Union more than a decade to build an atomic 
bomb. Three years later, in a June 1948 issue of the Saturday Evening Post, Groves 
explained his rationale to the American public. He wrote that the Soviet Union would be 
incapable of building an atomic bomb in less than a decade even if the United States had 
sent the “complete blueprints of the Manhattan Project to Russia on V-J Day.” He 
emphasized the extent of the industrial effort, noting that the gaseous diffusion plant at 
Oak Ridge required 12,000 construction drawings, 15,000 piping-material-erection 
sheets, and 50,000 material-order sheets for its operation. Blueprints for the rest of the 
Oak Ridge project would cover approximately 500 acres if they were spread out on the 
ground, and combined with the gaseous diffusion plans, they would weigh more than 230 
tons. This does not even include all the plans that would be necessary for Soviet 





duplication of Hanford or Los Alamos, nor for the tens of thousands of special-design 
drawings made by American industrial firms throughout the United States. Groves 
concluded: 
Once all these plans were collected, translated into Russian language and measurements, 
and safely delivered to the Soviet Union’s top scientists, what would they do with them? 
If past experience is any criterion, they would waste a couple of years searching 
suspiciously for a gimmick in the plans, which, they would be confident, some American 





Groves and many others in the military, intelligence, and policymaking 
communities were certain that the Soviets did not have the industrial capability to 
produce the facilities to develop an atomic bomb. The Saturday Evening Post article 
publicized this line of argument, but it was certainly not the first, and would not be the 
last, publication to do so. Over the period from 1945 to the summer of 1949, dozens of 
articles were written advocating this position in Time magazine, Life magazine, Fortune, 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Scientific American, the New York Times (and the New 
York Times Magazine), the Washington Post, and regional newspapers throughout the 
United States. One of the most widely-read and well-respected journalists of the time was 
New York Times reporter Hanson Baldwin. As the long-time military editor of the Times 
(he wrote for them for forty years), Baldwin won the Pulitzer Prize for his reporting from 
Guadalcanal in 1943, and during his career authored eighteen books on military 
operations. His close association with the U.S. defense community allowed him to write 
an insider’s point-of-view article on the American government’s perception of the Soviet 
atomic bomb prospects, which was printed in the Times on November 9, 1947. The 
article, titled “Had Russia the Atomic Bomb? – Probably Not,” and subtitled “Best 
                                                          
21
 Leslie Groves, “The Atom General Answers His Critics,” The Saturday Evening Post, Volume 220, Issue 51 
(June 1948), p. 15-16, 100-102, quote from p. 16 
252 
 
American Opinion Is That She Will Need Years to Develop It,” argued that although the 
Soviets had the theoretical scientific knowledge necessary to build the bomb (like most 
other countries), it did not have the industrial capability, technical know-how, or 
manpower availability to build a bomb within a few years.
22
 
Baldwin’s article detailed the difficulties in the design and manufacture of the 
thousands of new and intricate devices – gauges, valves, instruments, piping, electrical 
devices – required in the production of an atomic bomb. Baldwin contends that the 
manufacture of the bomb required engineers, technicians, administrative and production 
experts, machine tools, facilities, and general production knowledge “which Russia very 
definitely does not have in quality or quantity comparable to our own.” Despite their large 
population, the Soviet Union cannot concentrate an unlimited amount of energy or 
manpower on the production and development of atomic weapons unless it was to 
“neglect dangerously other major developments.” Even if it were to do so, Baldwin 
argued that because of the “relatively low productivity of the Russian worker,” the 
limited amount of industrial strength and electric power available in the Soviet Union, 
and the scarcity of machine tools and skilled workers, it is unlikely that the Soviets could 
concentrate as much total energy on the production and development of atomic energy as 
the United States did during the Second World War. In addition, Baldwin was 
“reasonably certain” that the Soviet Union did not have the manufacturing facilities 
comparable to Hanford, Oak Ridge, or Los Alamos. By 1947, the Soviets had probably 
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Baldwin concluded his article with a reassuring message to the American public: 
the United States has a “great headstart in the atomic race” and neither the Soviet Union 
nor any other country is likely to catch up in the foreseeable future. He reiterated that this 
was not his opinion, but instead the collective view of “Responsible Government 
authorities” who had made a reassessment of Soviet atomic potential and “a dramatic 
change in attitude toward the short-term future [had] resulted.” In 1945, atomic scientists 
were “talking glibly” of ten thousand atomic bombs and were assuring the public 
repeatedly that the Soviets would catch up and overtake the United States in just a few 
years. In 1947, Baldwin argued, the government knew a different reality, one that meant 
“that some of the terrific sense of urgency that overhung all atomic bomb discussions two 
years ago has been removed; we still have time. Whether this is a benefit and will permit 
more mature, more reasoned and less passionate and hasty decisions, or whether 





 The perceived scarcity of fissile material was yet another reason for the 
underestimation of the Soviet ability to manufacture an atomic bomb. From information 
they had gathered before the war, American intelligence concluded that the Soviet Union 
did not have large deposits of high quality
25
 uranium inside its borders. Leslie Groves and 
other high-level American policymakers assumed that the Soviets would have a difficult 
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 Or “high-grade”, defined as ore with a uranium content of 50 percent or greater 
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time obtaining the necessary ore for atomic bomb development. While the Soviet Union 
did have control of the Joachimsthal mines in Czechoslovakia and the rebuilt 
Auergesellschaft Plant in Oranienburg, Groves’ experience and knowledge of the 
German program convinced him that this would not be enough to fulfill their materials 
requirements. In some ways Groves and other U.S. officials were correct: the Soviet 
Union had no domestic sources of high-grade uranium and would have to make do with 
low-grade ore with a uranium content of as little as 1-2 percent. What he and the others 
did not understand is that low-grade ore, which was found in abundance in the Soviet 
Union and almost everywhere else on Earth, is entirely sufficient to begin the uranium 
refinement process. It might take longer to refine the uranium to weapons-grade, but it 
could be done. 
 Groves’ did not fully understand the science behind uranium refinement, and as a 
result he took steps to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining high-grade ore from 
foreign sources. He redirected a wartime policy originally intended to prevent the 
Germans from acquiring uranium ore and targeted it against the Soviet Union. The 
“Combined Development Trust,” an agreement between President Roosevelt and Prime 
Minister Churchill on June 13, 1944, gave Groves and the British Tube Alloys program a 
mandate to take control of all known available sources of uranium worldwide.
26
 The 
Trust gave Groves the ability to work outside of the normal bureaucracy and government 
channels to pursue aggressively a monopoly (in theory) of fissionable material, and the 
Alsos Mission and the American military gave him the geographical and geological 
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information he needed to plan his acquisitions.
27
 At the end of the war, the Combined 
Development Trust was designed to remain in place until it was extended or revised by 
official agreement. Groves used this provision to continue to control sources of uranium 
outside the United States, both to feed the accelerating American nuclear weapons 
program, but also to deny these essential resources to the Soviets.
28
 
 In addition, Groves convinced the government to stop all shipments of equipment 
that could, in any conceivable way, be used in uranium production. In April 1946, the 
United States used the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control 
(COCOM) to further prohibit uranium production items from going to the Soviet Union. 
COCOM was created immediately after the Second World War, and its membership 
included the countries that would become NATO (as well as Japan). COCOM was 
designed to keep strategic materials out of the hands of the Soviets and their allies, and in 
this case Groves used it to prevent equipment such as vacuum pumps, high-temperature 
heat-resistant steel (called sicromal), and other essential equipment from reaching the 
Soviet atomic bomb program. According to Henry Lowenhaupt, a scientist who worked 
in Groves’ Foreign Intelligence Section of the Manhattan Engineer District, and who 
would later serve a long career in the Central Intelligence Agency, “export control 
pressure against the Russian atomic program was being applied as rapidly and as 
forcefully as we could arrange it.”
29
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Convinced the Combined Development Trust was keeping uranium away from 
the Soviets, and hopeful that export controls could prevent them from acquiring the 
necessary equipment for uranium refinement, Groves was confident that he had found the 
way to impede Soviet progress toward the development of an atomic bomb. 
 
The Soviet System and the Atomic Bomb 
 The perceived incompatibility of the totalitarian Soviet system with advanced 
scientific discovery and innovative technological development was another component in 
the American underestimation of the Soviet capability to produce atomic weapons. The 
Soviet Union demanded universal acceptance of Marxist-Leninist ideology from its 
scientists, and refusal to adhere to the dogma meant the end of a career, banishment to a 




 All of this was widely known to many Americans in the 1940s, and certainly to 
most American scientists. Waldemar Kaempffert, the science editor for the New York 
Times, wrote an article in September, 1946 illustrating the history and effects of 
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Marxism-Leninism on Soviet science. “Science – and Ideology – in Soviet Russia” 
detailed the implementation of Soviet political philosophy in science following the 
Russian Revolution. Once the Communist Party consolidated their political power, they 
moved to purge the Academy of Sciences of suspected dissenters and 
counterrevolutionaries. Many scientists were dismissed or imprisoned, and the ones that 
remained scrambled to profess their faith in the Soviet system by publishing articles on 
subjects such as “Marxism and Surgery,” “The Dialectics of Graded Steel,” and the 
“Dialectics of the Internal Combustion Engine.”
31
     
 The most widely publicized influence of political ideology on science was in 
Soviet biology. Following the Revolution in 1917, Russian biologists tried to convince 
the Soviet leadership that entire species could be transformed through changed 
environmental conditions. As they adapted to struggle, they would progress, and become 
a better version of what they were before. As a logical extension of Marxism, they 
argued, this theory must be correct. Yet this premise is antithetical to Gregor Mendel’s 
science of genetics, which was accepted as valid by scientists worldwide and, most 
importantly, by Vladimir Lenin, who threw his full support behind Soviet biologist 
Nikolai Vavilov, the most prominent Russian geneticist. Vavilov would become a 
member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, President of the Lenin Academy of 
Agricultural Sciences, and Director of the Institute of Applied Botany. He was a foreign 
member of the Royal Society of London and was considered for membership as a foreign 
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associate in the U.S. National Academy of Sciences.
32
 Yet none of this could protect him 
from the changes that would occur in the Soviet Union. 
 After Lenin’s death and the purges of “dissenters” and “counterrevolutionaries” in 
the late 1920s and 1930s, the scientists who opposed the genetic theory of biology were 
elevated to positions of prominence by the Soviet political hierarchy, no one more so than 
botanist Trofim Lysenko, who argued that the theory of genetics was inconsistent with 
Marxist philosophy. Lysenko accused Vavilov of introducing foreign scientific ideas to 
the Soviet Union that came from fascist Germany and capitalist Great Britain and the 
United States. Lysenko’s science, on the other hand, was a Soviet science, and the fact 
that no other nation’s scientists subscribed to his theories only proved that the Soviet 
system had provided the impetus for the next true advancement in biology. By 1940, 
Lysenko had convinced the Soviet leadership to replace Vavilov with himself as Director 
of the Genetics Institute of the Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Applied Botany. 
Vavilov was exiled to a forced labor camp in Siberia, where he died in 1942.
33
 
 As the Second World War came to a close, and as Western scientists began to 
learn about the rise of Lysenko and the death of Vavilov, dozens of articles began to 
appear in American scientific journals, and even mainstream periodicals, about the 
subservience of science to social and political philosophy in the Soviet Union. Harvard 
biologist Vladimir Asmous published a particularly scathing report on Lysenkoism in the 
March 1946 issue of Science, in which he condemned the Soviet system for subjugating 
science to politics and argued that “freedom, as Americans understand it, is simply 
nonexistent in [the] USSR.” He continued: “But the most disturbing fact is that the case 
                                                          
32






of Vavilov is by no means an exception. We know that hundreds of less-known Russian 
scientists are dying slowly in Soviet concentration camps which can compete quite 
favorably in atrocities with Belsen, Dachau, and other Nazi horror camps.”
34
  
 Most of the articles published in the United States about Lysenkoism were written 
by biologists, geneticists, and botanists, but it would not be long before the American 
physics community began to link the ideology of Lysenko to Soviet physics. An article in 
the December 1948 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists warned that the attack on 
“bourgeois” influence in Soviet science had been “extended to the field of atomic 
physics” when the Soviet Union accused four of its physicists of subscribing to the 
“reactionary idealism and formalism” of Niels Bohr’s Copenhagen school of nuclear 
physics. The trend was so alarming to American atomic physicists that the Bulletin 
dedicated their entire May 1949 issue to Lysenkoism and how it affected Soviet atomic 
physics.  
 The editors of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists conceded that while it might 
seem strange that the Bulletin would devote an issue to a review of events in the Soviet 
Union in the field of genetics, they explained that “the Soviet purge of genetics is of deep 
concern to scientists everywhere and to the Bulletin in particular, because it is an extreme 
expression of a development in the opposite direction – toward even greater disregard of 
scientific facts and methods, and subordination of science to political expediency.” They 
continued: 
The supremacy of a racial, social, or economic dogma over the whole spiritual life of a 
nation, claimed by the modern totalitarian states, has created a new and ominous threat. It 
is not merely that the pursuit of science has been declared to derive its only justification 
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from immediate benefits to society…What is novel and alarming is that science is not 
only restricted, but also perverted.  
 
The dogma of Lysenko was being ruthlessly imposed on the entire scientific community 
of almost half the world, and genetics was only the beginning of the problem: 
What we lament is not merely the brutal destruction of a flourishing branch of science, 
the interruption of the life work of a number of good scientists, the wrecking of their 
laboratories, and the uncertainty of their personal fate. The supreme misfortune is the 
reversion of a large part of Europe to pre-scientific dogmatism, at a time when the 
survival of our civilization requires universal readiness to abide by scientifically 
established facts, and to use objective scientific methods in dealing with the crucial 
problems of mankind – problems such as atomic energy control, the prevention of war, 
and the rational utilization of world resources. 
 
 
The editors concluded with a warning to Western scientists: 
Another lesson of the purge worth pondering by American scientists is that science 
cannot remain permanently unfettered in a system which exercises strict control over 
other activities of the human mind – religion, philosophy, literature, art, social and 
economic research. For a long time, science has appeared as a happy island of free 
thought in the sea of Soviet regimentation. Not only was it supported on a scale which 
was the envy of many Western scientists, but except for occasional incursions, it was left 
free to pursue its self-set aims according to its own rules. 
 
We state here these lessons of the purge, not as our contribution to the “cold war,” but to 






 In the April 1949 issue of Philosophy of Science Lewis Feuer wrote an article that 
detailed the negative effects of Marxist political philosophy on Soviet physics. Feuer, a 
sociologist and former dedicated Marxist, was a professor at Vassar College, and would 
later write one of the most widely-read books on Marxist theory.
36
 Feuer argued that 
Soviet philosophy had prevented its physicists from participating in the great advances in 
physical science. Beginning with their criticism of the theory of relativity as idealistic and 
metaphysical, the Soviet Government discriminated against the followers of Einstein for 
twenty five years starting at the time of the Revolution. Finally, after more than two 
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decades of debate, Soviet scientists were able to assimilate relativity with Marxism. By 
this time, however, the Soviet system had significantly “retarded the development of 
Soviet physical science.” Western scientists, unencumbered by dogma, were able to 
continue their work throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Soviets scientist spent twenty five 
years trying to catch up to their Western counterparts, until they could finally invent 
phrases about the “dialectical unity of time and space” that would allow them to operate 
within the same scientific framework as the rest of the world.
37
   
Lysenkoism also criticized the use of probability and statistical methods in 
science. According to Lysenko, “all the so-called laws of Mendel and Morgan
38
 are built 
on the ideas of accident – but genuine science is the enemy of accident.” Quantum 
physics, the branch of physics most heavily utilized in the theory and development of 
atomic weapons, relies on probability and statistical methods, and thus under Lysenkoism 
would not be regarded as “genuine science.” For Feuer, this helped to explain why the 
Soviet Union was behind the United States in atomic development: 
Soviet physicists who bear the baggage of their philosophic doctrine are impeded in their 
work. They must be mindful that their methods conform not only to the facts but to the 
[Marxist] ideology; the two conditions cannot both be always satisfied. Perhaps the 
failure of Soviet physics to achieve the Western successes in atomic theory and invention 




The critique of Soviet science was not limited to academics in universities. Many 
key American policymakers, or those who influenced them, were also highly critical of 
the impact of political philosophy on Soviet science. Leslie Groves certainly was. An 
avid anti-communist dating back to before the Second World War, Groves thought the 
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Soviet system would slow the progress of Soviet atomic energy development. In 
November, 1945, while testifying before the Senate Special Committee on Atomic 
Energy, Groves responded to critics in Congress who argued that his estimate of the time 
when the Soviet Union would build its first atomic bomb was wrong. Groves admitted 
that he may have misestimated the Soviet timeline, but he insisted that if so, it might be 
“an error in the other direction.” Instead of fifteen or twenty years, it could be forty to 
fifty. Based on conversations he had had with associates who had visited the Soviet 
Union, Groves was told that, because of the Soviet system, the Soviet Union might never 
develop atomic weapons. The rationale for this conclusion was that the Soviets, under 
their present system, would never get “men with courage enough to go in and make the 
mistakes that are necessary to produce such a thing as this.”
40
   
 Samuel Goudsmit, the Scientific Chief of the Alsos Mission, joined the debate in 
1947. After the war, Goudsmit continued his work in atomic energy and became a senior 
scientist at the Brookhaven National Laboratory in New York. In his book Alsos, 
Goudsmit wrote about the failure of the Germans to developed atomic weapons, and 
attributed that failure to the inability of science to function in a totalitarian system. To 
make his case, Goudsmit used the same terminology as the critics of Lysenkoism had 
been using, and although there is no direct reference to the Soviet Union in the book, it is 
unlikely this was coincidental: 
German science, as we have seen, was severely handicapped by Nazi dogma. By 
persecuting and exiling all scholars afflicted with the Jewish “taint,” Germany lost some 
of the greatest scientists in the world. In a healthy country, however, such a loss could 
have been replaced in a relatively short time by outstanding scholars who were followers 
of the exiled men. This did not happen in Germany because the effect of the Nazi 
ideology was to make “non-Aryan” sciences like modern physics, unpopular, with a 
consequent loss of promising students. Finally, the instruction of the few students who 
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dared to study the abstract, or “non-Aryan” sciences, progressively deteriorated. Quite 
frequently the Nazis appointed teachers who did not even understand what they were 
teaching. Thus Munich, under the great Sommerfeld, was once the world’s most 
productive university in theoretical physics. When Sommerfeld retired, shortly before the 





Goudsmit argued that the German experience can provide important lessons for scientists 
and policymakers in the post-war world: 
Too many of us still assume that totalitarianism gets things done where democracy only 
fumbles along, and that certainly in those branches of science contributing directly to the 
war effort the Nazis were able to cut all corners and proceed with ruthless and matchless 
efficiency. Nothing could be further from the truth…The failure of German physics can 
in large measure be attributed to the totalitarian climate in which it lived. There are 
lessons we can all learn from that failure…Politics, the interference of politicians in the 
affairs of science, and the appointment of party hacks to important administrative posts, 
is another grave error it would be foolish to suppose was purely a German 
monopoly….The same thing applies to dogma, whether it be political, scientific or 






 The most important and influential voice for science in the post-war United States 
was Vannevar Bush. As the director of the Office of Scientific Research and 
Development during the war, Bush worked closely with members of the scientific 
community, the military, the intelligence community, and the political hierarchy. After 
the war, Bush was appointed the director of the Joint Research and Development Board 
of the Army and Navy (which became the Research and Development Board of the 
Department of Defense after 1947), and his influence at all levels of science and 
government continued. Like Groves and Goudsmit, Bush believed that the Soviet system 
of government would prohibit them from achieving significant scientific innovations or 
technological developments. 
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 Bush had held this view since, at the latest, 1945. In an Interim Committee 
meeting on May 31, 1945, Bush told the membership that the American advantage over 
“totalitarian states” during the war had been “tremendous.” Evidence from Germany had 
demonstrated that the American advantage “stemmed in large measure from [the 
American] system of teamwork and free interchange of information by which [the United 




 In 1949, Bush published Modern Arms and Free Men, in which he explained his 
views on the Soviet system of totalitarian government and their capability to match the 
United States in atomic energy and in general scientific development. Bush argued that 
the Soviet system’s rigidity meant that the United States had years before it would have 
to worry about a Soviet nuclear power: 
It has also been grasped that the task of repeating what this country did under the pressure 
of war is no mean task and requires years of effort. Thus the time has been moved ahead 
when there may be two stocks of bombs of comparable and substantial size, and we have 
more breathing time than we once thought. There is a high probability that there are some 
years, perhaps quite a few, before the question of two prospective belligerents frowning 
at each other over great piles of atomic bombs can become a reality…PP…The time 
estimate depends, of course, on how fully we think our adversaries may put their backs 
into the effort, how much they are willing, or able, to reduce their standard of living in 
order to accomplish it. They lack men of special skills, plants adapted to making special 
projects, and possibly materials. As we shall discuss later, they lack the resourcefulness 
of free men, and regimentation is ill adapted to unconventional efforts. On the other hand, 
their tight dictatorship can order effort, no matter how much it hurts. But we do not need 
an exact estimate; it is sufficient to note that opinion now indicates a longer time than it 
did just after the end of the war. The problem is not altered in its nature by this more 




Bush contended that the weakness of the Soviet Union was its ideological rigidity. 
It could not tolerate diversity, and this was “fatal” to true progress in fundamental 
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science. A dictatorship, like that in the Soviet Union, could not tolerate independence of 
thought and expression, and commitment to the party line prevented science from 
flourishing under such a system. Regardless of individual genius, a great scientist cannot 
operate in a system in which he is sent into exile if he questions the officially position of 
the state, no matter how antithetical to science it might be. The development of a Soviet 
atomic bomb could be the most affected by this type of rigidity: 
The keynote of all this effort was that it was on an essentially democratic basis, in spite of 
the necessary and at times absurd restrictions of secrecy and the formality that tends to 
freeze any military, or for that matter governmental, operation of great magnitude. If 
certain physicists thought the organization was functioning badly in certain respects, they 
could walk in on the civilian who headed that aspect of the effort and tell him so in no 
uncertain terms. The not only could, they most certainly did; and the point is that there 
was no rancor, and old friendships were not destroyed in the process. If civilians and 
military disagreed, as they often did, there were tables about which they could gather and 
argue it out. Punches did not need to be pulled, and no one kept glancing over his 
shoulder. If there were international misunderstandings between allies, and there were, 
they could be frankly discussed, sometimes with more heat than light, but also with a 
prevailing atmosphere of genuine desire to arrive at the conclusion that made sense and 
that best got on with the war. If a young scientist had an idea he did not have to pass it 
through a dozen formal echelons and wait a year; he could talk it over with his fellows 
and with superiors of accepted eminence in his own field and be sure it would be 







The Nazis, on the other hand, were regimented in a totalitarian system. Their able 
physicists should have made better progress than they did, but the German totalitarian 
organization “was an abortion and a caricature.” The German military leadership who 
commanded the program, or as Bush called them “nincompoops with chests full of 
medals,” presided over scientific operations of which they knew nothing. Thus 
communications between the scientists and the military were lacking, and the system 
prevented real innovation. According to Bush, this same type of system is present in the 
Soviet Union: 
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The type of pyramidal totalitarian regime that the Communists have centered in Moscow 
is an exceedingly powerful agency for cold war. It is capable of holding great masses of 
people in subjection, indoctrinating them in its tenets, and marshalling them against the 
free world. It can force its people to enormous sacrifice and thus build great quantities of 
materials of war. It can educate large numbers of men and women in science and 
engineering, construct far-flung institutes, mechanize agriculture, and ultimately create 
mass production of the manifold things it needs. But it is not adapted for effective 
performance in pioneering fields, either in basic science or in involved and novel 
applications. It has many of the faults of the German dictatorship, magnified to the nth 





 Bush concluded his argument with a reassuring message to the American people. 
The Soviet system of government could not possibly advance science with full 
effectiveness. It could not even apply science to war as effectively as the United States. 
Moreover, until the Soviet Union changed its system, and became a free nation, it would 
not be able to alter its pattern of inefficiency or become fully successful, and if it became 





 The detonation of the Soviet atomic bomb on August 29, 1949 should have ended 
all questions about the capabilities of science and industry in the Soviet Union. Yet 
contentious debate about how the Soviets developed an atomic bomb long before the 
United States expected them to continued for almost a decade. Even after the detonation 
of the Soviet atomic bomb, the general picture of the Soviet Union “as a basically 
backward country” did not change.
48
  
The unwillingness to accept Soviet capabilities began immediately after the 
American detection of the bomb. Despite the opinion of the majority scientific and 
intelligence experts who analyzed the data, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson refused 
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at first to believe the Soviets had built an atomic bomb. Johnson instead was convinced 
that a Soviet reactor might have exploded and so he rejected the intelligence findings. In 
response, the Atomic Energy Commission assembled a committee under the leadership of 
Vannevar Bush that included Robert Oppenheimer, former AEC commissioner Robert 
Bacher, the director of the British atomic bomb program William Penny, and Hoyt 
Vandenberg. The committee endorsed the original assessment that the Soviets had, 
indeed, detonated an atomic bomb, but still Johnson and even President Truman doubted 
the conclusion. Finally, on September 23, Truman felt he had no choice but to inform the 
nation that the Soviets had succeed in building a bomb.
49
  
 A little less than a month later, on October 17, the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy met to try and understand how the Soviets had accomplished this achievement far 
earlier than anyone had predicted (at least anyone in a position of power). The committee 
was made up of four senators and four representatives, an equal number from each party, 
and was chaired by Senator Brien McMahon, a Democrat from Connecticut. The 
committee had called CIA Director Roscoe Hillenkoetter to testify to the possible reasons 
why the United States was taken by surprise (and why the CIA failed in its mission). 
Hillenkoetter struggled to justify the estimates the CIA provided to Congress and the 
President, arguing that the estimate about the earliest possible date for the Soviet bomb 
erred only a few months from what actually occurred. To Hillenkoetter’s credit, he 
warned the committee against assuming the Russian scientists “are dumb or something,” 
and that in thinking so “we are just deluding ourselves.” But this line of argument was 
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quickly dismissed by both Hillenkoetter and the committee as they frantically looked for 
hypotheses to explain the discrepancy between estimate and reality.
50
 
 Over the course of the lengthy meeting, which when transcribed ran 137 pages, 
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, with the aid of CIA Director Hillenkoetter, 
detailed six reasons for the Soviet accomplishment, none of which included innate Soviet 
scientific ability. Over the next decade, these reasons, whether taken individually or in 
some combination, would guide the American narrative regarding Soviet science. 
The first culprit for those unwilling to give credit to Soviet science was the so-
called Smyth Report. In early 1944, John Lansdale and Leslie Groves discussed the 
problems of security following the public revelation of the atomic bomb. They wanted to 
limit the dissemination of secret information while at the same time declassify 
information that was already known, could be discovered by any competent scientists, 
and that had no real bearing on the production of atomic bombs. They also wanted to 
create a framework for information secrecy, outside of which it would be illegal to 
operate. That is to say, Lansdale and Groves would release all the information that they 
deemed acceptable for public consumption, and everything else would be off limits. 
Groves asked Professor Henry Smyth, Chairman of the Department of Physics at 




 The report was completed in July 1945, and was titled “A General Account of the 
Development of Methods of Using Atomic Energy for Military Purposes.” Groves met 
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with the Secretary of War on August 2, 1945 to discuss its release. Also attending the 
meeting was James Conant, Bush’s deputy at OSRD. Conant advocated for its release, 
stating that without it, “a serious situation may develop” as information was sure to come 
out about the bomb through various means. Conant stated that the report would give very 
little to the Russians, and “anyone could get the information contained in the report with 
very little money in less than three months.”
52
 
 At first, Secretary Stimson was concerned that the Soviets would need the report 
to help them build their own atomic bomb. He argued their scientists and their system of 
government would prevent them from acquiring this information without the report, since 
“people who lived under oppression cannot be as mentally alert or possess as much 
initiative as those who live in a land of free press and free speech.” In the end, however, 
Stimson was convinced by Groves’ reasoned argument: The United States could either 
release the Smyth Report, and thus set parameters by which all Americans would be 
legally bound to accept, or the accept the alternative, in which the Soviets would receive 
thousands of papers published with a lot more information.
53
  
 The report was released to the public on August 12, a few days after the atomic 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It did not contain any details on how to build a 
functioning weapon. It did not have any illustrations or diagrams that could help the 
Soviet Union repeat what the Americans had done or provide any information about 
industrial or manufacturing processes that were so integral to atomic bomb development. 
Upon its release, the Smyth Report received some press coverage, both positive and 
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critical, but it would later become a source of major contention after the detonation of the 
Soviet bomb. Nearly every article that was published in the days following Truman’s 
announcement of the Soviet bomb contained some mention of the Smyth Report and its 
“role” in providing the Soviet Union with the information it needed to build an atomic 
bomb. Despite the fact that it was intended to prevent information from reaching the 
Soviets, and despite the fact that it contained nothing more revelatory than what, 
according to Groves, “ten graduate students in nuclear science, supervised by one or two 
extremely able scientists of the type that could be found in any of the major countries of 
the world,” could have compiled in little time.
54
 Nevertheless, the Smyth Report 
remained the reason, in many American’s eyes, for the rapid success of Soviet atomic 
science. 
 The second argument was that the Soviet Union began their bomb program before 
1945, perhaps as early as 1943 or even earlier. This meant that the predictions of the 
intelligence community were not wrong, at least as far as how long it would take for the 
Soviets to bring their program from theoretical work to completion. If they had begun in 
1945 after only learning of the bomb’s existence from Hiroshima, then the four years it 
took them to complete their own bomb demonstrated a scientific capability which rivaled 
that of the United States. If, however, they began their program earlier, then they needed 
at least two, but perhaps as many as six, years longer to develop their weapon. This 
would mean the perception of the “backward Soviet Union” could remain intact. The 
New York Times was eager to accept this line of argument. On the front page of the Times 
on the day following Truman’s announcement of the Soviet detonation, an article 
appeared that contended the American estimate of the Soviet bomb was based on the 
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“incorrect assumption” that the Soviet Union did not know about the possibilities of the 
atomic bomb until Hiroshima, and “it would therefore be unwarranted to assume that 
Soviet scientists were completely unaware of the military potentialities of fission until 
1945, and that they did nothing about it until then.” It would be more reasonable, the New 
York Times argued, “to assume that they had been working on it in secrecy since January, 
1939, and that it thus took them ten, rather than four years, to reach the stage of testing 
their first atom bomb.”
55
   
 The third contention was that the Soviets had learned the secrets of the atomic 
bomb through espionage. To be sure, the Soviet atomic program did learn much about the 
Manhattan Project and the British Tube Alloys project through well-placed spies and 
collaborators. But the information they garnered for the Soviet Union could not replace 
qualified Soviet scientists, nor could it compensate for the perceived Soviet weakness in 
industry. Yet many Americans, both the average civilian as well as political and military 
leaders, adopted this explanation, allowing them to blame the Soviet bomb on the 
treachery of some “red” scientists who had become traitors to their country. This 
narrative became even stronger when, in February, 1950, the British theoretical physicist 
Klaus Fuchs confessed to spying for the Soviets. Fuchs had worked at Los Alamos and 
Oak Ridge during the war as a member of the British team, and he worked under Hans 
Bethe in the Theoretical Physics Division, specializing in the process of implosion so 
integral to the plutonium-style atomic bomb. After the war he continued to work for the 
British atomic energy project, and by the time he confessed his crimes, he had had years 
of access to the most important secrets of both the United States and Great Britain. 
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 Fuchs’s arrest led investigators to his currier, Harry Gold, who had been working 
as a spy for the Soviets since the mid-1930s. Gold was apprehended in May, 1950, and 
his interrogation led to the discovery of the Soviet spy ring that included Julius and Ethel 
Rosenberg, and Ethel’s brother, David Greenglass. The resulting media and political 
whirlwind, in which newspapers across the country ran daily stories about espionage 
almost continuously for the three years before the Rosenberg’s were executed (even the 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists followed the scandal), meant it was easy for many 
Americans to accept the premise that Russia had “stolen” the bomb, and not developed 
atomic weapons on its own. Federal Bureau of Investigation Director J. Edgar Hoover 
wrote two articles that appeared in Reader’s Digest in May 1951 and August 1952, titled 
“The Crime of the Century: The Case of the A-bomb Spies,” and “Red Spy Masters in 
America,” in which he argued that, between Harry Gold’s network and Klaus Fuchs, “the 
basic secrets of nuclear fission had been stolen.”
56
  
 A fourth line of reasoning involved the ability of the Soviet Union to acquire 
fissionable material for use in atomic bombs. Most policymakers had taken Groves’ and 
the CIA’s analysis of the paucity of Soviet high-grade uranium at face value, but after 
August 1949, they were forced to provide an answer for their faulty estimation. One 
explanation was that the Soviet’s were able to acquire uranium from North Korea and 
some of its other satellite nations, places where American surveyors had not searched for 
uranium ore, and therefore possible locations for Soviet exploitation. Another story 
argued that the United States itself sent high-grade uranium to the Soviet Union. A New 
York Times article published on December 6, 1949 reported that a former Air Force 
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major, George Racy Jordan, had testified under oath to the House Un-American 
Activities Committee (HUAC) that uranium and atomic information had been sent to the 
Soviet Union in 1943 and 1944 with the aid of Harry Hopkins, a close advisor to 
President Roosevelt. The story continued by implicating Henry Wallace, Vice President 
under Roosevelt at the time, with overruling Leslie Groves to allow the shipments to 
occur. Jordan testified that he witnessed suitcases full of uranium and atomic documents 
marked “Oak Ridge,” together with letters on White House stationary signed “H. H.” One 
of the letters, presumably from Hopkins, said that the writer “had a hell of a time getting 
this away from Groves.”
57
   
 Overall, the testimony to HUAC revealed, according to the article, that at least 
200 pounds of uranium oxide, 220 pounds of uranium nitrate, an estimated twenty-five to 
forty pounds of uranium metal, and an undetermined number of barrels of heavy water 
were sent to the Soviet Union as part of the Hopkins exports. Other shipments by 
American companies included 700 pounds of uranium oxide and 220 pounds of uranium 
nitrate, sales that were made “with full knowledge and approval of the appropriate 
Government agencies,” and the orders were considered routine and not noteworthy at the 
time.
58
 In the companies’ defense, the strategic importance of this material was not 
widely known at the time, and uranium was used in many commercial applications, yet 
the story, and others like it, was enough to convince many Americans that the Soviets had 
used unwitting Americans to support their atomic program. 
 Another premise some Americans accepted, the fifth, was that the Soviets had 
somehow subverted the process of atomic bomb development by ignoring safety 
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considerations and taking shortcuts the Americans would not take. Because the Soviets 
were devious, devoid of God-fearing sensibilities, and operated under an “oriental 
mindset,” they were willing to eschew many of the safety measures included in the 
American process of building atomic bombs. In the October 1949 issue of the Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists, an issue dedicated to understanding how the Soviets built their 
bomb in such a short time, both Bernard Brodie of Yale University and Eugene 
Rabinowitch of the University of Illinois (and the co-founder of the Bulletin) embraced 
this reasoning. Brodie wrote that “many of the refinements introduced into the American 
processes to safeguard human life and capital equipment may have been dispensed 
with.”
59
 Rabinowitch argued that the Soviets had most likely used slave labor for the 
more dangerous tasks, and this could have “considerably reduced the effort by 
eliminating the costly and extensive safety installations provided in all our facilities.”
60
      
 The sixth, and final, explanation was that captured German scientists had done the 
heavy lifting in the Soviet atomic bomb development. Of course, this ignored both the 
fact that the Germans were nowhere near building their own atomic bomb, and also the 
fact that the United States and Great Britain had captured the best of the German 
scientists. Regardless, an article in the New York Times appeared the day after the Soviet 
explosion, titled “German Scientists Held Aiding Soviet,” that reported that about 200 
German scientists had accepted jobs in the Soviet Union and had “contributed the know-
how to the Russian industrial potential in the conclusion of the atomic explosions.”
61
 This 
story was credible to many Americans because, according to historian Clarence Lasby, as 
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early as 1948 the Republicans in Congress had publically attacked the State Department 
and the administration for blocking the immigration of German specialists. The theory 
gained traction in the 1950s, both when critics of the Army accused it of abandoning 
German scientists to the Soviet Union at the end of the Second World War, and then 
again after the launch of Sputnik in 1957. The idea that the Soviets had captured better 
Germans gave comfort to Americans who wanted to attribute Soviet scientific and 
technological achievements to something other than Communist capabilities. According 
to Lasby, “with no specific evidence to the contrary, millions of Americans accepted the 
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As we stepped into the carriage one of the stable-lads held the door open for us. A sudden idea seemed to 
occur to Holmes, for he leaned forward and touched the lad upon the sleeve. 
“You have a few sheep in the paddock,” he said. “Who attends to them?” 
“I do, sir.” 
“Have you noticed anything amiss with them of late?” 
“Well, sir, not much of account; but three of them have gone lame, sir.” 
I could see that Holmes was extremely pleased, for he chuckled and rubbed his hands together. 
“A long shot, Watson; a very long shot,” said he, pinching my arm. “Gregory, let me recommend to your 
attention this singular epidemic among the sheep. Drive on, coachman!” 
Colonel Ross still wore an expression which showed the poor opinion which he had formed of my 
companion’s ability, but I saw by the Inspector’s face that his attention had been keenly aroused. 
“You consider that to be important?” he asked. 
“Exceedingly so.” 
“Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?” 
“To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.” 
“The dog did nothing in the night-time.” 





 Nuclear weapons were the result of the direct application of cutting edge 
advanced science to weapons development. As a consequence, intelligence about an 
enemy nation’s scientific capabilities became an essential component of strategic 
planning. Scientific intelligence, however, was unlike any type of intelligence that had 
come before it. Instead of focusing on tangible threats or existing materials, scientific 
intelligence was designed to predict the potential future ramifications of scientific 
research and development. To do so, scientific intelligence professionals had to evaluate 
the general capabilities of a nation, and then determine whether it had the ability to 
develop atomic weapons. They then used those particular assessments to determine the 
proximity and magnitude of the prospective strategic danger. It was not an ideal process, 
but because of the military impact of nuclear weapons it became an absolute necessity. 
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 This is a dissertation whose subject is scientific and atomic intelligence. Yet 
unlike many dissertations in the historical discipline, it does not evaluate why a particular 
event or process happened in the way that it did. Instead, it takes a historical process and 
attempts to determine why it did not happen in the way it could have otherwise been 
expected to. In short, this dissertation seeks to determine why the dog did not bark. That 
is to say, why was the United States Government unable to create an effective atomic 
intelligence apparatus to monitor Soviet scientific and nuclear capabilities? To address 
this question, this study offers the following conclusions: 
 1) The United States Government assumed that the advanced nature of German 
science favored the success of a serious endeavor to build atomic weapons. As a result, 
the American leadership expended immense resources and effort to determine the extent 
of the German atomic bomb program. Conversely, the United States regarded Soviet 
science as substandard, and it was presupposed that the inferiority of Soviet science 
would prevent the Soviet Union from producing an atomic bomb before the mid-1950s. 
Thus, the United States Government did not place a high priority on discovering the 
status of the Soviet bomb project.     
In 1942 the U.S. scientific, intelligence, military, and political leadership faced 
the unprecedented challenge of creating a scientific intelligence system capable of 
assessing the extent of foreign atomic development. This action was precipitated by an 
acute fear of German capabilities, a fear that originated in an extremely high regard for 
German science.  Because the fear of German abilities was so pronounced, the United 
States Government allowed Leslie Groves to create a strong, centralized, and coordinated 
system of atomic intelligence. In turn, this organization was extraordinarily effective, and 
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capable of providing actionable intelligence that successfully challenged the 
presuppositions of American leadership concerning the German atomic bomb program. 
The same cannot be said, however, when the United States atomic intelligence 
program shifted its attention to the Soviet Union in the beginning of 1945. Instead, the 
Soviet atomic energy program was perceived by many Americans as being incapable of 
accomplishing the task of building an atomic bomb within a few years of the end of the 
war. Many American scientists and governmental officials considered Soviet science 
inferior to American and German science, and therefore most in American leadership did 
not believe the Soviet Union could replicate the success of the Manhattan Project. In 
addition, they widely believed that the Soviets did not possess the industrial capabilities 
to develop atomic weapons. Some also argued that the rigidity of the Soviet totalitarian 
system would prevent the Soviet Union from quickly manufacturing an atomic bomb. 
Regardless of the reasoning, this gave the American scientific, military, and political 
leadership the misguided impression that they had ample time before the Soviet Union 
could catch up with the United States in atomic development, and thus the maintenance 
of a strong, centralized atomic intelligence program was not an immediate high priority. 
Even the detonation of the first Soviet atomic bomb in August, 1949 did not 
convince most Americans to reconsider their perception of Soviet science. In the 
immediate aftermath of the detection of the explosion, the American scientific, military, 
and policymaking elite spread blame widely for the intelligence failure, but refused to 
acknowledge the possibility of Soviet scientific strength as the primary culprit. Instead, 
they latched onto ideas that mitigated the impact of Soviet scientific ability. 
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 2) The centralization of U.S. scientific and atomic intelligence was the key 
component in the success of the American effort against the German atomic bomb 
program.  On the other hand, the decentralization of the post-war scientific intelligence 
apparatus was an immensely significant, if not the decisive factor in the failure of the 
United States to correctly determine the status of the Soviet atomic bomb program.  
When the first U.S. scientific intelligence program was initially conceived by 
scientists, the effort yielded poor results. The American scientists who had taken it upon 
themselves to learn all they could about the German atomic program were not skilled in 
intelligence collection or analysis, and thus were unqualified for the task at hand. At the 
same time, intelligence professionals in the United States did not have the scientific 
knowledge to inform their efforts, and were as equally unsuccessful as the scientists in 
learning the extent of the German atomic program. In addition, the established 
intelligence agencies – the Army’s G-2, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Office of 
Strategic Services, and a number of smaller intelligence agencies within governmental 
organizations like the State Department – did not coordinate their atomic intelligence 
efforts, resulting in significant gaps in intelligence coverage. And since they were not 
under a single, integrated command, parochialism and bureaucratic infighting prevented 
the established intelligence agencies from operating at an effective level. 
 The solution to this problem was to consolidate the atomic intelligence program 
under Brigadier General Leslie Groves, who was well versed in the scientific and 
technological fields of which atomic theory encompassed, and who also had a general 
knowledge of the intricacies of intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination. His 
background in large-scale construction and engineering had trained him to manage 
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complicated tasks and disparate groups, and he had the full confidence of George 
Marshall, Vannevar Bush, and President Roosevelt. 
 Leslie Groves will be remembered for his successful direction of the Manhattan 
Project, and rightfully so. But he should also be given credit as the man most responsible 
for the creation of the first centralized American scientific intelligence organization. 
When he took command of atomic intelligence in the fall of 1943, Groves immediately 
set out to consolidate all atomic intelligence functions under his individual control. He 
acquired the cooperation of G-2, ONI, and the OSS, securing their promises to send all 
atomic information his way. He appointed trusted subordinates such as John Lansdale, 
Robert Furman, Tony Calvert, and Boris Pash to handle the day-to-day intelligence 
operations, each of whom not only was highly competent, but also was fiercely loyal to 
Groves. He exploited British intelligence sources, bringing the entirety of the information 
gathered by the combined Allied atomic intelligence effort under his control. Finally, 
Groves was able to take actions that retarded German progress toward the development 
of an atomic bomb through overt military and clandestine operations. 
 Groves’ centralized atomic intelligence organization was immensely successful, 
and met or exceeded expectations at all three levels of the intelligence cycle. The paragon 
of the collection effort was, of course, the Alsos Mission, which accomplished all of its 
goals and should be considered as one of the most successful intelligence operations in 
history. But the collection efforts of the MED intelligence team were not limited to Alsos. 
Lansdale, Furman, and Calvert gathered information from a wide variety of sources, 
compiling as complete a picture of the German atomic program as was possible and, in 
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doing so, providing the Alsos Mission with all the resources it would need to be 
successful. 
 Timely analysis of German atomic intelligence was equally effective in Groves’ 
centralized system. Highly qualified scientists, such as James Fisk and Samuel Goudsmit, 
were able to give on-site analysis of German atomic developments while deployed with 
Alsos. In addition, the MED intelligence team utilized its own cohort of world-class 
scientists in the United States. As information was gathered, either by the Alsos Mission 
or by the collection efforts of Lansdale, Furman, and Calvert, the assets of MED 
intelligence were able to build an accurate assessment of German atomic development. 
By the time the Alsos Mission reached Strasbourg, Groves’ centralized organization had 
laid the analytical groundwork to prepare MED intelligence for the dramatic revelation 
that Germany was years away from building an atomic bomb.  
 Just as important as the MED intelligence team’s effective collection and analysis 
was their ability to convince American policymakers of the true state of German atomic 
development, and to disabuse the American leadership of their perception that German 
scientific and atomic research would naturally outpace that of the United States. Both 
Vannevar Bush and Leslie Groves trusted the soldiers and scientists of Alsos enough to 
immediately accept the Strasbourg evidence as valid. The trust they in turn had garnered 
with the political and military leadership ensured that the status of the German atomic 
bomb program would be accepted by top policymakers such as George Marshall and 
President Roosevelt. 
Despite its wide-ranging success and years of compiled institutional knowledge 
and experience, Groves’ centralized intelligence system was dismantled after the Second 
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World War, its personnel and resources strewn throughout the various remaining 
intelligence agencies of the U.S. Government. While many of the personnel continued to 
work on atomic intelligence issues, they did so in a decentralized, disjointed manner that 
was not capable of providing policymakers with an accurate picture of Soviet scientific 
development in the atomic field. The resulting atomic intelligence organization failed in 
all three aspects of the intelligence cycle. Collection was done piecemeal, through a 
variety of intelligence organizations, and could not provide analysts with the information 
necessary to produce an accurate assessment of the Soviet atomic program. Without 
adequate raw data, analysts made estimates that were based mainly on wild speculation of 
what they assumed the Soviet Union would and could do. In many cases, these estimates 
were based solely on the American and German experiences, and not in any way based 
on actual information from the Soviet Union. As a result, both military and civilian 
policymakers were given the impression that the Soviet atomic program was not of 
immediate concern, and they could continue to pay it, and the improvement of the 
American atomic intelligence system, less attention than it ultimately deserved. As a 
result, the poor performance of American atomic intelligence meant the faulty estimates 
of the Soviet nuclear program would continue, thereby slowing any measures to improve 
the American atomic intelligence system. 
While the rest of the American national security system was improving (primarily 
as a result of the provisions of national legislation such as the National Security Act of 
1947 and NSC-68), the refusal to give Soviet science the credit where credit was due 
meant that the American scientific intelligence apparatus continued to falter well into the 
1950s. The CIA’s Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) – which was explicitly created 
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to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence concerning enemy scientific 
development – did not become an effective intelligence agency until the 1960s, despite 
the emerging Soviet atomic threat.  
A survey report of OSI released in early 1952 indicated that the American 
scientific intelligence effort against the Soviet Union was experiencing considerable 
problems. It still lacked the necessary scientifically-trained personnel, and their need for 
scientific intelligence went “far beyond” their capacity to collect raw intelligence 
“susceptible of accurate evaluation.” The basic deficiency in OSI’s scientific intelligence 
product, according to the report, stemmed from the “abysmal gaps” in the American 
knowledge of the state of research in the Soviet Union. The survey places the bulk of the 
blame for this failure on a familiar culprit: lack of centralization. This dynamic continued 
to exist not only within CIA, but also between CIA and the military services, where 
rivalries persisted over within whose “exclusive prerogatives” scientific and atomic 
intelligence fell. These inter-service and inter-agency rivalries resulted in fragmented 
collection, disjointed analysis, information not being shared within the scientific 
intelligence community, and ultimately, a continued failure of the system.
2
  
This would not begin to change until after 1957 and the launch of Sputnik. Again, 
the United States was surprised by the scientific abilities of the Soviet Union. This time, 
however, they were forced to accept the realization that the Soviet Union had equaled, 
and in some cases surpassed, the scientific capabilities of the United States. Once the 
American intelligence community reached this conclusion, the rebuilding of an effective 
scientific intelligence apparatus could begin. In 1963, the CIA formed the Directorate of 
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Science and Technology (DS&T), and over the next decade consolidated all of the CIA’s 
scientific and intelligence functions under its auspices. 
3) The scientific and atomic intelligence efforts against both Germany and the 
Soviet Union must be evaluated as a single, continuous program and not as disparate, 
separate programs. This argument forces a reconceptualization of the current 
historiography, whose authors have constructed an artificial line of demarcation between 
the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the post-war period.  For example, 
Jeffery Richelson separates the German and Soviet periods into two different sections of 
his book Spying on the Bomb, and Richard Rhodes separates the periods into two entirely 
different books, The Making of the Atomic Bomb and Dark Sun. David Holloway (and 
others) have assumed that it is possible to understand the Soviet period without first 
assessing the intricacies of the years immediately prior. In each case, these authors have 
incorrectly addressed the subject in several ways: 
First, it is clear that the American intelligence transition from the German atomic 
effort to the Soviet atomic effort occurred months before the end of the Second World 
War. Chapter 4 of this dissertation demonstrates that following the discovery of key 
documents at Strasbourg indicating that the German threat was overblown, U.S. scientific 
and atomic intelligence immediately shifted its focus to the Soviets. This is the point at 
which the second intelligence effort begins, not the end of the war, and the transition 
maintained continuity of function, organization, and personnel.  
Second, the scientific intelligence effort against the Soviet Union was conditioned 
by the experience of the intelligence effort against the Germans. To argue, as some 
historians do, that we can understand the Soviet period without an adequate treatment of 
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the German period is a misinterpretation of the historical record, and needs to be 
corrected. This is particularly true when we consider the fact that the intelligence effort 
against the Germans was constructed without the advantage of precedent. That is to say, 
the intelligence program against the Germans was the first of its kind. It was forced to 
improvise its tactics, strategies, and operational management as the war progressed. The 
intelligence effort against the Soviets, on the other hand, could build upon the trained 
personnel, established functions, operational experience, and institutional knowledge of 
its predecessor. The primary question of this dissertation, of course, is why they chose 
not to. 
Finally, 4) The subject of this dissertation has implications with respect to the 
broader study of the Cold War, and even to present-day national security considerations. 
The detonation of the first Soviet atomic bomb would alter the type of intelligence that 
concerned the Soviet atomic bomb program. Since the Soviet Union had completed its 
development of atomic weapons, and they were no longer in the research stage, the 
Soviet atomic program stopped being the purview of scientific intelligence and became 
technological intelligence. Yet scientific intelligence directed at the Soviet Union would 
remain consequential even after 1949. Other potential Soviet scientific developments, 
such as nuclear weapons delivery systems (like long-range missiles and submarines), 
anti-ballistic missile systems, scientific implications for conventional weapons systems, 
and the improvements in biological and chemical weapons, would continue to be relevant 
to American national security policymakers.    
Yet there is evidence to indicate that the American national security community 
would at first resign itself to the fact that they might never learn enough about any kinds 
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of Soviet scientific research. Instead, the United States political and military leadership 
decided to rely on a security policy that included offensive military buildup (both nuclear 
and conventional), defensive military buildup (missile defense, a strong fighter-
interceptor program, attack submarines for Soviet missile submarine interdiction), mutual 




 The question that remains is whether any American scientific and atomic 
intelligence organization could ever replicate the success of the MED intelligence effort 
against the Germans. In other words, was the successful intelligence effort against the 
Germans an anomaly, and only the result of the culmination of wartime exigency and an 
immense fear of the Nazis? Or does it represent the standard, the model for excellence, 
something that future programs could successfully emulate? The evidence provided by 
the effort against the Soviet Union, along with the failed CIA assessment of the Iraqi 
nuclear weapons program in 2003-2004, and the dissonance within the intelligence 
community in regards to the Iranian and North Korean weapons programs, indicate that 
the success of MED intelligence is difficult to replicate. However, the only period since 
the Second World War that the United States has had a centralized, integrated 
intelligence system in the style of Groves’ MED program followed the attacks of 
September 11, 2001. The entire U.S. intelligence community, including scientific and 
nuclear intelligence, was consolidated in 2004 under the direction of a single individual, 
the Director of National Intelligence. The ability of this centralized organization to 
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correctly assess the status of foreign scientific and atomic development may contribute an 
answer to this debate.   
 While the need to monitor Soviet scientific developments in the field of atomic 
weapons was episodic, and ended once they had developed a functional weapon, 
scientific and atomic intelligence continues to have significant implications for U.S. 
strategic policy. Great Britain, Sweden, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, Libya, 
South Africa, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea would all initiate their own atomic programs in 
the decades following the Soviet nuclear test of 1949. Some have abandoned their efforts, 
but the threat of an unfriendly nation with nuclear capability still remains. The need for 
scientific and atomic intelligence can also be expended to include non-state actors, such 
as terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda that would benefit from the development of a nuclear 
capability. It is the responsibility of modern-day scientific intelligence professionals, the 
descendants of Leslie Groves’ wartime unit, to collect information about these potential 
threats, analyze their implications for U.S. security, and disseminate that information to 
the American policymaking leadership. As long as the acquisition of nuclear weapons is 
appealing to the enemies of the United States, scientific intelligence professionals will 
continue to be an integral asset for American national security. 
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